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Abstract 
The acceptable threshold for privacy is an individual choice, informed by culture, 
tradition and experience.  That it is important, conversely, is self-evident.  We use it to 
moderate personal information disclosure, how we choose to act and dress every day.  
However, the debate about privacy has struggled because of an incomplete scholarship 
that often halts with the question ‘what is privacy?’  Similarly, the affirmative statement 
‘privacy is dead’ is often made without further explanation of what we have lost.   
This thesis provides a clarification of privacy by presenting a formal model and tool for 
precise discussion.  It can be implemented, for example, in a mobile application or 
embedded on a website.  The utility of the formal model is supported by survey 
research of professionals in the field and those with no particular related work 
experience.  The formal model has given us several insights to how privacy behaves 
enabling progress towards an interdisciplinary understanding of terminology.  In 
particular, it demonstrates and solves for the problem of transitivity in privacy because 
it can follow each personal information disclosure as it travels beyond the data subject 
through a network of people, processes and technologies. 
In addition to the formal model and observations about the behaviour of privacy, a 
contribution of this thesis is its review of computer science literature specifically for 
contributions to privacy research, an assessment of current privacy practitioner 
methods, a study of privacy impact assessment practices at Ontario hospitals, and a 
detailed exploration of the possibilities of future work. 
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This work is about privacy.  A person may not be certain what ‘privacy’ is but they care 
deeply about it.  You can prove this by trying to open a locked stall door from the 
outside next time you are in a public bathroom.  The concept of privacy is strong in each 
of us, we mediate what we say, to whom we say it and where.  In mediating 
conversations we are each asserting control over what information we disclose about 
ourselves and others.  That information includes not only our thoughts and opinions, 
but our behaviour itself.  We act, speak and even dress differently when we are at work, 
a pub with some friends or at home alone.  These decisions, to dress, speak and behave 
in accordance with our environment are sprinkled throughout our lives.  In society, 
privacy also has a group preservation function; by allowing people to periodically 
separate from one another, we can remain in relationships (Schwartz, 1968).  We each 
determine how much privacy we need, from whom and when throughout our day.  As 
the days change, so do we, and our privacy preferences accordingly (Westin, 1967).  
The development of computing marked a change in how people interact with machines, 
and eventually with each other.  Indeed, “(t)he prospect of enhanced or changed flows 
of information among people raises many other social psychological issues” (Kiesler, 
Siegel, & McGuire, 1984).  In some cases, computing devices themselves have become 
the source for mediating our conversations and information disclosure choices (Turkle, 
2011).  There are 6 aspects of social psychology in Computer Mediated Communications 
that have a direct privacy impact.  First, easy, rapid communications change the 
quantity, distribution and / or timing of information exchange.  The expectations for 
quick turnaround and fast processing time can lead to pressure to respond, resulting in 
impulsive information disclosures.  Communication through text reduces the 
coordination of communication.  This lack of nonverbal cues, i.e., body language, 
eliminates ongoing context used to regulate, modify and / or control information 




physical space or attributes, which in turn eliminates another cue historically used to 
signal information sharing or withholding.   
Fourth, software does not communicate organizational or relationship hierarchies well.  
Relationships are a key factor for information disclosure decisions (Schwartz, 1968).  
Messages are depersonalized, which can invite more assertive and / or uninhibited 
conversation.  In electronic communication, messages are received by two parties – the 
machine and the recipient – but people do not actively consider the machine in 
communication.  Finally, as technology evolves, the rules for computing behaviour and 
norms are developing.  Office and home, work and personal and formal and information 
language are often blurred together in the same communication.  The impact of 
information disclosures are relatively unpredictable, and remain unknown.  In essence, 
electronic communication has significantly fewer non-verbal and contextual cues that 
would normally be used by people to guide information disclosures.   
This thesis establishes a formal model for privacy.  It approaches the concept as critical 
for human interaction and social health.  It departs significantly from existing work on 
privacy.  The formal model can be used to address the changes made by computing in 
social interaction, it provides a mechanism for people to get the contextual information 
now missing when they make decisions on information disclosure, and it also provides a 
framework for those who study privacy to represent their work in a consistent manner.  
This thesis seeks to make privacy explicit, to allow for reasoning about the subject 
matter and to make the factors surrounding decisions about information disclosure 
unambiguous. 
The remainder of this Chapter introduces aspects of privacy and related work, exploring 
briefly the notion of scientific methods applied to privacy.  A brief description of the 
remainder of this thesis is also presented. 
1.1. Aspects of Privacy 
Privacy is a common yet personalized notion.  While seemingly contrary, it speaks to the 




universal process.  For the group, privacy is culturally specific and used to regulate social 
interaction (Altman, 1977).  Consider, as Altman does, an office environment.  In 
Western society, a closed office door signifies a desire for privacy while an open door 
signifies a desire for inclusion.  Suppose your company decided to switch to an open 
workspace, eliminating offices entirely.  Perhaps to signify a desire for privacy, people 
would begin to utilize headphones or other devices accepted as a signal to others not to 
interrupt.  Similar signals exist in other societies or groups and are used thusly to 
regulate social interaction (Altman, 1977).  No doubt the cultural specificity to the need 
for balance contributes to the many definitions of privacy (for example, (Abu-Gazzeh, 
1995; Sharma, 2005)). 
Privacy can be considered as a marriage of categories: physical, territorial or 
informational.  These overlap conceptually and in practice, as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Aspects of Privacy 
Physical privacy is generally intended to reference the ability of a person to manage 
their own physical body, to choose sexual partners and / or to make medical decisions 
about our own treatment.  Territorial privacy refers to the right of privacy over our 
homes, often referenced in the legal right to protection against unlawful Government 
search and seizure (a right which also covers personal (bodily) and informational 
privacy).  Informational privacy is an ancient notion, beginning with secret ballots in 
voting systems and extending to more recent concepts of privacy on the Internet.  This 






records about ourselves are created and managed by computers in different 
organizations.  This work is concerned with a subset of informational privacy issues: the 
legislated action of personal information protection resulting from disclosure of 
identifiable personal information.a  First, we seek to identify some common themes in 
privacy. 
1.2. Some Common Themes 
The topic of privacy appears in many traditional academic disciplines, and of late, in the 
world of pop culture.  “That is a source of strength, for it raises the profile of privacy as a 
value, an interest and a right” (Raab, 2008).  While by no means comprehensive, we 
attempt to highlight this marker as part of the introduction for the purposes of hinting 
at the range of both scholarly and non-scholarly work outside the traditional sciences.  It 
also serves to inform some of the nuances associated with the formal model.  The 
literature review in Chapter 4 provides a more detailed review of discipline specific 
research found in computer science and professional privacy practice, while future work 
addresses broader concerns and applicability in Chapter 8. 
Researchers in psychology and sociology are often interested in privacy for mental 
health and group dynamics respectively.  Psychology can approach privacy as a 
dependency for establishing social relationships (Magi, 2011).  Sociology and social 
psychology examine privacy from the perspective of the group.  Within that group, 
some scholars examine the impact of privacy deprivation notionally related to 
Bentham’s panopticon and the balance between forced and chosen solitary 
confinement as an expression of privacy (Bentham, 1791; Goffman, 1961).  Others look 
at the threshold necessary for balancing individual needs for privacy against the 
                                                     
a Related privacy issues that are also crimes, such as voyeurism, are not considered in this work.  That 
said, the applicability of the formal model to physical privacy is explored in Chapter 8.  Similarly, other 
privacy protections which come from constitutions, common law or international treaties are not 
legislated per se but may be similarly incorporated in the formal model as described in the future work 




common good (Allen, 1998; Etzioni, 2005).  Gender studies also strongly debate privacy. 
MacKinnon’s seminal work on a feminist theory of the state expresses a strong critique 
of privacy, calling for feminism to explode the private, and see the political as personal 
(MacKinnon, 1989).  Others continue that exploration by examining gender implications 
of the public / private distinction (Gavison, 1992).  Economic researchers also examine 
privacy, studying for example the cost or revenue gained or lost from information 
disclosure (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005; Acquisti, 2004; Berthold & Böhme, 2010).   
Themes on privacy and surveillance appear in modern art in both individual artists and 
exhibits.  Surveillance art is a form of critical social practice, and crosses over many of 
the traditional boundaries that separate art and design (Shanken, 2014).  Generally, it 
uses technology to record a data subject in order to comment on either the process, 
technology or act of surveillance itself.  Vito Acconci’s Following Piece (1969) involved 
following a different person every day until that person ‘entered a private place’.  Other 
works around this time in the United States were presented as commentaries in the 
wake of the House Un-American Activities Committee (Shanken, 2014).  Other exhibits 
from Bruce Nauman, Live Taped Video Corridor (1970) and Peter Weibel’s Observation 
of the Observation: Uncertainty (1976) used closed circuit video to play with notions of 
identity and observation: Robert Adrian and Helmut Mark transformed every television 
set in Austria into a surveillance monitor for a brief moment to transform it in to a 
public communication in the early eighties.  Exhibits dedicated to surveillance art 
appeared in the early 2000, with the CTRL-Space exhibit in Germany.  The Tate Modern 
hosted an exhibit titled Exposed in 2010.  Both were dedicated to interruption of privacy 
by surveillance (Levin, 2001; Serota, 2010).  Watching You, Watching Me organized by 
the Open Society Foundations (2014) demonstrated new ways to interact with 
surveillance, including a tapestry of reproductions of 32,000 photos taken of and by the 
artist (Hasan Elahi).  Sanctum (2014) is an interactive exhibit that requests viewers 
consent to facial recognition scanning and subsequently displays a live feed of publicly 
available data about them.  Modern painters also use concepts of identity and 




still image from a video surveillance camera, one in the woods (The Park, 2005) and the 
other in a bathroom stall aptly titled CCTV (2008). 
The origins of privacy can be traced back to ancient philosophy in Artistotle’s distinction 
between public and private spheres of activity (Everson, 1996).  Privacy can be seen as a 
component of a spiritual relationship between an individual and their religious practice, 
while in a social context it is most often discussed in the context of the protection of 
religious rights by the state, and / or the debate over the separation of church and state 
depending on the country (Lyon & Van Die, 2000; Ritter, 2000).  Privacy themes can be 
clearly identified in classic literature and modern novels.  A few examples, George 
Orwell’s 1984 (and Zamyatin’s We), Alfred Bester’s The Demolished Man,  Zelazny’s Lord 
of Light, John Brunner’s Shockwave Rider, several Philip K. Dick novels, including The 
Minority Report and a Scanner Darkly.  Most tend towards dystopias, but some more 
modern books, such as Brown’s Digital Fortress, praise mass surveillance.  Similarly, 
privacy themed movies span genres (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
2012).  Louis 19, le roi des ondes is a comedy dealing with the reality of reality television 
stardom.  The Conversation, Enemy of the State and Cache are all set in current day, and 
highlight tension between technology and privacy as well as the emotional impact of a 
lack of privacy. 
1.3. Thesis Preview 
People collected personal information before information technology; on paper, the 
most sensitive of which might be stored in a vault somewhere.  Now, much of this 
personal information is in digital form stored on computers that are more likely than not 
connected to millions of other computers.  Even some machine generated data contains 
information is used for things we did not imagine when these computing devices were 
built, including evidence in a court of law where non-repudiation and integrity are 
assumed (tautologically, because it is machine generated).  Computing is about 
connectivity and trust, and no matter what side of the privacy debate one takes, 




Legislation forces us to make largely independent decisions on privacy as personal 
information moves through systems.  It also attempts to confine these decisions to 
different definitions of privacy, depending on the Act.b  These systems must account for 
this legal right and psychological need for people to make defensible decisions on their 
own privacy in the real world.  Yet, guidance from privacy literature is difficult to obtain 
because of the lack of a unified mechanism for representation.  Selected research in law, 
sociology, psychology, economics, computer science and information studies have 
examined meaning, concepts, associated terminology, and balancing risk.  Each 
discipline approaches the issue with its own language, models and assumptions.   
This thesis identifies a formal model that can integrate relevant interdisciplinary inputs 
based on the notion of privacy interest, and affirms that computer science can solve the 
privacy problem of representation.  In doing so, the model applies to both the disclosure 
of personal information in the physical world (paper, for example, handing your driver’s 
licence to a police officer) and electronically (mostly online, for example, signing in to 
your email account using a password).  The goal of creating this formal model is, among 
other things, to standardize the language, model and assumptions behind research to 
drive, enforce and enhance privacy in computer systems.  It further tests this 
proposition to determine if, among other things, a formal model would indeed assist in 
making explicit some of the requirements for making decisions on information 
disclosure that computing has eliminated.  Finally, we circle back to contributions and 
future work across disciplines that this model may assist or support privacy therein. 
1.3.1. Failure 
This thesis presumes that the formal model for privacy is possible; we hypothesize that 
it is possible to isolate ‘privacy’ as a concept.  This is a major step toward understanding, 
and it may fail.  Privacy may be impossible to isolate from other human values and 
ideals such as trust, justice or spirituality.  One of the reasons we have chosen the 
                                                     
b For example, in Ontario, there are five different definitions of personal information and personal health 




modality in this work is that it allows for quick failure.  It does not allow for a detailed 
consideration of, for example, the given harms in an informational disclosure treating 
those as consequences rather than outcomes (as traditional in legal scholarship on 
privacy (Solove, 2005)). 
Further, we presume a formal model is an important step forward in the debate on 
privacy – regardless of discipline – allowing for the ability to discuss privacy in a precise 
and consistent manner.  Aside from the conceptual nuances, the word ‘privacy’ itself 
varies in meaning and rightly so.  Half the world’s population speaks one of 13 
languages,c while the remainder of the world speaks a variety of others.  Computing 
could be a universal language, and the ability to express traditionally social concepts in 
computer models is a possible way to move forward in our understanding and shared 
experiences.  Failing the application to privacy as presented in this thesis is nonetheless 
possible, for example, there are too many definitional complexities, or infinite 
possibilities of combinations leading to decisions on information disclosure.  Or perhaps 
a more complex computational model is required to undertake the scholarship 
described in Chapter 8 (future work).  The effort in this thesis remains important, 
because while it shows that privacy cannot be entirely formalized today, the important 
issues of contextual and experiential specificity can be kept alive alongside the formal 
model.  These are questions which are on the cusp of being dismissed before they can 
well be subjected to inquiry.   
Another justification for this work is the current modality of privacy in computer science 
itself.  Models for implementation of privacy almost solely focus on the ability of the 
computing system to incorporate legal requirements once an information disclosure has 
occurred.  For example, now that I have created an email account, there is much work 
on managing the information I have shared.  However, little or none consider the 
                                                     
c The top 13 languages spoken by half the world’s population are identified in the Swedish 
Nationalencyklopedin include: Mandarin, Spanish, English, Hindi, Bengali, Arabic, Portuguese, Russian, 




original mechanisms for collection, or decision making on behalf of the data subject in 
making the disclosure of their information.  In order to allow such consideration, we 
have to make privacy speak the language of computing.  If that is simply not possible, as 
this thesis may well demonstrate, then the formal model can end much of the debate 
about using legal requirements as a basis for ensuring privacy in computational systems.   
1.4. Contributions 
The research is a unique approach that applies concepts, tools and techniques to 
advance a theory of privacy and a formal model.  It extends the notion of computer 
science aided privacy by introducing decision based thresholds and dynamicity.  The 
formal model created is evaluated against existing methods and adds significant value 
based on principles of scientific theory.   
The formal model also significantly advances the discussion of privacy.  Chapter 7 
outlines eight observable principles for the way privacy behaves, confirming some of our 
existing knowledge and proposing new unique principles based on the formal model.  In 
particular, our work demonstrates and solves for the transitivity of privacy as it is not 
simply a representation of the privacy state of an individual at a given point in time.  Our 
model can follow along each personal information disclosure with every data subject at 
every point in time throughout a day.  It is a tool for allowing systems to think about 
how information is shared along a network of organizations, people and processes. 
As the formalization developed, some additional distinctive contributions were 
identified. 
1. The creation of an information management based framework for classifying 
computing services in respect of the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information.  
2. Evaluation of computational science models in respect of representing 




3. Literature reviews in privacy cross disciplines, thus providing an opportunity 
to computer scientists to understand the differential nature of privacy in 
multiple fields. 
4. The concept of positive and negative thresholds for privacy providing for 
system dynamicity. 
5. Proof, using available evidence, that it is not a common organizational 
practice for healthcare organizations to conduct privacy impact assessments. 
1.5. Thesis Overview 
The work addresses some of the problems described in this Chapter.  The next, Chapter 
2 presents a deeper discussion of the problems in representing privacy, including an 
overview of enforcement patterns in a given jurisdiction.  This Chapter also sets up 
Ontario as a case study for the remaining thesis, although the model is very much 
designed to be applicable in any jurisdiction.  Appendix A in Chapter 11 provides 
additional detail on the problem of a lack of organizational understanding of privacy, 
describing the research process utilized to demonstrate and prove that issue in Ontario.  
Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive survey of literature found on privacy in the 
computer science domain, including research on other representations and models that 
have been used to address various problems in privacy.  Also found in this Chapter is an 
overview of the existing mechanisms used by industry professionals to attempt to 
‘measure’ or quantify privacy and a brief analysis of each. Requirements identified for 
the formal model, the major contribution of this thesis is found in Chapter 5.  Examples 
of the formalization at work are presented, together with discussion of the 
representation.  The discussion of some of the results obtained from the 
implementation of the model are presented in Chapter 6.  We use both the model 
examples and the experiment results together to suggest some privacy behaviours in 
Chapter 7.   
Privacy research is multidisciplinary.  The thesis presents many possibilities for future 
work beyond computer science, and these are set out in Chapter 8.  This Chapter 




impact on different disciplines in looking at privacy.  Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the 
results and discussions presented in this thesis. 
1.6. Summary 
This thesis argues that a formal model for privacy will make information disclosures in 
computing more transparent in the face of uncertainty.  Although decisions on privacy 
were historically made with some degree of uncertainty, computing has removed 
several of the key contextual factors for decision-making.  A knowledge of those factors, 
making explicit what is now implicit / opaque for the user (and arguably the machine) 
enables informed decision-making. 
The development of a formal model that is precise and concise allows for consideration 
of the full range of privacy interests and obligations on behalf of both data subjects and 
organizations. 
The formal model provides a cross-discipline tool for the discussion and clarification of 
privacy.   
The model gives rise to a discussion of whether it is correct or not; and a mechanism for 
modification to reflect the appropriate circumstances thusly. 
We acknowledge there is debate on the methodology employed in this work and that it 
is experimental.   
The next Chapter outlines in detail the problem statement, using Ontario as a case study 






Privacy inquiry is both philosophical and scientific, and comes with the problems 
associated with each type of investigation.  Using a formal model to measure privacy 
and create a scientific theory is based on Popper’s work on scientific contributions 
(Popper, 1967).  Popper sets out structural requirements for scientific theories, such as 
we propose for privacy, including that a theory must be falsifiable.  Each example in our 
formalization stands as an attempt to test it.  The formal model structure makes clear 
the boundaries for which privacy may be tested in its very definition.  Any theory must 
also be simple, so that it has the highest possible testability.  If the formal model fails, it 
will be clear that either a more complex model is required or privacy cannot be 
formalized.  The theory must be repeatable with the same results.  Results from 
experiments carried out to test the model – both theoretical and practical – can be 
easily reproduced using the details provided in the respective chapters.  Finally, the 
theory must be capable of evolution (in keeping with the principle of falsifiability).  The 
formal model presented here is intended to continually be in flux.  Not only is it in need 
of refinement, but also the factor set is not completely identified.  This is not a flaw, 
rather, it is intended to be subject to further refinement to enhance its strength and 
applicability.  There is indeed a distinction between the process and outcome: the 
contribution herein is to the understanding of privacy.  Without a formal model to 
examine and question there would be no further understanding.  The dichotomy of an 
unfinished formal model is a risk, albeit a very necessary one in the pursuit of scientific 
inquiry.  The contribution of the formal model for the theory of privacy is thus: simple, 
repeatable and flexible (or perhaps, finitely infinite).   
As part of the theory and to help the discussion about privacy, we use measurement as 
the core scientific principle.  Measurement is the act of assigning value in a given range 
to decrease uncertainty.  It lends itself to repeatable, scientific processes that can be 
proven.  Measurement is about codification, it can lead to institutionalization of 




replication for the purposes of growth, accuracy and comparison.  Thus, measurement 
meets the objectives and requirements set out by Popper’s rules for scientific theory. 
When there are no real numbers measurement is harder.  The value of privacy is like 
any other psychological or sociological value, it can be measured but those 
measurements are more likely than not representational (Thurstone, 1954).  For 
example, if you have 3 units of privacy, that number is meaningless.  However, if we 
were able to suggest that you had 3 units of privacy in a given context, and when that 
context changed you had more or less units of privacy that may begin to illuminate 
meaningful scientific principles.  We base our formal model on the theory of 
representational measurement for that reason, to highlight privacy impacting choices 
and the changes that occur as a result.  Representational theory is used when numbers 
are correlated (no cause) to other numbers, assigned by rules, such as a finite state 
machine.  In the case of representation, for the purposes of expressing uncertainty in 
measurement, the unit is called a measurand.  A measurand has two parts: (1) an object 
being measured, and (2) a quantity intended to measure (Kacker, Sommer, & Kessel, 
2007).  For privacy, the measurand is the ‘state’ of privacy any given data subject is in at 
the moment. 
Using measurement for privacy goes beyond considering it as a problem to be solved.  It 
provides the basis for a theory for privacy that can be applied across disciplines.  
Traditional policy mechanisms fail in privacy enforcement because they neglect 
consideration of computational requirements, e.g., a policy may require informed 
consent but understanding the computational requirements of information 
management architecture is arguably more complex than such a mechanism may allow.  
Measurement also makes privacy knowledge acquisition easier for both the organization 
and the data subject. 
2.1. Social Threshold 
Privacy research across disciplines touches on some similar themes, spheres of activity, 




values, and the determination that one ‘has privacy’ or ‘does not have privacy’.  This 
threshold is contextually dependent (consistent with Nissenbaum’s theory) on the 
amount of overall privacy available (Nissenbaum, 2009).  Adapting Marsh’s thresholds 
for trust (Marsh, 1994), Figure 2 illustrates this for privacy.  
 
Figure 2: Threshold for Privacy 
An absence of privacy is not the same as being the subject of total surveillance, which 
suggests a negative valuation of privacy is possible.  This thesis is focused on the positive 
valuation for privacy.  Historically we each made a determination about our own degree 
of privacy based on a number of factors such as those described earlier.  Technology has 
changed the availability of those factors, and added new ones described in Chapter 5.  
The notion of this threshold nonetheless underpins the value of privacy. 
2.1.1. Values 
In our work, we chose to represent privacy as a continuous variable over a specific 
range.  While Figure 2 presents the overall schema, our model stays within an even 
narrower range here, [+1,+9].  In a formal model it is demonstrable that small 
differences yield significant outcomes (more or less privacy overall, for example).  The 
notion that the value of privacy is somewhat inflexible or more important in context is 
consistent with this level of sensitivity.  This is further described alongside the factor set 




subjective assessment of their privacy differently, for example, a value of 5 to me might 
be high privacy, while to another data subject it might very low privacy.  To that extent, 
the model disregards the need for stratification at the outset, suggesting that this may 
be a topic for future work.  
Once testable, the formal model may allow observation of anomalies or consistencies in 
the behaviour of privacy that have not been observable prior because they were 
untestable (and therefore not subject to Popper’s refutability principle).  It becomes 
possible to identify privacy behavioural norms.  To that end, experiments have been 
designed to test the model with data subjects to observe behaviour and present those 
results in Chapter 6.  This ‘implementation’ of sorts is a first step towards the 
possibilities presented by using values for formal models in privacy. 
2.2. Concerns about Methodology 
The very subjectivity of privacy is one of the reasons that previous studies have 
withered.  Attempting to base research on one or more definitions of privacy is indeed 
limited.  Think of privacy.  How would you visualize it?  How would you seek to explain 
your expectations and guidelines for information disclosure?  When asked individually it 
is difficult enough for us to conceive of a descriptor for privacy that is clear or concise, 
let alone consistent.  Instead, this formal model starts with a notional idea of privacy 
that is non-discipline specific: that we as individuals have an interest in privacy.  In this 
way, the model may indeed suffer from being closely linked to one concept versus 
another.  The advantage is we are well aware of these biases, and can surface them 
here.  As well, the model can be adjusted to adapt as it is tested and refined.  It is 
possible, then, to devise tests for each definition to determine if the formal model does 
indeed bring people closer to an acceptable point of privacy representation and 
people’s expectations thereof. 
2.3. Concerns about Definitions 
This Chapter and the next present and discuss definitions for privacy, concluding with 




For feminist scholars, the very existence of privacy is a cover for gender inequality (Fox-
Genovese, 1992; MacKinnon, 1989).  Some scholars prefer the group notion of privacy, 
versus the individual rights notion (Altman, 1975).  These are valid arguments and not 
undermined in the methodology or formal model presented herein.  This work does not 
seek out a specific definition of privacy, it merely acknowledges the phenomena and 
associated interest.  Inspired by Marsh, it also proposes an ‘end-state’ approach 
wherein we attempt to define a formal model that behaves the same regardless of 
definition or outcome.  We can test the formal model against multiple definitions from 





3. Problem Statement 
Privacy is difficult because it is legislated.  The legislation is open to interpretation, 
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and people have different understandings of 
concepts such as consent.  This is further complicated by the evolution of networked 
communications, or ubiquitous computing. This thesis sets out to show that 
computational technologies are nonetheless a valid means of addressing the issues 
involved by positing that privacy is important, is currently regulated by different 
legislation (even within the same geographic jurisdiction) and that organizations do not 
understand how to apply privacy rights or fulfill obligations under these laws. 
3.1. Privacy is Important 
Privacy serves four functions in society: it enables personal autonomy, the ability of an 
individual to control when information is released to the public.  It allows for individuals 
to deviate from social or institutional norms.  Privacy allows for self-evaluation.  Finally, 
privacy encourages communication by allowing for limited and protected circumstances 
(Bland, 1968).  It can refer to features in physical architecture, such as a ‘privacy fence’ 
(Abu-Gazzeh, 1995; Booher & Burdick, 2005; Mustafa, 2010; Witte, 2003).  It can 
represent a set of engineering requirements for an information management system, 
such as ‘privacy requirements’ (Anton, Earp, & Young, 2009; He, Antón, & others, 2003; 
Kavakli, Kalloniatis, Loucopoulos, & Gritzalis, 2006; Omoronyia, Cavallaro, Salehie, 
Pasquale, & Nuseibeh, 2013).  It has been trademarked as a marketing feature, such as 
‘privacy by design’ (Cavoukian, 2009, 2012; Cavoukian & others, 2009; Duncan, 2007; 
Felten, 2012).  Moreover, the existence of privacy legislation across the world further 





Figure 3: World Map of Regulatory Requirements (Baker & McKenzie & International Association of 
Privacy Professionals, 2012) 
Countries with privacy legislation use a variety of enforcement mechanisms that are 
constantly evolving.  For some, a Privacy Regulator is appointed.  For others, there are 
civil and / or criminal penalties (Baker & McKenzie & International Association of Privacy 
Professionals, 2012).  For example, in Canada the Office of the Privacy Commissioner / 
Ontario was enacted under the provincial privacy legislation.  In Hong Kong, there are 
criminal penalties for direct marketing.     
In order to comply with legislation, named organizations create a variety of policies, 
standards and procedures.  In some countries, the legislation specifies the need for a 
Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) role such as Canada’s Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) section 4.1.  In other organizations, privacy is part of 
another group (security, compliance or legal for example).  Organizational policies are 
typically managed through traditional program management procedures that are not 
specific to privacy; for example, accountable person, budget assigned, a program of 




Generally Accepted Privacy Principles).   Together, these activities make up a privacy 
management program run by the CPO (or equivalent).  Once the program is up and 
running, there are several mechanisms that may be used to evaluate not only the 
efficacy of the day-to-day operations but also identify any new potential privacy impacts 
to data subjects (as required under legislation).  Typically, a data subject would have no 
visibility or transparency to organizational privacy practices unless required by 
legislation. 
Further public interest is evidenced by press coverage.  June 2013 saw the ‘Summer of 
Snowden’, the beginning of the National Security Agency (NSA) leaks by a government 
contractor named Edward Snowden.  An example of some of these stories are displayed 
in a new timelines in Figure 4, where we can see over a two week period in June 11 
different news stories from 1 news media outlet on the topic. 
 
Figure 4: Al Jazeera's in-depth look back at a year of NSA leaks (“Guardian announces leak of classified 
NSA documents,” 2013) 
As both Government and private sector organizations face increased external scrutiny 
from the press and regulatory bodies around the world, individuals face an increasingly 
complex computational environment that they must negotiate in order to adequately 
protect themselves.  While there are some technical and policy solutions, to date there 





3.2. There is a Lot of Legislation 
Some countries have multiple privacy acts, typically sector or issue specific.  Some 
define ‘privacy’ or refer to informational privacy.  Some use audit for enforcement, 
others are complaint based.  Fines may apply to violations in some legislation, others 
allow for civil or even criminal penalties.  Even within a given country, different rules 
may apply.  For the purposes of scope, we utilize Canada and Ontario as a case study for 
the remainder of this Chapter. 
In Ontario, there are five privacy specific statues, each with different applicability to 
personal information (PI).d  These are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Privacy Legislation in Ontario 
# Statute Year Abbreviation Sector Application Data Type 




2.  Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy 
Act 
1987 FIPPA Public Provincial 
government 
PI 
3.  Municipal Freedom of 
Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act 





4.  Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act 
2000 PIPEDA Private Commercial 
Activities 
PI 
5.  Personal Health 
Information Protection Act 
2004 PHIPA Health
care 
Health care PHI 
                                                     
d There are a number of other statues and regulations that impact privacy across Ontario.  Notably, the 
Education Act contains significant clauses related to the collection, use and disclosure of education 
related data – including a specific identifier called the Ontario Education Number.  The Youth Criminal 
Justice Act, a federal statute, contains extensive requirements for the management of data related to 
young offenders, in particular about the retention and destruction of such data.  These and other statues 
are not mentioned here as they are privacy-specific statutes; rather they are laws intended to govern a 
specific set of services provided by the Government that also contain privacy requirements.  These will be 





Each of these Acts there are exceptions to the rules set out for collection, use and 
disclosure that create further complications.  For example, organizations could be 
subject to mandatory disclosure requirements in respect of lawful access requests.  We 
initially scope our work to establish a core rule set (described in greater detail in Section 
5.5.1) with the idea that more complex decision tables could be established in future 
work (see Chapter 8).  
Among these 5 Acts, there are two different enforcement bodies.  The Information and 
Privacy Commissioner / Ontario (IPC) is responsible for enforcement of FIPPA (#2), 
MFIPPA (#3) and PHIPA (#5).  The Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) oversees 
enforcement of the Privacy Act (#1, and Canada’s oldest privacy legislation) and PIPEDA 
(#5). 
Perhaps the most critical difference amongst legislation is the mechanisms that 
authorize collection of personal information.  There are two types of collection 
practices: consent or notice plus authority. 
Typically, legislation that governs Government activities (#1 through 3 above; Privacy 
Act, FIPPA and MFIPPA) operate using a notice function.  It allows Government to 
bypass consent requirements by providing a notice of collection, which states: (a) what 
information is being collected, (b) the reason for collection, and (c) a contact person to 
ask questions.  This notice must be displayed prominently, for example, in the 





Figure 5: ServiceOntario Privacy Statement (ServiceOntario, 2014) 
PIPEDA (#4 in Table 1) applies to all private sector companies and uses a consent based 
collection mechanism.  If a company wants to collect, use and disclose a data subject’s 
personal information as defined in the Act, they must ask consent first.  The type of 
consent can vary: it may be in writing or oral, and it may be explicit or implicit.  A sample 





Figure 6: Google’s Privacy Policy – Privacy & Terms (Google, 2014a) 
This is Google’s privacy policy, which a data subject must agree to as part of using any of 
Google’s services that require a login.  A snapshot of the consent authorization is Figure 
7. 
 
Figure 7: Mandatory Opt-In for Creating Your Google Account (Google, 2014b) 
Although Google is an American company, this consent mechanism applies in Canada 
and other jurisdictions, and across Google services including YouTube.  In Canada, this 
type of consent is called a ‘mixed consent’, because accepting it allows Google to 
undertake any activity listed in the Privacy Policy (3,450 words in this particular 
iteration) but also notes that additional consent will be obtained for purposes other 
than those listed in the policy.  Thus far, it has not been challenged under PIPEDA to 




3.3. Organizations Don’t Understand It 
Confusion over patchwork legislation and terminology can lead to inactivity in 
operationalization of privacy as a result of the inability to assign roles and 
responsibilities.  If a Chief Privacy Officer is not required by legislation, who is 
responsible for organizational privacy programs, practices and outcomes?  Ultimately, 
each organization decides how best to manage programs and when, or if, to track and 
report on outcomes.  How does a data subject learn about how their information is 
managed at a given organization, and from whom?  Such processes vary substantially 
from organization to organization, as our study on Ontario hospitals demonstrates (see 
Appendix B, Chapter 12).  Without access to, or consistency of, this information, it 
seems unlikely that a data subject could make informed decisions about privacy, or give 
meaningful consent. 
The duality of a privacy professional’s role combined with the variety of organizational 
cultures results in a number of different combinations of depth, quality, breadth, nature 
and application of operational privacy.  Privacy programs have no set criteria, metric or 
descriptive quality.  The same conditions that enable customization bring the lack of 
transparency for the data subject.  How do I know if Hotmail and Gmail manage my 
information in the same way?  Or if they do it differently, how do I know if that 
difference matters to me?  Information provided in privacy policies is often vague and 
lengthy.   
There are other privacy problems that manifest for data subjects when organizations try 
to respond to privacy requirements under legislation. 
Applying privacy legislation to service organizations means that front-line staff should be 
educated and empowered to discuss privacy with data subjects.  For example, when a 
store clerk asks for my postal code, s/he should be able to explain where it goes, who 
has access to it and why.  Moreover, what are the implications for sharing or not sharing 
that information?  Otherwise, a data subject cannot meaningfully provide consent to 




of cloud computing makes consent even more complex, particularly if the cloud services 
are outsourced or sold through a reseller.   
Privacy legislation sets out the rules for managing information, but this is predicated on 
the assumption that the initial collection of PI was lawful and appropriate.  Even then, 
traditional computing schemes like role based access controls are difficult to implement 
in environments where there is a hierarchical service delivery model.  For example, one 
person may work directly with the customer while another is responsible for data input.  
The data subject may assume their point of contact is the only person they are 
consenting to see their data. 
Breach notification requirements (under PHIPA, #5 in Table 1) vary procedurally.  For 
example, characteristics for what constitutes a breach are not set out by legislation.  An 
unauthorized access by a staff person may or may not require notification, depending 
on the organization’s practices and internal policies.  In addition, the mechanisms for 
identifying breaches, for example, back end logging, may increase the risk of breach 
itself by creating more records of PI. 
3.4. People Don’t Understand It 
On the other end of the transaction, data subjects also have to navigate a complex set 
of requirements that change from service to service; for example, what is private by 
default on Facebook may not be on WhatsApp.  Each application and service comes with 
different settings for privacy preferences.  Making things even more complex, for better 
or worse, until 2012 Google had 60 different privacy policies for the various products 
and services it offered (Rao, 2012).  For owners of Social Network Sites (SNS) in 
particular, there is a significant profit motive to make ‘sharing’ as easy as possible, as 
more content and users drive increased ad revenue.  
Finally, as more and more services are available online only, the punitive damage 
associated with opting out is increasing.  For example, renewing a driver’s licence online 
(depending on location) may take less time than in-person wait times.  In addition, the 




services can often be a problem in lower-income and / or rural areas, where Internet 
service can be an added expense or unavailable (Norris, 2001). 
3.4.1. Profit Enabled Sharing 
It is becoming easier for companies to collect data and analyze it, compared to the past 
when everything was paper-based.  For example, social network sites (SNS) are one of 
the most common forms of computer mediated communication (CMC), defined as sites 
that require the data subject is asked to create a profile, identify other users and 
explore the site based on those connections (Ellison & others, 2007).  Such sites 
generate billions of unique data subject visits a month, as displayed in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Billions of Unique Visitors to Top Ten Social Media Sites (“Top 15 Most Popular Social 
Networking Sites,” n.d.) 
SNS focus on enhancing user connectivity.  They do not necessarily inform users about 
the privacy risks associated with increasing disclosure of their PI.  Most SNS do not 
enable a data subject to control what other users may post about them on the site.  In 
one study, 58% of participants report they are ‘very concerned’ that other users may 
reveal PI without their consent online, but 26% report willingness to disclose their 
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Service providers of SNS’ have complete and unrestricted access to the data that users 
post about themselves and others.  They generate profit from providing these ‘free’ 
services by selling advertising based on the specificity of the user profile that can be 
created.  The more data a user shares, the more tailored the advertising can be.  In a 






Figure 9: How Twitter Ad Tailoring Works (Skrivastava, 2013) 
2012 forecasts indicate that US social media ad spending of this type could reach $9.6 





Figure 10: Spending on Advertising (Staff Writer, 2012) 
Similar data for Canada indicates that traditional media are the preferred source for 
product buying research (Staff Writer, 2012).  However, consumers 18-34 are twice as 
likely to turn to trusted social media when conducting the same research.  This 
correlates to a greater investment; in 2011 $2.57 billion went to online spending with 
estimates of $3+ billion by 2013 (Staff Writer, 2012). 
3.4.2. Privacy Policies 
Privacy policies are another supporting instrument that organizations use to explicate 
their information management practices in respect of PI.  Such policies are used by 
organizations to communicate with data subjects; as one maneuvers through websites, 
each different site is guided by a different set of policy expectations resulting in 
numerous policies to review.  Regardless of whether an organization is obligated to use 
consent or notice for collection, it is implicitly required and best practice determined by 
regulatory authorities to present the data subject with a privacy policy.e  
                                                     
e ‘Notice’ as described in section 4 of PIPEDA outlines these principles; subsequent Acts are based on 




Research has sought to evaluate the efficacy of privacy policies, noting that they are 
often unread, when read difficult to understand and generally unsupportive of data 
subject decision-making processes (McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Milne & Culnan, 2004).  
As early as 2007, research indicated 3% of people reviewed online privacy policies 
carefully, noting that policies were too time consuming to read and difficult to 
understand; yet noting that they were more comfortable at sites that have a privacy 
policy (Cranor & Tongia, 2007). 
One particular study notes that the length of the policy is a factor in the infrequency 
with which they are reviewed by data subjects, concluding that data subjects are 
unlikely to understand the privacy risk of disclosing information online (McDonald & 
Cranor, 2008).  There are other structural issues with online privacy policies, first that 
they are designed to be read by a human and include language that is open to 
interpretation.  Websites can include any volume of information in the policy, and 
online it is particularly easy to provide details.  Combined with differences in 
presentation, these factors make it difficult for data subjects to determine how a policy 
may apply and when it might change (Cranor, 2003).  Noting these difficulties, 
alternatives to privacy policies such as P3P have been suggested but have not garnered 
sustained broad adoption for reasons including design challenges (Cranor, 2003). 
3.4.3. Missed Expectations 
Being online not only makes it easier for organizations to share data in privacy policies, 
it also makes it easier for data subjects to disclose more information – or have data 
inferred about their behaviour.  Organizations are incentivized to get privacy right; the 
more a user trusts an SNS for example, the more data they will share and the more ads 
the organization can serve.  Privacy policies may spell out explicit terms of use, yet there 
is still a response when an organization goes ‘out of bounds’ with what user (perhaps 
unstated) expectations are. 
In 2008, a non-profit advocacy group filed a complaint against Facebook under PIPEDA 




subjects, the Assistant Commissioner concluded that 4 of the 11 subjects included well-
founded non-resolved complaints.  In particular, the finding concluded; 
On the remaining subjects of third-party applications, account 
deactivation and deletion, accounts of deceased users, and non-users’ 
personal information, the Assistant Commissioner likewise found 
Facebook to be in contravention of the Act and concluded that the 
allegations were well-founded.  In these four cases, there remain 
unresolved issues where Facebook has not yet agreed to adopt her 
recommendations.  Most notably, regarding third-party applications, the 
Assistant Commissioner determined that Facebook did not have adequate 
safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized access by application 
developers to users’ personal information, and furthermore was not doing 
enough to ensure meaningful consent was obtained from individuals for 
the disclosure of their personal information to application developers 
(Denham, 2009). 
Facebook continues to struggle with privacy issues.  In 2014, the company faced 
criticism for conducting research on 689,000 users in 2012 to manipulate news feeds 
after a research paper was published (“Facebook emotion experiment sparks criticism,” 
2014).  This original research was covered by the Terms of Use every user agrees to 
when they sign up for an account.  Popular response was not favourable, with some 
users commenting “I’m not a lab rat”, “This is bad, even for Facebook” (“#BBCtrending: 
‘I’m not a lab rat!’ ... reaction to #FacebookExperiment,” 2014).  Facebook’s researchers 
took to the site to engage directly with users, provide more details and apologize 
(Kramer, 2014). 
3.4.4. Dissonance 
As demonstrated in Figure 3, many countries have privacy legislation.  Specific to 
Canada, the enforcement of this legislation is largely through complaint mechanisms.  




they file a complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.  This 
process heavily relies on the consumer to be educated about both privacy and the 
bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms available to exercise their rights.  Recent 
industry research demonstrates that consumers may lack the contextual awareness to 
understand situations that may breach their privacy rights as demonstrated in Figure 11.  
For example, although 74% of global consumers reported that sharing of their 
information with third parties constitutes a privacy invasion, privacy policies often 
contain language to cover organizational obligations of disclosure to third parties. 
 
Figure 11: Global Consumer Attitudes to Online Data Collection Practices (“Consumer Attitudes to 
Online Data Collection Practices,” 2013) 
Related, privacy regulatory bodies in Canada often have an educative mandate in their 
founding regulations, which further suggests that informing the data subject about 
privacy rights and obligations is (a) a good thing and (b) requires particular effort.   
3.5. Patterns of Privacy Enforcement 
The less transparent organizations are about their privacy practices, the more difficult it 




information. By being transparent about informational privacy practices in legislation, 
the data subject can make more informed decisions about who and when to release 
their own information. 
Organizations that collect personal information benefit as well; in Ontario, for example, 
where legislative enforcement is generally complaint based, having a happy customer 
means a customer who does not register complaints with enforcement bodies (either 
the IPC or the OPC).  Increasing complaints and inquiries can generally be considered to 
reflect misunderstandings between the data subject and the organization. 
3.5.1. Complaints under the Privacy Act 
In 2009 under the Privacy Act (Canada’s oldest privacy legislation), which governs 
federal Government privacy practices (including the management of employee personal 
information), there were 2,572 inquiries and 665 complaints received.  The next year, 
inquiries dropped to 1,944 and complaints rose to 708.  For 2011, inquiries dropped 
again to 1,310, while complaints rose again to 986.  Over the 2012-2013 reporting 
period, there were 2,599 inquiries (almost double) while complaints increased to 1,458.  
Historical data is provided in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Inquiries and Compliants under Canada’s Public Sector Privacy Legislation (Office of the 
































































































































































































































































1986, 2004, 2005b, 2006b, 2007b, 2008b, 2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b, 2013b, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993). 
The notable spike in complaints in 2003-2004 was notably the result of over 500 
complaints filed from First Nations groups with Health Canada over a consent form.  The 
form was subsequently changed.  
3.5.2. Complaints under FIPPA 
Specific data on complaints filed under FIPPA in first five years of reporting is not 
published.  The significant decrease from the 1995 through 1998 period was due to a 
process change; much of what was previously handled as a formal privacy compliant 
was resolved informally at the intake stage beginning in 1997.  By the time the 25 year 
report was issued, 2,139 complaints had been processed. An overview is provided in 
Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Compliants under Ontario’s Provincial Public Sector Privacy Legislation (Information and 
Privacy Commissioner / Ontario, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
3.5.3. Complaints under MFIPPA 
Complaints under municipal legislation were not recorded until 1991, and specific data 
was not made public until 1994.  By the time the 25 year report was issued (2012), 1,766 

























































































































Figure 14: Complaints under Ontario’s Municipal Public Sector Privacy Legislation (Information and 
Privacy Commissioner / Ontario, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
3.5.4. Complaints under PIPEDA 
Under PIPEDA, the number of complaints has remained relative steady over time in 
recent years.  In 2009, there were a total of 231 new complaints opened and 5,095 
inquiries from the public received. In 2010, the numbers decreased slightly to 207 
complaints and 4,793 inquiries.  In 2011, they rose to 5,236 information requests and 
281 new complaints accepted.  A decrease was evident again in 2012 in new complaints 
filed (total of 220), 4474 information requests were received and 33 breach notifications 
























































































































Figure 15: Inquiries and Compliants under Canada’s Private Sector Privacy Legislation (Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 
2011a, 2012a, 2013a) 
The office also publishes findings and relevant sections of the Act.  A brief review of 
available data, the majority of complaints are based on the consent principle of the 
legislation; in other words, data subjects are expressing unhappiness with how 
organizations are managing their data as stated in consent forms. 
3.5.5. Complaints under PHIPA 
During the first full year under PHIPA, 177 new complaints were opened and 108 were 
closed.  59% of those new complaints involved access or correction to existing records 
of personal health information (PHI).  23% were breaches (19% self-reported, 4% 
initiated by the regulatory office) and 26% regarded the collection, use and / or 
disclosure of PHI.  Over the past 9 years, the overall numbers have steadily increased.  
By 2013, 126 access and correction complaints were opened (7% down from the 
previous year).  Self-reported breaches by organizations were down 3% to 184, while 
officially initiated breach investigations were up 21%.  New individual complaints rose 
















Figure 16: Compliants under Ontario’s Health Privacy Legislation (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner / Ontario, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
3.6. Increasing Data Collection 
As wireless computing functions are increasingly embedded, for example, FitBit for our 
wrists and smart meters for our homes, data collection can originate from every 
electronic device in our environment.  Each one collects or infers some information 
about the humans that interact with that device.  
Visions of future computing environments involve integrating tiny 
microelectronic processors and sensors into everyday objects in order to 
make them “smart”.  Smart things can explore their environment, 
communicate with other smart things, and interact with humans, 
therefore helping users to cope with their tasks in new, intuitive ways.  
However, this digitization of our everyday lives will not only allow 
computers to better “understand” our actions and goals, but also allow 
others to inspect and search such electronic records, potentially creating a 
comprehensive surveillance network of unprecedented scale 
(Langheinrich, 2005). 
This is a unique challenge for privacy because the design purpose of ubiquitous 
computing is to embed seamlessly in to the environment, be it home or office 
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2004).  Control over PI or PHI is much harder to maintain, for the data subject and the 
organization, when we move away from desktops and traditional data centers (Acquisti 
et al., n.d.).  While the legislation is still architected for an environment where 
computers and computing are standout and stand-alone activities.  Figure 17 hints at 
the increasing number of devices to come across industries. 
 
Figure 17: Estimated Number of Internet Ready Devices (Intel, 2009) 
This work hypothesizes that, in such an environment, computers can be used to solve 
the ‘problem’ of privacy just as easily as they contributed to it.  The use of computation 
technologies makes everything easier and faster; we can use these exact same tools that 
are threats of privacy to make privacy itself easier and faster. 
3.7. Workable Models Can Exist 
These types of issues may arise because organizations have treated privacy as a problem 
to be solved (Baker, 2009, 2012; Dribben, 2012; Nissenbaum, 1998; Orcutt, 2012; Pope, 




measuring privacy (see an overview discussed in the Case Study) focus on organizational 
activities. 
However, the multitude of legislation that provides a complex environment also 
presents an opportunity.  These laws, the cases and orders associated with enforcing 
them, describe the actors (organizations and roles) and rules by which they may manage 
PI.  These rules are predictable and generally described as if-then statements.  For 
example, ‘If an Organization of type ABC collects information of type X the information 
must be protected.’ 
In Computer Science, these types of rules could be represented in a finite state machine 
(FSM).  A FSM model can calculate privacy from the perspective of the data subject.  
Inputs can be derived from a set a factors that together provide the characteristics of 
privacy.  Some weighting of the inputs may be required, and will include pre-defined 
factor sets (some binary, some ordinal).  While some inputs may not be possible to 
calculate entirely, representative measurement allows for some number to be assigned 
to differentiate between one state and another.  This thesis conjectures and sets out to 
demonstrate that this kind of representation can be utilized in multiple environments, 
as a mobile app in a networked computing environment (‘ubiquitous computing’) or 
integrated as part of the consent process for a company providing greater transparency 
for the data subject then the consent box presented by Google and others. 
Coming up next, the literature review begins by returning to the abstract themes of 
privacy before reviewing scholarship that impacts directly our formal model.  We 
expand the traditional content for this Chapter by incorporating a review of existing 





4. Literature Review 
Conceptual discussions of privacy start this Chapter, which quickly sets the stage for the 
starting point of privacy research for computer scientists.  Insights in to privacy by a 
variety of scholars are reviewed here, including a presentation of the conceptual 
frameworks developed specifically to support this research.  The work of prominent 
privacy scholars is reviewed where there is a direct impact on the proposed 
representation.  Meanings of privacy are explored.  A cost / benefit analysis of privacy is 
presented.  Personal information as a commodity is explored.  Positive and negative 
thresholds for privacy (public v private) are presented.  Relationships with other key 
concepts in computer science are discussed, and tools currently in use are reviewed.  
Research tools are introduced, explored and analyzed.  
4.1. Academic Literature  
Privacy in the discipline of computer science (CS) is not well bounded.  The literature 
review is grouped thematically to illustrate four different kinds of research: attempts at 
representation, implementation, domain specific matters and artificial intelligence 
(specifically relevant for the model architecture). 
4.1.1. Representation 
CS research that attempts to represent privacy typically takes one of two approaches: 
policy based proposals and / or ontological frameworks. 
4.1.1.1. Policy 
The policy-based research generally falls within privacy policy creation, breaches and 
assessment processes.  Popp and Poindexter focus on the creation of policies, arguing 
for the coordination of security and privacy policies (Popp & Poindexter, 2006).  They 
present a proposal for countering terrorism through information and privacy-protection 
technologies originally part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
research and development agenda as part of the Information Awareness Office (IAO) 
and the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program.  These programs were respectively 




of information used to determine patterns of activity indicative of terrorist plots.  This 
information is both collected and analyzed, and the authors proposed that privacy 
protections can and should be implemented as part of both of these activities.  The 
paper provides quantitative data demonstrating that time spent on the analysis phase of 
intelligence activities can be exponentially increased using IT methods, which also 
eliminate siloes in information analysis (generally agreed to be one of the problems 
resulting in the failure to prevent the September 11 2001 attacks).   
While assessments are a relatively well-researched topic in privacy (in particular outside 
the discipline of CS), there are few privacy breaches studies that go beyond incident 
rates.  Liginlal et al present a unique empirical study on the causality of privacy breaches 
based on the GEMS error typology (Liginlal, Sim, & Khansa, 2009).  The use of traditional 
models of human error from the 1990s fits well with privacy breaches, and results in an 
easily applicable 3 step method for defending against privacy breaches (error avoidance, 
error interception and error correction).  While the authors’ conclusion is not unique in 
privacy policy circles, basically that different systems need to be built differently to 
mitigate the risk of human error, they do present a robust research paper in an under-
researched sub field of policy that can be applied to any industry or sector that is 
involved in information processing activities subject to privacy legislation. 
4.1.1.2. Ontologies 
Three different approaches to privacy ontologies are evident in CS: policy enforcement 
based (Hassan and Logrippo’s ontology for privacy policy enforcement (Hassan & 
Logrippo, 2009a)), industry specific (Hecker’s privacy ontology to support e-commerce 
(Hecker, Dillon, & Chang, 2008)), and general to the legislation (Tang’s privacy ontology 
for interpreting case law (Tang & Meersman, 2005)).  The privacy policy enforcement 
ontology is built on much of the policy-based research in CS, so its applicability varies; 
for example, the ontology proposed by Hassan and Logrippo is based on a set of privacy 
principles specific to Canada so it could only be applied in this jurisdiction.  This type of 




(for preventative policy actions), logic assertions and theme analysis.  A schematic form 
of the model is provided in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Privacy Analysis Tool Schematic (Hassan & Logrippo, 2009a) 
This ontology is somewhat limited because of the jurisdictional construct.  However, the 
use of formalized representation to represent legal requirements shown in Figure 19 are 
helpful in converting legal requirements into the logical assertions required by the tool 
for analysis, including structural, flow and dictionary information. 
 




Curiously, Hassan and Logrippo note that “our approach is far from covering all aspects 
of privacy legislation, in fact we are not even trying to approach such completeness, 
since ethical, social and other aspects can be impossible to represent in logic-based 
semantics” (Hassan & Logrippo, 2009a).  Yet, the process ontology proposed in purports 
to accomplish just that in order to calculate privacy policy enforcement. 
Hecker et al works include similar process ontology, but also includes the entity 
relationships in Figure 20.   
 
Figure 20: Privacy Ontology with Entity Hierarchy (Hecker et al., 2008) 
This four step process results in a process based ontology, which can identify the 
resources and data subject.  Finally, with the addition of the entity, the privacy ontology 
provides the basis for an entity hierarchy.  The success of this approach depends on 
privacy policy abstraction, which the authors propose so that record types, resources 
elements and concept domains are all accounted for.  They note that much of this work 
can be borrowed from other domains, to ease both the database requirements and 
computational processing resources once implemented. 
Hecker et al’s unique contribution to the field is found in the rationale for the privacy 
ontology.  The authors paraphrase; privacy on the web faces massive problems due to 




second the “complex, leakage-prone information flow of many Web-based transaction 
that involve the transfer of sensitive, personal information” (Hecker et al., 2008). 
Tang and Meersman set out to apply ontological technology directly to regulated 
privacy requirements, by linking case law and legislation (Tang & Meersman, 2005).  The 
proposed ontology is set out in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Privacy Ontology Structure (Tang & Meersman, 2005) 
The directive commitment consists of fact proving, syntax interpreting, interpretation 
and justification and fact reasoning to undertake case analysis.  The legal abstractor 
bridges the case parser and the ontology.  The authors describe the data as including 
law retrieval systems with a privacy sub-directive retrieval system and the e-court 
system (to retrieve documents from the court debate system).  The case parser is the 
basis of the legal ontology data.  In this environment, the proposed ontology would be 
represented by fact lexons (extracted from case law) and the directive commitments 
(that tailor fact lexons to ascribing real life application requirements).  Tang and 
Meersman are some of a very few researchers in the ontological field of privacy that 
propose a development environment: DOGMA (Developing Ontology-Guided Mediation 
for Agents), as it separates concepts and relations from constraints, derivation rules and 





While the Popp and Poindexter approach is common within the CS domain, it fails to 
recognize the instances where security and privacy do not converge, and may in fact 
conflict.  While the authors highlight the typical privacy protections: privacy appliances, 
data transformations, anonymization, selective revelation, immutable audit and self-
reporting data, they fail to demonstrate an understanding (as (Hecker et al., 2008)) that 
the best privacy protection is to minimize collection.  Other policy research fails to 
consider the ethical considerations associated with privacy research, suggesting that the 
individuals’ role is minimal.  In addition, the authors do not discuss the business purpose 
behind programs – a critical legislated privacy requirement is the justification for 
personal information collection - and / or question the factual evidence that supported 
the development of IAO and TIA. 
Some similarities exist in ontological approaches.  Each specifies some method of 
formalized representation of legal requirements, which is significant difference in 
privacy – the only legislated area of CS.  They all follow the same steps, outlined by 
Hecker et al, in the creation of the privacy ontology, (1) define a glossary of terms, (2) 
define static model concepts, including resources, entities and relationships, (3) identify 
safeguards to protect resources, and (4) identify the processes that apply.  Problems 
arise upon closer examination.  Hecker et al notes that the very purpose of Web 2.0 – 
information dissemination – is the anti-thesis of privacy.  They explore the concept of 
how generic privacy ontology can be used to remake the architecture of e-commerce 
transactions to be privacy friendly and encourage capitalism, but do not address the 
core question. For example, what is the possibility of re-architecting the Internet as we 
know it, so that Web-based transactions simply did not require the transfer of personal 
information at all? 
4.1.2. Implementation 
The second section is by far the largest in CS, and focuses on presenting technical 
system implementations.  Implementations vary widely, to assist the reader they have 




architecture, applied techniques for online privacy, location-based privacy issues, and 
(as mentioned earlier) a set of papers on artificial intelligence techniques in health care 
(including health information management, user adaptive expert systems and decision 
support systems literature). 
4.1.2.1. Privacy Architecture in Products and Systems 
Guarda and Zannone are among few researchers who suggest an implementable model 
for engineering privacy requirements (Guarda & Zannone, 2009).  Their paper 
introduces the field of “privacy engineering” to describe the current technical efforts to 
systematically embed privacy relevant legal primitives into technical design.  Like the 
work on privacy ontologies (Hassan & Logrippo, 2009) in order to align the privacy 
artifacts, Guarda and Zannone note that aligning enterprise goals with privacy policies, 
data protection policies and user preferences is key.  Picking up on privacy requirements 
engineering, the authors highlight the criticality of this phase by proposing features 
necessary to develop privacy-aware systems.  The authors also provide an interesting 
comparison of EU requirements with US regulations, noting this is a fundamental 
consideration in borderless information flows.   
The Venter et al paper on Privacy Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS) is a unique 
contribution to the field (Venter, Olivier, & Eloff, 2004).  The authors propose a system 
for detecting privacy intrusions on a high level by detecting anomalous behaviour and 
reacting by throttling data access and / or issuing alerts using privacy enhancing 
technologies (PETs), including the Layered Privacy Architecture work that encompasses 
the personal control layer, organizational safeguards layers, private / confidential 
communication layer and the identity management layer.  The PIDS (like traditional IDS 
models) is applied to an unauthorized query case study based on the assumption that 
information is stored in a central networked repository, and the results can be 
monitored and throttled depending on the anomaly profile feature.  Venter et al note 
that the successful implementation of the PIDS depends on a PIDS anomaly profile for 




While Guarda and Zannone and Venter et al focus on infrastructure, the majority of 
scholars in this classification of research focus on specific implementations.   Two of the 
more interesting examples are represented here in Clarkson et al, who present a 
technique for authenticating physical documents based on random, naturally occurring 
imperfections in paper texture (Clarkson et al., 2009) and Jha et al who use genomic 
computation as a case study for developing a privacy-preserving implementation for 
computational biology (Jha, Kruger, & Shmatikov, 2008).  Where Clarkson’s focuses on 
how to authenticate the paper itself – not the content printed on a page – the Jha et al 
work on DNA collection is an inherent threat to privacy.  
The two researchers take oppositional approaches to embedding privacy.  Clarkson 
seeks to create a process which allows for registration and validation of the sheet of 
paper without a central registration authority, thereby minimizing privacy risk.  On the 
other hand, Jha et al state that protecting the privacy of individual DNA when the 
corresponding genomic sequences is available is not realistic, so they choose to outline 
a practical tool to support collaborative analysis of genomic data without requiring 
release of underlying DNA and protein sequences.  The Jha et al privacy protecting tool 
is a cryptographic secure protocol for collaborative two-party computation on data 
using dynamic programming algorithms (edit distance, Smith-Waterman) including 
oblivious transfer and oblivious circuit evaluation.  They test 3 privacy-preserving edit 
distance protocols, and a privacy-preserving Smith-Waterman before generalization to 
privacy-preserving dynamic programming experiments, and conclude by noting that 
performance of the algorithms are tractable even for instances of substantial size as the 
first step towards a practical method for privacy in genomic computation. 
Clarkson et al discuss the privacy implications of the model using undesirable attacks 
such as an optical-scan voting system contaminated by a corrupt election official.  More 
generally, they point out that the ability to re-identify ordinary sheets of paper casts 
doubt on any supposedly private information gathering process that relies on paper 
forms.  In other words, anonymous is not necessarily anonymous because of the 




An additional area of research within the technical implementations centers on 
information retrieval.  Goldberg sets out with the goal of fetching items from database 
servers without the server learning which item the end user has requested (Goldberg, 
2007).  This is a particularly appealing challenge for privacy-advocates as it ensures not 
only end-user privacy, but also subject matter privacy.  This type of information retrieval 
is also discussed in later papers on AI techniques that can be utilize in decision-support, 
and Goldberg notes the importance of specifying the additional requirements that exist 
within the health care domain. 
4.1.2.2. Applied Techniques for Online Privacy 
While Guarda and Zannone touch briefly on online privacy policies and user 
preferences, including the adoption of P3P and the P3P Preference Language (APPEL), 
privacy-aware access control languages, including E-P3P, EPAL and XACML; there are 
other researchers that have an in-depth focus on the use of these techniques for online 
privacy.  Cranor et al study the deployment of the standard W3C platform for privacy 
preferences (P3P) format to assess usefulness to end users and researchers (Cranor, 
Egelman, Sheng, McDonald, & Chowdhury, 2008).  The methodology for the study 
required the analysis of both machine-readable P3P policies and human-readable 
privacy policies; in order to assess both, Cranor et al utilized the Privacy Finder P3P 
evaluator and the W3C P3P Validator.  The policy study also examined, as many 
researchers in this area do, the content of policies (including settings, marketing and 
sharing), industry trends (type of data collected, uses for data collected, data recipients) 
and popular sites.  There is a growing body of work on policy errors, semantic and 
syntactic, which Cranor et al contribute to in this work.  The authors provided a 
thorough analysis of the three critical areas of P3P implementation, and a high level 
overview of each aspect of the P3P protocol with an overall positive conclusion about 
the future of P3P in the context of a forthcoming legislative impetus. 
Other researchers in the privacy policy online environment study the efficacy of P3P as a 
viable technology for privacy protection.  Reay et al uniquely apply signal theory, and 




Miller, 2009).  While the predictions presented are not particularly surprising (P3P 
adoption will remain stagnant, little or no corrective maintenance on invalid P3P 
documents will be undertaken and little or no perfective maintenance will be 
undertaken on P3P policies because sellers are unmotivated) there have utilized a 
unique method for arriving at their conclusion that may provide other insights when 
applied to other privacy / CS questions. 
Kelley et al proposes a new format for displaying the P3P about commercial websites to 
users called a Privacy Nutrition Label (Kelley, Bresee, Cranor, & Reeder, 2009).  The 
paper describes two sets of tests: the first series was used to develop the design of the 
final label; the second used to assess the use of the final label.  The authors conclude 
that the final Privacy Nutritional Label is a more accurate reflection of a given privacy 
policy, faster to use and more pleasurable for the user (Kelley et al., 2009). 
The last two papers are part of many that propose applied techniques in social 
networking to address online privacy.  Narayanana and Shmatikov present a 
methodology that demonstrates how anonymization techniques used by social network 
providers (Twitter, Flickr and LiveJournal) is also easily undone with an error rate of 12% 
(Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2009).  Xiao and Varenhorst explicitly examine Twitter, and 
the inadvertent disclosure of personal information by end users because of general 
unawareness about the functionality of the service (Xiao & Varenhorst, 2009).  
Narayanana and Shmatikov’s work contributes to the growing body of work on the 
importance of a robust de-identification protocol for personal information, while Xiao 
and Varenhorst supply enhanced privacy controls and a new alert function to be built in 
to Twitter. 
4.1.2.3. Location Based Privacy 
Implementation research on location based privacy varies.  Applewhite provides a 
fascinating overview of the evolution wireless technologies and standards as a precursor 
to the discussion of wireless networks and interoperability issues (Applewhite, 2002).  




and more reliable (wireless infrastructure), commenting that location technology can 
now be embedded into wristwatches and pagers, or even implanted under the skin.  
Privacy issues are often disregarded by manufacturers because the technology and 
associated services are optional.  The author points out as these services become 
endemic, commercialization is a natural and predictable result, including personal 
information contained therein, raising some interesting ethical considerations. 
Work on wireless networks by Li et al further highlights the special considerations for 
privacy in this area: uncontrollable environments, sensor-node resource constraints and 
topological constraints (Li, Zhang, Das, & Thuraisingham, 2009).  While privacy has been 
studied in the generic networking domain, these considerations represent a difficulty in 
the extrapolation of that work to wireless sensor networks.  Traditional data protections 
in networking during data aggregation include cluster-based, slice-mixed and generic 
privacy solutions, while context-oriented protections include location based for the data 
source (flooding methods [baseline, probabilistic], random walk and fake sources) and 
the base station (local adversaries, global adversaries and temporal privacy).   
Other researchers tackle specific protocols for location-based services to ensure end 
user privacy.  Zhong et al presents an overview of a variety of cell phone services that 
allow end users to ‘find’ each other (Zhong, Goldberg, & Hengartner, 2007).  The typical 
privacy control has been location cloaking, where the device or a third party cloaks the 
location before giving it to a service provider.  The proposed solution presented by the 
authors is based on homomorphic encryption, using the techniques of public-key 
cryptography; they provide an overview of the Paillier cryptosystem and the CGS97 
scheme.  In the first of the three protocols presented, Louis, the authors described two 
phases where two people can inform each other of their locations in the optional 
second phase of the protocol only if the conditions of the first phase (actual location 
proximity) have been met.  This requires the participation of a third person to undertake 
location matching.  In the second protocol, Lester, the information disclosure is only 
one-way.  The distance between people can be learned, but only depending on context 




protocol, Pierre, builds on the Lester protocol but gives the second person more 
confidence in privacy controls.  If proximity is achieved, information is given but fewer 
details about exact location are presented based on the distance input by the end user 
when they sign up for the service.   
4.1.2.4. Evaluation 
Research on privacy architecture and location based privacy / ubiquitous computing is 
particularly helpful to this work.  Guarda and Zannone provide a unique contribution to 
the field of privacy with an excellent description of privacy engineering concepts, and a 
focus on privacy requirements engineering.  Privacy requirements engineering can be 
used as a basis for comprehensive privacy architecture, such as that provided in Venter 
et al.  Clarkson et al raise an interesting consideration for privacy scholars in terms of 
broadening the concept of identifiability by examining physical characteristics of 
documents.  The model itself presents particularly neat diagrammatic registration and 
validation pipelines.  Conversely, P3P is one way to facilitate an informed online 
transaction.  However, Kelley et al neglect to consider that privacy is a highly context 
dependent issue.  It is feasible that a user may make different privacy decisions in an 
online transaction despite or even contrary to policy because of branding; the 
perception of trust may be more important than the published privacy policy no matter 
how easy it is to read.  Several of the other applied research papers (Narayanana, Xiao) 
posit that anonymity is not a robust privacy-protection using real world examples that 
often involve releasing more information than necessary for re-identification, neither is 
it practical in social networking tools.  Li et al represents an excellent taxonomy of 
privacy-preserving techniques for wireless sensor networks in a logical format that could 
be easily repeated for other technological implementations and systems.  In addition, 
the tabular summary of the privacy-preserving solutions presented is a succinct 
summary analysis that can be used to build on Applewhite’s work and provide further 




4.1.3. Domain Specific 
Some domain topics are specific to privacy and bear inclusion.  Data subjects (or the 
people aspect of privacy) and legislation are considered rarely by CS research.  
Identifiability is a more recently popular area of study. 
4.1.3.1. Privacy Interests 
Logically, there is minimal CS research in the field of privacy law.  Landau, on the other 
hand, presents a business based analysis of American government’s recent report on 
the Patriot Act data mining and surveillance activities and its impact on privacy (Landau, 
2009).  The report is credited with precise details on data mining and surveillance 
typologies, as well as a list of measures on which information-based programs should 
rightly be judged.  Overall, Landau provides a rare positive evaluation of government’s 
work, highlighting a number of recommendations and references that most certainly 
provide the basis for excellent resource materials for future study. 
Greenleaf provides an interesting CS based overview and analysis of the privacy 
framework in the Asia Pacific Rim, with a descriptive focus on the Pathfinder program 
(Greenleaf, 2009).  The researcher details each of the 9 principles as well as their 
strengths and weaknesses, and provides unique and reasonable alternatives to 
increasing data subject privacy protections under development in the Asia-Pacific rim 
countries.  This type of analysis in CS is a corollary for the computational model-based 
approach to extracting legislation and incorporating it into a technical framework 
((Hassan & Logrippo, 2009a)).  The proposed UML-based governance extraction model 
would operate as part of an implemented legal compliance framework in a given 
organization.  The work in this area notes that the novelty of the model lies in the 
classification of legal requirements and the abstraction of the governance model, as well 
as the potential for translating both to a logic-based language for validation. 
4.1.3.2. Data Subjects 
The data subject in privacy is referred to as the person about whom the data relates.  




over their own information in any given system as possible.  Few of the researchers in 
this area of CS mention this principle, although as early as 2003 there were articles on 
considerations of the data subject in pervasive technology computing.  Jacobs and 
Abowd propose a new framework for technologists to consider privacy requirements, 
which may suggest they are better classified in the literature review under systems; 
however their unique contribution is about obtaining a better understanding of the data 
subject (Jacobs & Abowd, 2003).  For technologists, the critical points are: consideration 
of the physical nature of the input stimulus, location origin, sensing location and 
granularity of information produced.  This combination of hardware, software and usage 
factors are the basis of the proposed framework, which is developed based on the 
Terrell’s legal ethics work, itself rooted in metaethics (how values are expressed rather 
than what they are).  The authors’ use of Terrell’s metaethical work is a unique 
contribution to the study of privacy values and the expression therein technological 
systems. 
Beckwith and Halperin et al address the perspective of the data subject in research on 
ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) environments and pervasive computing respectively 
(Beckwith, 2003).  Beckwith immediately notes the tension between the goal for 
ubicomp to be particularly unobtrusive and obtaining informed consent by using a case 
study of sensors in a long-term care facility, citing previous research on user perceptions 
of technology, noting the willingness to accept invasion technology when the data 
subject perceive benefits outweigh risks.  In terms of privacy, Beckwith cites Anne 
Adams model that identifies three factors that determine user privacy perceptions: 
information receiver details, information usage details and information sensitivity.  In 
doing so, Beckwith’s ubicomp study highlights the criticality of general privacy 
awareness and education, and the impact of each of Adams’ model’s considerations – 
plus inference control – on how people make privacy decisions.   
Halperin et al sets out to establish a general framework for evaluating the security and 
privacy of the next generation implantable medical devices (IMDs) while establishing 




access and accuracy criteria, as well as device identification, configurability, updatable 
software and multi-device coordination.  In addition, operators should consider 
auditable operational histories for devices, and minimized power consumption to be as 
resource efficient as possible.  Traditional security controls, such as role-based access 
controls, have to be adapted for wireless communications and the internals of IMDs 
which are somewhat unique.  For example, an availability attack on an IMD could drain a 
device’s battery, overflow its internal data storage media or jam a communications 
channel.  When it comes to privacy, the authors detail requirements such as device-
existence and device-type privacy (Halperin et al., 2008, p. 2).  The authors provide a 
detailed overview of the security and privacy concerns particular to the use of IMDs in a 
patient that transcends jurisdiction and focuses on the technical functionality of the 
device.  Beckwith and Halperin et al arrive at the same conclusion using case studies: 
there is a general lack of education and awareness on privacy by data subjects.   
Castañeda et al note that the value in their study on identifying data subjects concerns 
online is to refine the existing intuitive understanding of privacy, thereby enabling its 
implementation with specificity (Castañeda, Montoso, & Luque, 2007).  The authors 
have presented an easily repeatable methodology for examining each of the individual’s 
conceptual understanding of, and dimensions of, privacy requirements that can be 
adapted for any jurisdiction.   
Dinev et al conclude that their findings are consistent with the notion that government 
initiatives to improve security do influence the use of the Internet by data subjects 
(Dinev, Hart, & Mullen, 2008).  The authors have developed, detailed and utilized a fairly 
robust model (nomologically valid) with detailed repeatability testing to analyze the 3 
privacy concerns identified by prior research which could be repeated for additional 
analysis on other environments to assess privacy concerns of data subjects. 
Using Facebook as an example, Masiello criticizes the conclusion that participation in 
the social Web requires complete transparency and suggests the paradox of choice for 




tools to effectively negotiate trust between users and service providers.  The author 
presents an interesting expansion of privacy that includes consideration of the right to 
not be mischaracterized or surprised by information that is available on the Web.  She 
also cites Lessigs’ that the function of privacy is to remove the burden of defending 
private choices. 
4.1.3.3. Identifiability 
A significant body of research on identifiability has been done; Sweeney’s seminal paper 
on the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population, famously concluded 
that “few characteristics are needed to uniquely identify a person” (Sweeney, 2000).  
Golle revisited, refined and further confirmed this work in his paper (Golle, 2006).  Malin 
et al presents three novel re-identification algorithms that can determine identity from 
previously thought anonymous information such as IP addresses.  By joining unidentified 
and identified datasets, the algorithms can not only identify a person, but also 
collocation individuals.  The paper notes this is a stated objective of homeland defense 
surveillance (in the United States) (Malin & Sweeney, 2004). 
Recent interest in ehealth has spawned a new body of privacy research focused on 
identifiability and trust in medical records systems; Sweeney offers suggestions for 
privacy support of the Nationwide Health Information Network (NIHN) (Sweeney, n.d.).  
A new approach to de-identifying health information found in medical records is 
proposed using a number of detection algorithms.  Regardless of the successful ability to 
remove explicit personal information, Sweeney notes that risks remain in detecting 
implicit information where “an overall sequence of events whose preponderance of 
details identify a particular individual” (Sweeney, 1996).  The case studies in ehealth 
become quite narrow, for example, Sweeney examined identifiability in pharmaceutical 
marketing data in the US concluding that, while health information can be de-identified 
with some success, the general use of inferior de-identification standards in the 
American privacy legislation (Health Information Protection Accountability Act, HIPAA) 





There are significantly fewer papers in the CS domain that focus on either researching 
the data subject, and / or the implementation of law.  These are key drivers for privacy.   
4.1.4. Artificial Intelligence 
The technical implementation papers focuses on AI techniques used in health care.  CS 
health care implementations are unique in privacy because they require an additional 
legislative framework that applies only to data elements that meet the legislative 
definition of personal health information (Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2004).  
Additionally, AI is a highly specialized research area and a branch within CS that aims to 
study and design intelligent ‘agents’ with the idea being that human intelligence can be 
precisely described and simulated by a machine.  Privacy, conceptually, is a fluid 
requirement that is particularly non-deterministic in nature; the techniques and tools 
used in AI research are particularly amenable to privacy requirements as expressed by 
data subjects.   
In the field of AI, health care and privacy, there are three relevant themes for privacy 
representation: health care information management, user-adaptive expert systems and 
decision-support systems. 
4.1.4.1. Health Information Management 
Patel et al provides an overview of the earliest work in medical artificial intelligence in 
the 1970’s, and reiterate earlier claims made by researchers, including that AI in 
medicine must be integrated to the rest of biomedical informatics, and the world of 
health planning and policy (Patel et al., 2009).  Gerard et al apply AI to study the 
feasibility of applying stated preference discrete choice modelling by end users, thus 
demonstrating how AI can be used to manipulate analysis of existing data sets and infer 
additional data (Gerard, Shanahan, & Louviere, 2003).  Canfora and Cavallo examine 
how AI techniques based on Bayesian models can be utilized to protect privacy within 




Patel et al comments that the practical influence of AI in medicine depends on the 
development of integrated environments to merge knowledge-based tools and other 
applications.  Finally, the ability to influence the delivery of health care depends on the 
understanding that medical practices and research are inherently information 
management tasks and must be tackled and supported as such.  To support these 
claims, the authors identify the needs for interdisciplinary biomedical informatics 
education, biomedical networking infrastructures for communications and information 
exchange, and credible international standards for communications and information 
exchange.  Advances in knowledge sharing and integration standards have happened, 
along with the gradual tendency of CS departments to embrace biomedical applications 
work.  On the other hand, Gerard et al present a study that explores the feasibility of 
applying stated preference discrete choice modelling for use in developing breast 
screening participation enhancement strategies – essentially positing that more breadth 
is required in information management, as opposed to the development of additional 
techniques.  Gerard et al stress the need for additional economic information in making 
health care related program decisions, but highlight the lack of available data about 
consumer preferences for program options.  By using stated preference discrete choice 
modelling (SPDCM) this data can be utilized to assist decision-making in the case study 
area (breast screening).   
Canfora and Cavallo focus on the importance of data quality and privacy protection by 
proposing a Bayesian model for online maximum and minimum query audits based on 
probabilistic inferences that can be drawn from released data – which could apply to the 
feasibility study presented by Gerard et al.  They begin by noting that the online 
environment makes data collection on a large scale an easy task, making it important 
and necessary to balance the collection and dissemination of data with the public 
expectations of privacy and legal obligations.  In order to distribute statistical 
information while preserving privacy, data collectors use Statistical Databases (SDB) 




in the database.  The authors propose a Bayesian network as a disclosure control tool 
for SDB, based on probabilistic inferences.   
4.1.4.2. User Adaptive Expert Systems 
Three papers that presented AI techniques for user adaptive expert systems.  Buttussi 
and Chittaro propose a wearable system that supervises physical fitness activity based 
on exercising in outdoor environments (Buttussi & Chittaro, 2008).  Real-time data is 
collected from sensors and merged with professional knowledge to create a user model 
that provides motivation, safety and health advice to the user and the context.  
Beckwith tackles the issue of privacy in ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) environments; 
where the goal is to be particularly unobtrusive (Beckwith, 2003).  He notes immediately 
that the inability to see technology in action raises unique issues for consent, and 
presents a case study of ubicomp in an eldercare facility that uses sensors.  Halperin et 
al set out to discuss the security and privacy implications of implantable medical devices 
(IMD), noting that the understanding of how these requirements interact with and 
affect medical safety and treatment efficacy is limited (Halperin et al., 2008).  This threat 
becomes more real as IMDs become interoperable with a network.  The authors 
establish a general framework for evaluation the security and privacy of the next 
generation IMDs while establishing corresponding criteria. 
The user model in Figure 22 consists of personal information, physiological information 
and user experience data.  MOPET uses three sub-systems to analyze the data: context 
analyzer for raw data acquisition from sensors, user interface which visualizes speed and 
heart rate graphs, and the training expert which provides data based on context 
analyzer and the user model database (by applying rules stored in the knowledge base 





Figure 22: MOPET Data Collection (Buttussi & Chittaro, 2008) 
The researchers did not address the possibility of exploring methods to limit excess data 
collection while still achieving the utility goals of MOPET. 
4.1.4.3. Decision-Support Systems 
Flouris and Duffy presented an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of using AI 
systems in large-scale data sets to extract potentially valuable patterns that deductive 
models may miss (Flouris & Duffy, 2006).  This concept is more generally referred to as 
data mining.  Using statistical algorithms represents an inductive approach, which 
challenges traditional hypothesis-driven data analysis.  Resulting data patterns may be 
useful for discovery of unknown mechanisms.  The authors suggest that AI algorithms 
can provide accurate solutions even when strong co-variation exists between predictor 
variables.  They examine three AI techniques for DSS, including Classification and 
Regression Trees (CART) which allows accurate prediction or classification of cases 
where split conditions occur by generating decision trees; Multivariate Adaptive 
Regression Splines (MARS) which develops models by adding the basic functions that are 
most effective in error-minimizing, thus providing a non-parametric regression tool for 
the development of simple non-linear models, and TreeNet, a pattern recognition 
algorithm that uses stochastic gradient boosting to improve modeling capabilities in 
regression analysis for predicting a response from a set of independent variables using 
decision trees.  Despite success in the use of AI algorithms, the authors note that there 
is a risk that these systems capitalize on chance patterns of errors in the data sets.  
Nonetheless, they conclude that AI systems can effectively reduce the time and cost of 




Corchado et al note an increase in the information available in biomedicine for 
conducting expression analysis, a technique used in transcriptomics (the study of 
messenger ribonucleic acid and genomic information extraction) (Corchado, Paz, 
Rodríguez, & Bajo, 2009).  They proposed a model to integrate cooperative algorithms 
characterized for their efficiency in data processing, filtering, classification and 
knowledge extraction.  This system focuses on the detection of cancerous patterns 
found in the data extracted from exon arrays taken from patient samples.  The data is 
pre-processed and filtered, subjected to clustering techniques, and knowledge is 
extracted using expression analysis.  The proposed model in Figure 23 uses sequential 
form and considers the characteristics of each step in order to achieve an appropriate 
integration. 
 
Figure 23: Proposed Expert System Model (Corchado et al., 2009) 
The authors use pre-processing and filtering techniques to clean the data, including the 
Affymetrix background correction and RMA technique for normalization.  They account 
for control, errors, variability, uniform distribution and correlations.  The clustering 
technique, ESOINN, weights the neurons but introduces a new definition for the 
learning rate to provide greater stability for the model.  CART is used for knowledge 




results of the working model were compared to the results obtained by the data source 
institute using traditional methods.  Validity was confirmed, and the authors conclude 
by suggesting that the ability to work with data from the exon arrays is one of the best 
contributions of the model because of its capacity for selecting significant variables. 
Bichindaritz and Marling present current work in case-based reasoning (CBR) in the 
health sciences (Bichindaritz & Marling, 2006).  CBR is an AI approach that capitalizes on 
past experiences to solve current problems.  This approach is especially of use in health 
care for several reasons: an established history of learning from case studies many 
anecdotal accounts of treatment, few formal treatment models for disease, and among 
others, medicine is a highly data intensive field.  Bichindaritz and Marling apply AI 
techniques in a completely different direction, using them to discuss the efficacy of CBR 
data collection in decision-support systems.  They cite current work on the evolution of 
CBR to assess treatment efficacy using case-based retrieval.  The authors conclude by 
presenting a roadmap for CBR in the future, which includes formalization of CBR in the 
health sciences by studying commonalities starting with case representation formalism.   
Vermeulen et al propose an AI model for to increase the efficiency of patient scheduling 
systems (Vermeulen et al., 2009).  The goal of the model is to present an adaptive 
approach to automatic optimization of resource calendars.  With a less sophisticated 
data set, the proposed model would replace the human scheduler with an automated 
adaptive model, which was tested extensively in a precisely simulated environment.  
The patient arrival simulation was based on stochastic arrivals, and a standard random 
walk.  The resource calendar was set with capacity allocation based on previous testing, 
and the scheduling practice was simulated as is currently managed.  The adaptive model 
was tested based on short term (days) adjustments, and included consideration of 
adaptive urgent scheduling, using a FlexRes algorithm and a Dynamic algorithm.  
Opening hours were adjustable, and the experiments yielded interesting results.  Over 
the short-term efficient use of the scheduler was demonstrably increased even when 
stochastic arrival processes were included.  This efficacy decreased over the medium-




could also be used to make privacy-related efficiency analysis decision-making based on 
enforcement criteria if adapted properly, for example, with a similar data set. 
4.1.4.4. Evaluation 
AI research (as a sub-discipline of CS) is most applicable to the specificity of the model 
development.  Canfora’s model is probably the best example of a privacy protection 
model that can be applied across multiple AI techniques in healthcare information 
management, including those presented by Patel et al and Gerard et al.  Overall, the 
literature in this area tends to reiterate and compile the nuances of AI techniques and 
its application to biomedicine.  As the field becomes more sophisticated and generally 
accepted, the papers will undoubtedly become more sophisticated and prescriptive in 
suggesting models that can be implemented in real world case studies.  In addition, 
research in this area notes but does not suggest mitigation or address the issue of 
appropriate representation of human cognition.  For example, as noted by Patel et al 
there is an overwhelming need to remember that cognitive factors determine how 
human beings comprehend information, solve problems and make decisions – factors 
which cannot be ignored in the application of AI to biomedical informatics problems.  
Misconceptions about laws governing probability, for example, have a dramatic impact 
on the proper selection and utilization of heuristic approaches.  Halperin et al does an 
excellent job of outlining the tension between privacy, security, safety and utility goals 
that must be considered in an AI system.  Safety and utility goals must include data 
access and accuracy criteria, as well as device identification, configurability, updatable 
software and multi-device coordination.  However, again here, the majority of 
researchers seem to confuse privacy and security requirements.  Research on AI in DSS 
tends to be scoped very narrowly.  With the exception of Flouris and Duffy, researchers 
typically do not provide extrapolation of the results of their work that would assist 
others – particularly from an interdisciplinary perspective – in applying these models to 
other environments.  Additionally, researchers in this area largely failed to address even 
the most obvious privacy concerns.  Bichindaritz and Marling’s suggestion of AI systems 




genetic data projects will integrate the genetic profile of patients on their medical 
records; forcing the need for CBR systems that reason with multiple data typologies is 
fascinating but rife with the potential for misuse of patient data.  In addition, the 
authors call for integration of CBR with electronic patient records and information 
retrieval, as well as support for feature and case mining without consideration of the 
multiple regulatory regimes that would contain information management and privacy 
requirements to be integrated prior to implementation.  That said, they do warn of 
potential legal pitfalls about data ownership – but this appears to be more about 
intellectual property rights in research than patient privacy.  Generally, most AI 
researchers failed to address – or understand – the issue of excessive data collection. 
4.2. Existing Industry Tools 
There are typically four ways in which organizations work to evaluate and document 
privacy compliance.  Privacy Audits, Maturity Models and Risk Assessments are typically 
used to inform organizational compliance with privacy laws.  Privacy Impact 
Assessments, on the other hand, are designed to consider the impact to a data subject’s 
privacy – but may or may not be used in that way.   
Each method varies in respect of transparency as demonstrated in Table 2; some final 
documents are intended to be publicly available, whereas others are designed for 
organizational use only.  Visibility of practice also varies; some methodologies are more 
established and tested than others.  Finally, some methods focus more or less on the 
privacy impact to the data subject. 
Table 2: Summary Analysis of Existing Privacy Evaluation Techniques 
Methodology Transparency Visibility of Practice Data Subject Focus 
Impact 
Assessment 
Typically not publicly 
available unless 
requested through 
Freedom of Information 
mechanisms in statute (if 
applicable). 
Guidance on the PIA 
process is publicly 
available from a variety 
of sources, including the 
Government of Canada. 
The PIA is the only 
methodology that is 
intended to focus on the 





Methodology Transparency Visibility of Practice Data Subject Focus 
Privacy Audit Intended for internal use 
and not publicly 
available. 
Guidance on privacy 
audits is publicly 
available and there is a 
standard of practice 
(ACIPA/CICA, GAPP). 
Intended to focus on 
organizational 
compliance with specific 
privacy standards, 
legislation and / or 
regulations.  May or may 
not include agreements. 
Maturity Model Intended for internal use 
and not publicly 
available. 
Guidance on privacy 
maturity is publicly 
available and there is a 
standard of practice 
(ACIPA/CICA, GAPP). 
The ACIPA/CICA GAPP 
models incorporates 
many capabilities related 
to the data subject, for 
example, consent 
mechanisms. 
Risk Assessment Intended for internal use 
and not publicly 
available. 
Guidance on general risk 
management practices is 
publicly available but 
there is no standard of 
practice for privacy risk 
management. 
Intended to focus on 
organizational risk; harm 
to data subject is one 
factor for possible 
consideration. 
 
Each of these methods are applied at discrete points.  Systems, projects and programs 
adapt and change, while the documentation does not necessary get corresponding 
updates.  It is worthwhile to highlight that none have results based evaluations; in other 
words, use of the method itself does not necessarily provide assurance of compliance, 
each are processes not outcomes. 
4.2.1. Privacy Impact Assessments 
Privacy impact assessments (PIA) are a tool practitioners use to address the impact of a 
given program, product or service on the privacy of a data subject, characteristics may 
vary from region to region (Warren et al., 2008).  Notionally the idea of an impact 
assessment dates back to the 1970s, although it may have been in use as early as 1960 
(Clarke, 2009).  These assessments appear in New Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, 
Canada with some limited application in Ireland, Finland and the United States at the 
federal Government level (Clarke, 2004).  Research in these jurisdictions notes the 




general public (Bamberger & Mulligan, 2012; Flaherty, 2000; Oetzel & Spiekermann, 
2012; Tancock, Pearson, & Charlesworth, 2010).   
There are some sector specific PIAs but generally they have the same characteristics as 
follows (International Standards Organization, n.d.).  PIAs are carried out at a point in 
time (as opposed to an ongoing strategy).  They are done either before or during the 
development of a project (as opposed to after, like an audit).  Typically PIAs consider 
privacy beyond just compliance of personal information management required under 
law.  PIAs would present solutions, not just identify problems.  The assessment also 
typically describes the assessment methodology itself (not just the outcome) and 
involved a number of stakeholders and contributors as outlined in Table 3 (Ministry of 
Government Services, Information, Privacy and Archives, 2011).   
Table 3: Roles and Responsibilities for PIAs 
Topic Area Role Responsibility in Respect of PIAs 
Business Processes Business Manager, 
Project Manager 
Relevant business processes, role and responsibilities 
and required resources (i.e., people, processes and 




Engineer, Architect Relevant technology and organizational directives, 
policies and standards 
Security Security Engineer, 
Security Analyst 
Relevant physical, technical and procedural security 
safeguards, and organizations directives 
Information 
Management 
Records Manager Data classification and retention standards within the 
organization or industry best practices that apply 
Legal Issues Lawyer, Paralegal Applicable privacy legislation, regulations, service level 
agreements, contracts, etc. 
Risk Assessment Risk Manager Organizational risk assessment methodology, for 
example, enterprise risk management procedures 
Privacy Privacy Analyst Expertise in issues, principles and applicable legislation 
PIA Methodologies Privacy Analyst Best practices in the industry for conducting 
assessments 
 
In Canada, the Federal Government’s Treasury Board Secretariat has set out a policy, 




These are related but different from the guidelines issued by the Province of Ontario, 
Ministry of Government Services.  Health specific guidelines for PIAs are issued by the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner / Ontario, which again vary.  In the realm of e-
health (loosely considered to be the use of any electronic system to collect, use and / or 
disclose PHI and / or provide health services), there is no specific guidance to assist 
practitioners in applying PHIPA to the intricacies of a networked environment.  While 
PIAs do take into consideration the impact to the data subject, there is no consistent 
methodology (even in the public sector) for evaluating or commenting on the impact.  
There is also no mechanism for evaluating a reasonable expectation of privacy afforded 
to the data subject. 
4.2.2. Privacy Audits 
The Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP) were developed by the American and 
Canadian Institutes of Chartered Professional Accountants (AICPA/CICA).  The principles 
are used by Certified Public Accountants (CPA) for audit purposes, and to support the 
implementation of privacy programs with some degree of rigor.  The principles 
themselves are based on key concepts extracted from local, national and international 
laws and regulations.  Some aspects of the principles also include best practices 
(American Institute of Chartered Professional Accountants (ACIPA/CIPA) & CA, 2009).  
AICPA/CICA also make available a number of supporting tools, checklists and controls to 
assist CPAs in using the principles to evaluate organizational compliance with the 
principles (which are the foundation of privacy legislation in Canada and the US, as well 
as some parts of the EU).  
Audits are typically done after a system has been designed, or is operational, to check 
for organizational compliance.  They may also be used in conjunction with risk 
assessments to inform how organizations prioritize compliance with privacy legislation.  
Privacy audits do not address the impact to data subjects as a result of non-compliance, 





4.2.3. Privacy Maturity Models 
ACIPA/CICA also developed a privacy maturity model, based on GAPP and the Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM) framework (American Institute of Chartered Professional 
Accountants (ACIPA/CIPA), n.d.-a).  The purpose of a maturity model, generally, is to 
document the evolution of an organizational program.  Specific to privacy, maturity 
models can be utilized to evaluate how an organization is evolving to becoming 
increasingly compliant with the legislative requirements.  A Privacy Maturity Model 
builds on the CMM maturity levels (Luckevich, 2012);  
1. Ad Hoc – procedures or processes are generally informal, incomplete and 
inconsistent; 
2. Repeatable – procedures or processes exist, but not fully documented or 
applied; 
3. Defined – procedures or processes are fully documented and applied; 
4. Managed – reviews are conducted to assess control efficacy; or, 
5. Optimized – regular reviews and feedback are used to continuously improve 
controls. 
Each capability would have a description under each level of maturity; so the model 
allows for the maximum level of customization.   
Similar challenges to the PIA methodology would exist in terms of achieving wide 
acceptance and standardization (Reddy & Venter, 2007).  The underlying assumption of 
a maturity model is that not every organization would have at the optimized level of 
maturity to achieve an acceptable level of compliance; the use of this tool indicates that 
the goal of the organization is not 100% compliance with any particular legislative 
framework.  In addition, this model is not typically applied to the actual level of privacy 




4.2.4. Privacy Risk Assessments 
A risk assessment focusses on a quantitative or qualitative value of privacy risk (aka, 
non-compliance) related to a given situation and a recognized potential outcome 
(positive or negative).  Generally, privacy risk assessments are evaluations based on a 
potential risk related to privacy that an organization wishes to avoid, such as regulatory 
inquiries, negative press coverage, harm to reputation and / or costs associated with 
breaches (American Institute of Chartered Professional Accountants (ACIPA/CIPA), n.d.-
b).  Notably absent is the potential harm to a data subject associated with these harms, 
or civil or criminal penalties in a given country. 
4.3. Analysis 
A representation of privacy is based on theories of social science and information 
science.  Dicey’s research sets out the basis for presuming privacy interests through the 
creation of laws (Dicey, 1897).  Second, Shannon’s theory on digital communications and 
storage sets out the basis for measuring information (information theory) (Shannon, 
1948).  Yet, there is debate on the approach to privacy in academic and practitioner 
spaces which have been reviewed here.   
The proposed methodology is an experimental view of how privacy works and may be 
formalized, but it also relies on the diversity of the work that has already been carried 
out.  None of this work has sought to formalize and measure privacy; privacy has 
traditionally been seen as belonging to one discipline or another.  This work changes 
that view, seeking to create an interdisciplinary solution.  There are two possible 
problems with the thesis.  First, the application to computer science may seem trivial.  
Second, the bounding of the problem may be prove to be suspect.  Both of these are 
deliberate design choices.  The use of computer science methods is unique, and 
intended to extend the discipline.  The simplicity of the formalization is intended to be 
bounded within the framework of a specific law.  Simplicity allows for greater 





5. Formal Model 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that a Finite State Machine (FSM) computational 
model can be used to represent privacy for the data subject (not the data owner).  We 
theorize that all data subjects have a current state of privacy at a point of time, and the 
sharing of personal information causes a change in that privacy state.  Requirements for 
the model can be derived from processes and procedures in existing industry tools as 
reviewed in Chapter 2.  These requirements can be mapped to different models to 
identify the best fit so that it is informed by industry practices.  
5.1. Finite State Machines 
This Section provides a general description of FSM that assumes the states are already 
defined.  Each of the states incorporates the relevant details of each individual, where 
each state is the possible privacy state of the data subject.  These states can be generic 
for each person, but some people might add additional states.  The transitions from one 
state to another happen as a result of an event, for example, new legislation in the same 
region, when the person moves from one jurisdiction to another or when a person 
shares personal information about themselves.  The current privacy state of the data 
subject in the system might not change with certain events but each event requires a re-
calculation to determine if there is a change in state.  Obviously, the sum total of all 
events cannot be covered.  However, the framework is open to additions in states as 
well as events that trigger changes in states. 
Using an FSM to represent privacy necessitates calculating privacy from the perspective 
of legislative compliance only: the data subjects’ actions and information is either 
protected under legislation (private) or not (public).  The starting state in the FSM is 





Figure 24: Theoretical Application of an FSM 
The acceptability of the state would depend on the data subject: for some people under 
certain circumstances, public is an acceptable state.  For other data subjects under other 
(or the same) circumstances, public is not an acceptable state. 
There exist three types of FSM: (1) Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA), (2) 
Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) and (3) ɛ-NFA.  A DFA has one start where 
computation begins and is the only possibility to implement FSM. A transition in DFA is 
only from a state to a single state on a specific input. NFA allows for a transition from 
one state to multiple states on a single input compared to DFA and is not possible to be 
implemented. In ɛ-NFA, we can make state to state transition on ɛ input (no input). 
These transitions are done spontaneously without looking at the input string. The ɛ-NFA 
is not possible to be implanted as well. The NFA and ɛ-NFA are easy to design and may 
have exponentially fewer states than DFA. A ɛ-NFA design can be converted to NFA and 
then to a DFA design for implementation.  A DFA is a 5-tuple, (Q, ∑, δ, q0, F) 
(Almehmadi, 2014): 
 Q is the set of states. 
 ∑ is the input alphabet.  
 δ is a transition function that tells how an automaton moves from state to state. 
 q0 is a start state. 







The alphabet is a finite state of symbols in language for any FSM, as string over an 
alphabet S is a list, each element of which is a member of S and the length of string is 
equal to the number of positions.  For example, the empty string ε is a length 0.   
5.2. Privacy States 
The notion of privacy states was originally conceived in 1967 rooted in legal scholarship 
(Westin, 1967), linked to a theory that focuses on the types and functions of privacy 
within a limited-access approach (Margulis, 2003).  Privacy is contextually significant for 
individuals, who seek to control how and when to achieve the right balance in one of 
the four states: solitude, intimacy, anonymity and reserve (Westin, 1967).  A brief 
overview is provided in Table 4 (Cranor & Tongia, 2007). 
Table 4: Westin's States of Privacy 
State Description 
Solitude A data subject is free from observation and separated from a group. 
Intimacy A data subject is part of a small, defined and agreed upon unit. 
Anonymity A data subject is free from identification but still in public. 
Reserve A data subject creates a barrier against sharing information. 
 
This thesis expands on this notion, applies it to a computational context and proposes 
more nuanced states of privacy for a data subject, where a data subject may exist in 
different states at any given point in time depending on the context.  The states are 
defined in Table 5. 
Table 5: Expanded States of Privacy 
State Physical Self Digital Self Example 
Private Existence is unknown Existence is unknown A child hiding 
Unidentified Existence is known No identity data A shadow 
Anonymity Existence is made aware Limited identity information An organ donor 
Masked Existence is visible Linkages to identity are 
concealed 
A financial donor 
De-identified Existence is unconnected Non-specific identity 
information is known 
Unpublished identity 
information is available 
about a patient in a study 
Pseudonymous Existence is connected but 
accuracy is unreliable 
Identity data could apply to 
multiple persons 
Reference to common 
characteristic, e.g. female 




State Physical Self Digital Self Example 
Confidential Existence is connected but 
limited distribution 
Limited identity data 
available to defined person in 
a certain role 
A doctor with access to her 
patient's records 
Identified Existence is connected with 
unlimited distribution 
Data is available with few or 
no controls 
Social networking sites 
Public Existence is completely 
transparent 
Digital self is livecast, online 
and cross referenced 




The transitions in a FSM highlight the issue of information flow and the change in 
privacy state as a person shares or redacts personal information about herself.  In 
paper-based systems, when information is collected it stays in a specific physical place 
and format.   As a data subject interacts with more electronic devices, wearables and 
the like, more personal information becomes recorded and available about them. 
As a data subject shares or redacts personal information the FSM allows for the 
representation of those potentials in a privacy state.  Transitions toward to less private 
states are represented when a data subject shares personal information, triggered by an 
information disclosure event; of which there are three possible types: 
1. A data subject discloses personal information about themselves or their property 
2. A third party discloses personal information about a data subject or their 
property 
3. A networked device infers personal information about a data subject or their 
property 
Intentionality behind disclosure is not of interest for the purposes of demonstrating 
calculability in the current work. However, it may be an important matter for future 
work to reinforce the contextual notion of privacy. It may be well-intentioned, 
accidental or malicious. In all respects, the disclosure reveals information about a data 
subject and may be calculated based on what has changed in the data available about 
the data subject. 




1. Information about a data subject or their property is redacted 
2. A protective mechanism is used to protect information about a data subject or 
their property 
As above, the intent of redactions and protective mechanisms is not of interest in the 
current work, only efficacy.  A non-disclosure, failure to disclose or providing 
misinformation (lying) may or may not result in a transition.  See future work, Chapter 8 
for additional discussion.   
5.4. Computing Transitions 
We theorize that all data subjects have a current state of privacy at a point in time, and 
the sharing of personal information causes a change in that privacy state.  The factors 
involved in the context of that specific event of sharing of personal information will 
together determine the next privacy state, as in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25: Theoretical Calculation of Privacy 
An information redaction or refusal to disclose personal information results in no 
change to the current privacy state, while an information disclosure results in the data 
subject landing in a new place.  The formalization is powerful because it allows us to see 
such changes.  In particular, the formal model enables the ability to comprehensively 
examine all redaction and disclosure methods.  Having that knowledge enables us, 
regardless of background or discipline, to break down both the disclosure of personal 
information and the steps involved in said disclosure.  By making explicit transactions 
that were previously implicit, we can consider also begin to consider additional data 
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personal information disclosure decisions (Kiesler et al., 1984; Riva & Galimberti, 1998; 
Schwartz, 1968). 
Given that a data subject is in a certain privacy state at a specific point in time, a 
transition from one privacy state to another might happen as a result of divulging or 
redacting personal information about the subject (Figure 25). Each of the data factors 
introduced here will play a role in deciding what would be the next privacy state for the 
data subject. A state transition can be expressed as: 
Next_Privacy_State =  T (Current_Privacy_State, Legislative Rule Set, Source of 
Personal information, Consent Profile, Action, Type of Personal Information, 
Recipient, Information Management Services) 
 Where 
 Next_Privacy_State ∈ { Private, Unidentified, Anonymity, Masked, De-
identified, Pseudonymous, Confidential, Identified, Public} 
 Current_Privacy_State ∈ { Private, Unidentified, Anonymity, Masked, De-
identified, Pseudonymous, Confidential, Identified, Public} 
 Action ∈ {Release, Redact} 
 
A detailed description of the remaining factors is presented in the following Section. 
5.5. Factor Set 
In our model, there are 5 factor sets in the computation of a privacy state and the 
transitions between these states. These sets are summarized in Table 6.   
Table 6: Summary of Factor Sets 
Factor Category Description and Rationale for Inclusion 
Legislative Rules The laws of a given region that apply to the data subject in a given 
transaction of personal information. 
Types of Personal Information To apply the appropriate definition of personal information and 
categorize all types 
Privacy Preferences To classify data subjects by privacy preferences and provide for 




Factor Category Description and Rationale for Inclusion 
Information Management 
Services 
Accounting for the functionality of a given computational system 
that may necessitate privacy invasion (by design) 
Source of Personal Information To incorporate consideration of machine generated data that 
becomes personal information 
 
Each of these factors contributes to the data subject’s ability to obtain and / or retain 
privacy in a given situation.  Some of these factors are out of the direct control of the 
data subject, for example, machine services, while others are subject to indirect 
influence in a given context, for example, legislation. 
5.5.1. Legislative Rules 
Privacy is legislated, so the rules will be country specific and situation specific.  Although 
they impact a data subject’s privacy, they cannot be controlled by the data subject.  The 
context of the calculation for privacy will change depending on the location of the data 
subject; and therefore the rules that will apply as the data subject discloses their 
personal information.   
Different jurisdictions will have different legislation and circumstances for the 
application of privacy rules.  Using Ontario as an example, there are 5 privacy acts that 
may apply.  To sum, the nature of the organization in respect of the distinction between 
private and public sector must be considered.  In the private sector, PIPEDA will apply, 
and in some cases PHIPA; public sector organizations will be guided by the Privacy Act, 
FIPPA, MFIPPA and PHIPA.  Table 7 provides additional details. 
Table 7: Summary of Ontario Privacy Legislation by Applicability 




Federal government or work 
undertaking  
Data subject is engaged in providing federal 
Government service, for example, enrolled in 
the armed forces 
If Ontario provincial 
government activity 
Provincial government agency / 
board / commission or Ministry 
Data subject is engaged in receiving provincial 
Government service, for example, driver’s 
license  
If Ontario municipal 
government activity 
Municipal government agency / 
board / commission or Ministry 
Data subject is engaged in receiving municipal 





Context Organization Description 
If Ontario commercial 
activity 
Private sector company Data subject is engaged in purchasing a good or 
service from a company, for example, 
purchasing groceries 
If Ontario healthcare 
activity 
Health information custodian Data subject is engaged in receiving healthcare, 
for example, filling a prescription 
 
It is possible that multiple rule sets could apply in any given situation, for example, the 
data subject may be engaged in commercial activity in an Ontario hospital such as 
purchasing a coffee in a Tim Horton’s in a hospital lobby.  The PHIPA rule set would 
apply to any video surveillance while the PIPEDA rule set would apply to the transaction 
of the coffee purchase.   
The existence of laws suggests that society has a privacy interest (DeCew, 1997).  When 
considering the geography of Ontario, as above, there are five laws that set out the rules 
for personal information management.  Largely, rules are established considering both 
role and context that bind those regulated to specific actions in respect of the data sets 
that are covered by the Acts. The rule set described in Table 8 would require updating 
alongside any legislative changes. 
Table 8: Summary of Rules 
Legislation Rule Sections Total Rules to Apply 
Privacy Act Section 4 through 6; Section 7 through 9 Apply 46 rules for managing PI 
FIPPA Section 37 through 49 Apply 51 rules for managing PI 
MFIPPA Section 27 through 38 Apply 51 rules for managing PI 
PIPEDA Section 5 through 9; Schedule 1 Apply 113 rules for managing PI 
PHIPA Section 10 through 17; Section 29 through 
50 
Apply 234 rules for managing PHI 
 
The rule sets outlined in Table 8 deliberately do not include requirements for managing 
consent preferences of the data subject. Consideration of data subject’s consent is 
outlined further in this Section.  While the initial collection of consent is a rule, the 
remaining rules governing consent are not applicable to the calculation of the user’s 
privacy per se.  Rather, they are operational guidelines for the organization to follow as 




13.  (1)  A health information custodian shall ensure that the records of 
personal health information that it has in its custody or under its control 
are retained, transferred and disposed of in a secure manner and in 
accordance with the prescribed requirements, if any. 2004, c. 3, Sched. A, 
s. 13 (1). 
The more of these rules that apply, the more privacy protection a data subject has 
under the law.  Some of those protections result in more information disclosures, others 
less, others with restrictions.  In order for the privacy calculation to be meaningful, it 
needs to move with the data subject as personal information is disclosed or withheld 
through interactions with other parties as the law requires.   
5.5.1.1. Decision Tables 
Defining the state transitions for calculation purposes is required for each legislative 
regime, and each action taken with the personal information.  Each privacy Act sets out 
different rules that are context and role specific.  For calculations purposes, a separate 
decision tree or table is necessary to represent the sum total of options available to 
each data subject under each Act.  When it comes to handling personal information, 
there are a finite number of actions that an organization (or representing agent) may 
take, including: 
1. Collecting personal information, either from the data subject or a secondary 
party about the data subject; 
2. Accessing personal information, such as opening a data subject’s file or 
electronic record; 
3. Using personal information from a data subject’s record to take an action; 
4. Disclosing personal information about a data subject to another party (internal 
or external to the organization that is holding that information); 
5. Disposing of a data subject’s personal information in electronic or paper form; 
6. Retaining personal information about the data subject, in accordance with a set 




7. Archiving (or saving) the data subject’s personal information. 
A different table for each action listed above is necessary to fully represent each rule set 
to guide state transitions depending on the rules in each Act.  Returning to Ontario as an 
example, the total numbers of tables for each Act by action are listed in Table 9. 
Table 9: Overview of Required Decision Tables for Ontario 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
FIPPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
MFIPPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
PIPEDA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
PHIPA Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 5 
 
In order to identify each rule set completely for PHIPA, 5 different decision tables or 
trees are necessary for collection, access, use, disclosure, disposal, retention and 
archiving rules contained in the Act. 
Using this breakdown, it is also possible to see how privacy rules may come from other 
sources than traditionally named or referenced privacy legislation.  For example, the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act contains requirements related to retention of criminal records 
of young people but not any of the other categories.  This type of analysis can be 
applied to any other statue, legislation or regulation to identify any rules related to 
personal information that may impact a data subject’s state of privacy. 
Returning to the example of Ontario set out in the Problem Statement, under the 
Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) rules (see Section 1.3.2) are 
                                                     
f In Canada, access generally refers to the right of the data subject to access their own personal 
information as held by the government, a healthcare organization, federally regulated undertaking or 
commercial entity.  This reflects a country specific notion that access to personal information and privacy 
rights related to that information are related.   





established to manage personal health information (PHI).  These rules govern collection, 
use and disclosure practices.  Within disclosure, some rules set out required disclosures 
while others are permitted only with consent.  Table 10 demonstrates how the rules for 
collection under PHIPA can be mapped by role.  The data subject under PHIPA is 
referred to as an ‘individual’, while the remaining roles are other parties. 









Temporal Networks and 
Relationships 






Agent Yes Consent Yes Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Yes 
Assistant 
Commissioner 
No No No No No No No No No 
Attorney for 
Personal Care 
Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority 
Attorney for 
Property 
Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority 
Board Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority 
Commissioner No No No No No No No No No 
Guardian of 
property 
Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority 
Guardian of 
the person 
Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority 
Health Care 
Practitioner 




Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent 




No No No No No No No No No 
Minister Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 
Partner Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Relative Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Researcher Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent 
Research 
Ethics Board 
No No No No No No No No No 




Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority Authority 
Law 
Enforcement 
Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent 
Third Party No No No No No No No No No 
Individual 
Employer 








Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent Consent 
 
PHIPA defines some roles (indicated above) while other that are implicit in the Act are 
made explicit for calculation purposes.  Instead of restricting the data type to ‘personal 
health information’ as defined in the Act, the table uses a broader definition set out in 
the factor set (see 1.4.1).  Possibilities for information disclosure are represented as 




replicated for use and disclosure requirements, and then for any other subsequent 
privacy Act in Ontario as mapped out in Table 18.  For data subjects in different 
countries or legal jurisdictions, different rule sets can and will apply. 
5.5.1.2. Example 
The example in Figure 26 demonstrates how a data subject’s state of privacy changes as 
they disclose personal information necessary to book an appointment to see a doctor in 
a hospital. 
 
Figure 26: Applied Privacy Calculation 
By making a phone call, the data subject initiates the move from the state of private 
towards less privacy, subsequently disclosing their name and medical issues.  Figure 26 
demonstrates how those information disclosures decrease the amount of privacy for the 
data subject, moving their state of privacy to Unidentified, Masked and then De-
identified as more identifiable information about the subject is shared.  The data 
subject’s final state of privacy is even less, at Confidential, as the receptionist at the 
doctor’s office decreases the state of privacy by accessing and entering information to 


















(PHIPA, Recipient1, Unconcerned, Disclose,
Measurement Characteristics,
Recipient2, Software)





Table 11: Step-by-Step Application 






Action PI Type Recipient Info Mgmt. 
Service 
End State 


















































































To take the example further, a patient record contains detailed information about the 
data subject.  Disclosure of that record, or additional uses, further decrease the data 
subject’s state of privacy (with or without explicit knowledge at the time).  As shown in 
Figure 27 below, the state of privacy changes when researchers access the patient’s 
digital record. 
 
Figure 27: Continued 
Here, we can see that the data subject’s privacy profile (consent preferences) follow the 
personal information through multiple processes.  More details on the use of a privacy 
























Each of these steps is detailed in Table 12. 
Table 12: Step-by-Step Application 





























































































5.5.2. Personal Information Types 
Privacy legislation sets out definitions for personal information, personal health 
information and applicable roles for each role set out in the legislation.  Personal health 
information can, in some sense, be considered a subset of personal information 
although legislation treats them as separate data types.  The Privacy Act, the oldest 
privacy legislation in Canada applicable in Ontario had a detailed definition of PI, notably 
applicable to records in ‘any form’, with a strong focus on identifiability (Department of 
Justice Canada, 1985).  FIPPA and MFIPPA both bounded the definition similarly, using 
the terminology ‘recorded’ and ‘identifiable’, but also expanded it to include sexual 
orientation (Ministry of Government Services, 1990a, 1990b).  PIPEDA’s definition of 
personal information is significantly less detailed and open to interpretation, including 
the similar terms of ‘identifiable’ but disregarding the use of ‘recorded’.  PHIPA specified 




organizations (health information custodians), and further clarified recorded form to 
included ‘oral’ records (Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2004). 
Each of these definitions is set out in brief for purposes of computing in Table 13. 
Table 13: Summary of Legal Definitions 
Data Type(Privacy Legislation) Definition of Personal Information  
Personal Information (Privacy Act) Information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in 
any form including, without restricting the generality. 
Personal Information (FIPPA)  Recorded information about an identifiable individual. 
Personal Information (MFIPPA) Recorded information about an identifiable individual. 
Personal Information (PIPEDA)  Information about an identifiable individual, but does not 
include the name, title or business address or telephone number 
of an employee of an organization. 
Personal Health Information 
(PHIPA) 
Identifiable informationh about an individual in oral or recorded 
form. 
 
With this context, identifiability is considered to be information that can be used to 
distinguish or trace identity either alone or when combined with other information that 
is linkable to a specific data subject (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2010).  Therefore, to 
calculate privacy a measurement of identifiability is required: how much privacy exists in 
based on how identifiable a data subject is.  Identifiability goes beyond a specific list of 
data elements, for example, name, and includes any information that could be used 
alone or in combination with other data to identify a data subject. Under the 
identifiability umbrella, some types of data can reveal more about a person than others. 
For example, with a few notable exceptions, a phone number is less privacy invasive 
than a unique identifier (like a social insurance number).   
Identifiability relates to privacy in other ways. First, the more information that is 
revealed, the more identifiable a data subject is. Second, in an electronic environment, 
machines often generate additional identifiable data about human behaviour and 
actions at a specific point and time with or without the system user or data subject’s 
                                                     
h Information that identifies an individual or for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances 




knowledge. Third, in an online environment, both user generated and machine 
generated data are transmitted, yielding more personal information. For these reasons, 
it is worthwhile to consider the type of personal information / personal health 
information present in calculating a privacy state, as presented in Table 14 (Marx, 2006). 




Data points that answer the question of ‘who are you’.  For example, ancestry, legal 
name, biometrics, password or alias. 
Shared 
Identification 




Data points about the data subject’s physical location and how to reach them.  For 
example, residence, email address or wireless computing information. 
Temporal Data points about the details of activities, for example, date and time. 
Networks and 
Relationships 
Data points about the data subjects’ relationships and proximity.  For example, 
family, marital status, roommates and co-present people at a given location. 
Objects Data points about the physical and territorial objects around the data subject.  For 
example, vehicles, communications devices and buildings. 
Behavioural Data points that describe a data subjects’ behaviour.  For example, the use of a given 
device, employment history, buying patterns and judgments (criminal / civil). 
Beliefs, Attitudes 
and Emotions 
Data points that indicate a data subjects’ state of mind.  For example, whether a data 
subject is happy or sad.  
Measurement 
Characterizations 
Data points that describe the data subjects’ history and future.  For example, credit 
rating, test scores, drug and psychological tests, medical records. 
 
5.5.2.1. Example 
The more of each data type that is present in a given exchange, the less privacy a data 
subject is likely to have.  For illustrative purposes, consider an example where a data 
subject is interested in obtaining internet service from a telecommunications provider at 





Figure 28: Applied Privacy Calculation 
By sharing more and more personal information, the data subject has moved towards a 
public state and away from a private state.  The step-by-step process is described in 
Table 15. 






































































































(PIPEDA, Data Subject, Pragmatist, 




(PIPEDA, Data Subject, Pragmatist, 
Disclose, Ind. Identification,




















5.5.3. Consent Preferences 
As discussed in the Problem Statement, privacy legislation in Ontario is divided by notice 
or consent mechanisms.  User preferences for the latter are irrelevant; the data subject 
has no choice in the collection, use and disclosure of their information.  However, for 
laws that utilize consent mechanisms (PIPEDA, and to some extent PHIPA), data subject 
preferences can impact privacy. 
Consent may be given in written or oral form, implicit or explicit.  Methods for consent 
vary depending on the legislation, context, rights of the data subject, and obligations of 
the organization.  For our purposes, the methodology is irrelevant.  Consent may be 
given for any activity related to the management of personal information (PI) and 
personal health information (PHI): collection, access, use, disclosure, disposal, retention, 
archiving.  Generally, data subjects may provide unlimited consent, limited consent or 
no consent.  Options may be considered in any combination as the framework in Table 
16 allows. 
Table 16: Data Subject Consent Options Matrix 
 Collection Access Use Disclosure Disposal Retention Archiving 
Unlimited 
Consent 
X       
Limited 
Consent 
  X     
No Consent    X    
 
A data subject may, for example as depicted in Table 16, provide unlimited consent for 
the collection of their personal information, limited consent for the use and no consent 
for disclosure (beyond the collecting organization).  Logically, if the data subject 
provides no consent for collection, then no consent is provided for use and / or 
disclosure.   
5.5.3.1. Example 
By choosing to consent to the End Use License Agreement (EULA) for a website in order 
to register for an online rewards program, for example, the data subject has moved 




agreeing to have their browser history and behaviour tracked in accordance with 
whatever the terms are set out in the EULA.  This change is demonstrated in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29: Applied Privacy Calculation 
This example is intended to be generic, as EULAs and Terms of Services for website can 
vary.  Details are provided in Table 17 at a similarly high level. 
Table 17: Step-by-Step Application 






Action PI Type Recipient Info Mgmt. 
Service 
End State 












Unidentified PIPEDA Data 
Subject 

















Setting aside that example, determining consent preferences in any given situation 
requires more nuance than a typical website visit may allow.  For example, in 
healthcare, a data subject may have numerous types of consent preferences that must 
be honoured by the organization involving the actors, organizations and data types.  A 
complementary option exists. 
Existing research from the 1990s categorizes the general Western public in one of three 
different privacy profiles.  These profiles are based on 4 questions provided to data 
subjects in survey format (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005). 
















2. Do you strongly agree that business organizations seek excessively personal 
information from consumers? 
3. Do you strongly agree that the Federal government is invading citizen’s privacy? 
4. Do you agree that consumers have lost all control over the circulation of their 
information? 
Scoring system for the scale results in one of three profiles (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 
2005).  If the data subject answers ‘yes’ to 3 or more of the questions above, they are 
assigned a Privacy Fundamentalist profile.  2 privacy concerned answers (‘yes’ to 2 of 
the questions above) result in the assignment of the Privacy Pragmatic profile.  1 or no 
privacy concerned answers results in the assignment of the Privacy Unconcerned.  The 
results of the brief survey of data subject privacy preferences based on well-established 
privacy categories may provide a reasonable substitute for consent, as presented in 
Table 18. 
Table 18: Consent Preferences by Privacy Profile 
Privacy Profile Definitions Default Consent Preferences 
Fundamentalist ‘Yes’ to 3 or more questions No consent for collection, use and 
disclosure 
Pragmatist ‘Yes’ to 2 questions Consent for collection and use, no consent 
for disclosure 
Unconcerned ‘Yes’ to 1 question, or 0 ‘yes’ 
answers 
Consent for collection, use and disclosure 
 
Data subjects would be able to adjust consent at a more granular level as the 
computational model evolves and adjusts under each rule set as allowed. 
5.5.4. Information Management Services 
Computers are generally accepted to be an effective tool for information management; 
used to organize, retrieve, acquire and maintain information. As technology evolves it 
becomes cheaper and more convenient to store information for longer periods of time. 
Increasingly, machines can read information without human intervention. Regardless of 
evolutions in technology, when it comes to managing information about an identifiable 




Alongside of those discrete functions are specific privacy considerations, some of which 
are more significant than others.  The use of these machine services in combination or 
alone can move a data subject from one state of privacy to another. Each factor in the 
set has a qualitative risk value associated based on how much identifiable information 
can potentially be disclosed through the use of the service.  The risk assignments in 
Table 19 are intended to provide a demonstration of how a value could be assigned, not 
to suggest a deterministic risk.   
Table 19: Summary of Privacy Risk by Services 
Services Description Privacy 
Risk 




Backup Services that retain copies of data subject information, for example, 
iCloud 
Low 
Hosting Any type of computational service that involves holding on to data 
subject PI, for example, cloud storage 
High 




Registration Services that involve registering, for example, Facebook Medium 
Software Any type of application that is intended to be installed on a desktop 




Content that is served to the data subject online via any platform, for 
example, desktop, tablet or phone 
Medium 
 
These factors are only applicable where the state of privacy is calculated for an 
electronic and / or virtual world; for example, where a data subject wants to calculate 
their privacy state while sending an email, or when using a word processor.  The relative 
weight of each factor is represented above as a representation number to indicate the 
more a networked machine service manages personal information, the less privacy is 
afforded to the data subject.  The higher total service factor set in Table 19, the more 
likely the individual will move to a lower state of privacy. 
5.5.4.1. Example 
Consider in Figure 30 the example of a data subject visiting a social networking site.  






Figure 30: Applied Privacy Calculation 
In this case, our data subject may not be aware that use of the live chat feature 
decreases her ability to control her own information while simultaneously allowing the 
online service provider to track, in real-time, her conversations (both content and 
recipients).  Details of this interaction are provided in Table 20. 
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Here, it is possible to see that the additional use of machine services impacts the data 
subject’s privacy (in this case, in real-time).   
5.5.5. Personal Information Sources 
Computer forensics is a discipline based on the analysis of data held and / or retrieved 
to support the use of that data in evidentiary procedures. Based on a survey of the basic 
subject of the science of computer forensic techniques (Jansen & Ayers, 2007), this 
factor set lists the ways that a computer system can generate identifiable information 




















Any device will generate additional data that may also be part of disclosing identity 
characteristics about data subjects. For example, in using a word processor, a machine 
will generate metadata about the document that includes the author’s name, workplace 
and perhaps even how much work effort the author put in to the document by 
displaying the number of edits.  While not always considered personal information 
under legislation, these values can be calculated.  As with all data, identifiability 
becomes a statistical question (Samarati & Sweeney, 1998; Sweeney, 2000, 2001).  
There are three sources summarized in Table 21 
Table 21: Sources of Personal Information 
Source of PI Description 
Device Generated Data generated by the devices is unlikely to meet the definition of PI or PHI under any 
of the privacy statutes applicable in Ontario. However, the existence of metadata 
increases the likelihood of identifiability. 
User Generated Data generated by the user will meet the definition of PI under one of the privacy 
statutes applicable in Ontario. 
Inferred Data inferred by the network about the user (for example, behavioural) is likely to 
meet the definition of PI under one of the privacy statutes applicable in Ontario. 
 
Table 21 intentionally does not consider secondary sources of personal information, for 
example, situations where two friends of the data subject share personal information 
about the data subject.  This is touched on as part of the work in Section 5.3.   
5.5.5.1. Example 
As with other factor sets, the more of each source contributing personal information the 
more likely the data subject is to move away from a state of private to a state of public.  
Take, for example, the case of police surveillance.  In Figure 31, the move from physical 
surveillance to digital surveillance lessens privacy further when machine learning is 





Figure 31: Applied Privacy Calculation 
Going beyond the data that the data subject has posted to use networked generated 
and / or inferred data provides new insight to the data subject that lessens her privacy.  
In this case, that data could be IP usage or smart meter data generated by networked 
servers collected by the police in the course of a lawful investigation.i  This example also 
demonstrates, in particular, how the data subject’s privacy can be impacted by other 
people acting in different capacities by examining the ‘who’ column in Table 22. 
Table 22: Step-by-Step Application 
Start State Legislative 
Rule Set 
PI Source Consent 
Profile 



























                                                     
i Again, intentionality is not of concern for the purposes of demonstrating calculability.  See Future Work 
for additional work items. 
j There is typically an exemption from both notice and consent requirements in privacy legislation in the 
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We have created a formal model for how privacy is understood to behave.  We have 
identified a mechanism to enable that behaviour consistently across computing services 
that collect, use and disclose personal information or services that seek to infer and 
create personal information on their own.  The model is designed to yield the same 
results insofar as the factor sets apply with a universality principle.  The second key to 
the model is the availability of the factor sets and data points identified as contributory 
to privacy.  What is less clear is if the formal model itself is of use to a data subject; 
perhaps simply the output of the model is.  Ideally, we can demonstrate to data subjects 
their privacy state, share what happens inside the finite state machine model, and then 




The goal of this work is to raise awareness, mitigating some of the elimination of non-
verbal cues utilized for personal information disclosure in the pre-online environment.  
We hope to assist in understanding privacy, how it moves in a computing system and 
the threshold values thereof.  We do not seek to change how people view privacy, set 
their own privacy preferences or manage their consent.  Moreover, we are opening the 
door for other systems to work within their own confines and concepts with the finite 
state machine so long as they are consistent to the core model explicated herein 
describing how privacy works.  The finite state machine is key, therefore, to creating a 
better cultural understanding of privacy rules and states, and the analysis of legal rules 
and behaviours. 
The following outcomes have been achieved: 
1. We present a uniformity for privacy.  Everyone has the same transitions and 
states.  We acknowledge it will take time to identify each rule, but we present a 
beginning.  Using this framework we can derive all possible transitions and 
states. 
2. Different information management services have a demonstrably different 
impact on privacy.  We can identify the applicability of a model such as privacy 
by design, but we cannot see any impact to privacy using such a model.  Some of 
the factors will be unchangeable, and thus their impact is inevitably, finite and 
predicable.   
3. We present a framework for testing privacy.  The finite state machine model 
represents legal privacy, in other words, privacy that is allow for under the law.  
We can test that against the expectations of the data subjects.  If they match, 
then we can conclude that the expectations are accurately reflected in the 
legislation.  If not, then the legislation is not an accurate reflect of either the 




The formal model allows for privacy to be computed by a machine, and show to people 






6. Using the Model 
There is no visibility to the data subject and / or transparency by the organization of 
how the state of privacy changes while information is being managed in the system.  A 
formal model for privacy helps the data subject make decisions about disclosing their 
personal information, and possibly helps organizations demonstrate they are providing 
an appropriate duty of care.  The formal model presents a theoretical framework for the 
computation of privacy, proposing the privacy is finite.  Our hypothesis is that this is a 
useful exercise. 
Computability can be demonstrated in a mobile application intended for use by the data 
subject, as shown in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32: Mobile Application Workflow 
Prior to developing a mobile application, we decided to test the usability and feasibility 
of informing data subjects about their privacy state at the point of requested personal 
information disclosure.  This was not intended to test the formal model.  We did not 
develop or quantify specific measurands to test.  We were interested in exploring this 
specific type of practical application of the formal model, particularly for the purposes 
of making transparent the non-value based (e.g. a number) implication (a higher 
number or a lower number) of a personal information disclosure decision.  For the 
purposes of this, we developed a web-based demonstration to allow participants to 
walk through a simulated mobile application and provide feedback at the end of the 
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between the concept (informing data subjects about their privacy state at the point of 
requested personal information disclosure) and execution (the look and feel of the web 
demonstration) we elected to eliminate this distinction and see if participants identified 
it themselves. 
6.1. Participants 
In general, we were looking to identify data subjects who use computing systems as part 
of their daily life at work or in their personal lives.  The scenario in our online 
demonstration describes the privacy state as a result of personal information 
disclosures from participating in a loyalty card program for a store however, personal 
experience with such a program was not a pre-requisite for participation.  Beyond that, 
testing the applicability of the formal model does not require any specific set of 
participants or categories of data subjects.  Quite the opposite.  In order to test the 
usefulness of such a formal model for privacy in a practical setting, a range of research 
participants is helpful.  Consideration was not given to the bias inherent in our own 
networks, e.g., a privacy researcher or doctoral candidate is likely to have a more 
privacy sensitive network of contacts.  The impact of this point is elaborated further 
later in this Chapter. 
Given our preference for participants actively engaged in online computing activities, we 
elected to utilize online methods for recruitment including institutional internal mailing 
lists and social media accounts.  Recruiting methods varied accordingly. 
6.2. Methodology 
We selected the survey method of data collection because it is designed to measure 
attitudes and create descriptive statistics.  We designed an original survey.  Our problem 
specification was straightforward, we sought to understand if providing the output of 
the formal model to participants would be useful.  For what, or under what 
circumstances, were considered irrelevant.  We acknowledge that people may not care 
about the consequences of disclosing personal information, but the goal of our study 




We had originally intended to develop a Research Ethics Board (REB) approved mobile 
application for participants to download, and designed pre and post-questionnaires for 
each to complete.  In consideration of the excessive personal information that often 
comes with mobile application data collection practices, we revised our method.  We 
created an online mobile application demonstration for participants hosted on a third 
party website to click through, and a link to a second third party service provider to 
complete a four question evaluation.  We included an optional text box for participants 
to provide any kind of feedback they desired in respect of the demonstration.  Given the 
now more privacy friendly survey design, we elected to target the general public and 
our colleagues across multiple spheres of influence.  We identified no specific 
population beyond that stated above.  We elected not to conduct any sampling analysis 
or procedures; the results of this survey are intended to be illustrative at best.  Similarly 
we did not track coverage errors, nonresponse bias or outcome rates.  We were able to 
track at the country level click rates for the survey thanks to the functionality of the 
survey provider, but we were not interested in correlating those to actual respondents.  
This point is elaborated further later in the Chapter.  Both the demonstration and the 
survey are self-administered.  Participants may reach out with any questions or 
concerns but they will do so unprompted.   
We designed the survey to test a concept, namely that the provision of additional 
information about privacy at the point of making a decision about personal information 
disclosure might prove useful to the participant.  Our survey questions are thus discrete, 





Figure 33: Survey Questions 
6.3. Materials 
The recruitment and data collection phases of the study required different materials 
described in detail in this Section respectively. 
6.3.1. Recruitment 
We identified three different mechanisms for inviting participants: email, LinkedIn and 





Figure 34: Invitation to Participate in Research 
With REB approval, we also utilized LinkedIn and Facebook to promote the research to 
our own networks.  Similar content was distributed limited by site specific features.  
LinkedIn status updates are limited to 700 characters, so the content of the email was 





Figure 35: LinkedIn Recruitment Message 
Given the use of social networks dependent on our own relationships and networks, the 
REB requested we highlight the ‘voluntary’ aspect of the study.  We elected to make 
these posts public in order to capture as broad an audience as possible.  Moving to 
Twitter represented a more challenging communication method as in Figure 36 because 
of the 140 character limit. 
 
Figure 36: Twitter Recruitment Message 




6.3.2. Data Collection 
The link provided in all the recruitment messages directs to a hosted third party website 
that contained the mobile application demo click through.  No cookies or other tracking 
tools were utilized on the site as this information is irrelevant to the study.  Once 
clicking the link, participants were directed to a website with the details of participation 
in Figure 37 as required by the Research Ethics Board. 
 
Figure 37: Letter of Information 





Figure 38: Consent for Participation in Research 
Difficult to capture in the screenshots, the complete text of the letter of information 
follows. 
Letter of Information 
You are invited to view and provide feedback on a web demo conducted by Tracy Ann Kosa, a 
doctoral candidate at UOIT.   You will be invited to answer survey questions after viewing the 
demo.  Questions will require selected responses and an opportunity for general feedback 
(optional).  The purpose of this research is to determine if a mobile app can help people consider 
the consequences of disclosing information about themselves.  After you have viewed the 
webpages, completing the survey should take about 2 minutes.   
Your Participation 
Participation in this research is 100% voluntary. The purpose of this research is to test the idea of a 
privacy mobile application, not the participants of their responses. It is possible that participants 
may feel coercion to participate, and / or embarrassment in difficulty navigating the demo. 
Participants themselves are not subject to assessment, only the functionality of the application 
itself. All surveys are anonymous. All data is hosted in Canada using Fluid Survey. You may 
withdraw at any time without consequence: prior to submitting the survey simply close the 
browser window and all survey data will be permanently removed. After submitting the survey, 
you may not withdraw as all surveys will be anonymized. 
Time Commitment 
Participation in this research should take approximately 5 minutes.  You are required to view 





The results of this research may also be published in professional journals or presented at scientific 
conferences.  Any such presentations will report only aggregated findings.  Interested participants 
may contact the researcher directly for a copy of the study results summary.  Results will be 
included in the publication of the researcher's doctoral thesis in 2015 through the UOIT library. 
Questions 
This research study has been approved by the UOIT Research Ethics Board.  Any questions about 
study participation may be directed to Tracy Ann Kosa at tracyann.kosa@uoit.ca.  Any ethical 
concerns about this study may be directed to the Compliance Officer at UOIT at 
compliance@uoit.ca.  Thank you for your interest in participating.   
By selecting "Yes" below you confirm that you are consenting to participate in the study and you 
are affirming you are age 18 or above.  Your participation is voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw at any time.   Participants are not waiving their legal rights by signing this consent form.   
Consent Options 
Click Yes, and proceed to navigate using the left menu pane. 
Click No, and close browser. 
If the participant does not click the ‘Yes’ consent option or the ‘No’ consent option, they 
will be served a pop-up containing additional instructions in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: Popup Warning 
Once the participant consents, they are directed to the ‘Welcome’ page in Figure 40, 





Figure 40: Screenshot of Welcome Page 
The Welcome page establishes the scale for public to private for the participant, 
assigning a representative numerical value to each boundary of the positive threshold 
for privacy established in the formal model. 
The participant is then directed to the Description page in Figure 41.  This page is 
intended to communicate the states created in the formal model in a user-friendly 
manner, and demonstrate to the user the possibility of a scale for privacy (rather than 
the ‘on/off’ light switch modality). 
 




Then the participant is directed to start the demonstration in Figure 42.  They are 
presented with a scenario that describes how the four requests for personal information 
disclosure are tied together. 
 
Figure 42: Screenshot of Start Page 
As the formal model establishes, this page assigned a personal information disclosure 
profile of private by default, reflecting that each new disclosure moves the state of 
privacy.  It is either when the data subject takes action or is subject to surveillance that 
the factors pertaining to a privacy state are activated, thus moving the privacy state.   
This page also establishes a brief scenario: 
This demo will walk through a situation where you are asked to share 
your personal information.  The scenario is that you are at a local 
pharmacy chain.  You have gathered your items and taken them to the 
cashier to pay.  The cashier asks you to sign up for the store’s loyalty 
shopper program, and you have agreed.  The cashier asks you for some of 
your personal information.  The demonstration will tell you how sharing 




Each of the following four situations of personal information disclosure are connected to 
the same scenario by design; participants who attempt to click a ‘back’ button in their 
browser will be redirected to the Start screen in Figure 42, but it is not necessary for the 
participant to have identified them as such for the purposes of demonstrating the 
applicability of the formal model.  The first is a disclosure of name and email address as 
in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43: Screenshot of Personal Information Disclosure #1 
Participants are at no time asked to submit any personal information by design.  Rather, 
they are encouraged to ‘Click to Reveal Privacy State’.  The notional concept of a privacy 
state is not explained beyond that provided in Figure 41 by design so as not to distract 
from the information provided in Figure 44. 
 




Here, we communicate to participants the output of the formal model.  Namely, that a 
personal information disclosure as small as a name and email address changes the 
privacy profile for a data subject.  There are four ways this is identified on the screen.  
First, the new state is 8, versus the starting state of 9.  Second, the state name has 
changed from private to unidentified.  Third, there is now a dot on the line (previously 
displayed on the Welcome page, Figure 40).  Fourth, the dot itself is position slightly to 
the right of the ‘private’ indicator on the line.  The same display feature is applied to all 
scenarios in the demonstration.  
The second scenario prompts the participant to think about the process of signing up for 
a loyalty card at a store, e.g., Starbucks or Shoppers Drug Mart. 
 
Figure 45: Screenshot of Personal Information Disclosure #2 
The participant is invited to ‘click to reveal privacy state’ as in the previous scenario, and 





Figure 46: Screenshot of the Results of Personal Information Disclosure #2 
For consistency, we use the same four methods to display the results of the state 
change in each subsequent scenario.  Attempting to draw particular attention to the 
change, we elected to change the position and the colour of the dot on the line.  In this 
particular scenario, the dot appears as green (versus blue in the previous).  The third 
scenario continues with the loyalty card example more explicitly in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47: Screenshot of Personal Information Disclosure #3 
The frame of the displayed results of this scenario remain consistent, and the dot on the 





Figure 48: Screenshot of the Results of Personal Information Disclosure #3 
In the fourth and final scenario, we continue with the loyalty store exemplar.  In this 
case, we prompt the participant to think about downloading a mobile application on 
their phone, a common activity for smartphone users. 
 
Figure 49: Screenshot of Personal Information Disclosure #4 
Again, the change in the display includes both the placement and colour of the dot, 
moving again towards the right side of the screen and changing to a darker yellow with 





Figure 50: Screenshot of the Results of Personal Information Disclosure #4 
Once the participant closes this ‘window’, they are directed in Figure 51 to click to 
complete the post-demonstration evaluation survey. 
 
Figure 51: Screenshot of Thank You and Link to Evaluation Survey 
There are four survey questions.  The intentionality of the survey is to query our 
hypothesis that the applicability of a formal model would be useful to data subjects by 
enabling some transparency in transactions of personal information disclosure.  The 
survey also provides an open text feedback box for participants to comment on any 
other aspect of the demo that they may wish to.  Comments are coded and included in 





Figure 52: Screenshot of Post-Demo Survey Questions 
A third party service provider (Fluid Survey) was used to track survey responses.  Data is 
stored in Canada in the Fluid Survey hosting environment and accessible via their 
homepage with credentials. 
6.4. Procedures 
We had determined in advance that a minimum of 50 responses would be ideal to 
conduct some limited analysis.  Data collection began on January 5 via Twitter and 
LinkedIn posts.  The survey was also announced to a class of UOIT students, again, as 





Figure 53: Completed Survey Responses by Date 
As Figure 53 demonstrates the target of 50 surveys was received by the end of day 3.  
We elected to leave the survey open for an additional 10 days primarily to allow for any 
responses from UOIT students.  By the revised date, we received 133 completed 
surveys. 
Closing the survey on January 15, 2014, we examined the click rates (not all participants) 
for the survey by country of origin to determine if there were more Canadian responses.  
Results are presented in Figure 54. 
 
Figure 54: Percentage of Survey Clicks from the Top 5 Countries 
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Of the total 143 clicks on the survey link (not total responses) 52 people had IP 
addresses originated in the US, representing a total of 39%.  Canada was second, with a 
total of 22 originating IP addresses of 143 for a total of 17%, followed by Germany (16, 
or 12%), UK (13, 10%) and Switzerland (12, 9%).  The remaining IP addresses were 
scattered across the globe, including New Zealand, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and 
France with between 2 and 3% each.  Additional clicks were tracked from Australia, 
Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Finland, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, 
South Korea, Sweden and Thailand. 
6.5. Observations 
Our survey yielded 133 completed results.  Returning to our original question set, the 
raw count summary of responses is presented in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55: Raw Count of Completed Surveys Grouped by Response 
Two points are immediately clear.  First, there were minimal ‘strongly agree’ responses.  
The highest was 11% support for an application like this would help me make decisions 
about privacy.  6% strongly agreed that the demo gave new information about privacy, 
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while 5% strongly agreed that viewing the demo increased their privacy awareness.  
Only 2% strongly agreed that the demo changed the way they thought about privacy. 
Second, there was a significant volume of ‘neutral’ responses.  The Likert scale is 
intended to allow for representation of ‘neutral’ or undecided responses, so this is not 
entirely unexpected.  The impact on the first three questions was similar ranging from 
23% for the demo gave me new information about privacy and an app like this would 
help make decisions about privacy, and 19% for viewing the demo increased my privacy 
awareness.  Neutral responses spiked to 32% for the last question on whether the demo 
changed the way a participant thinks about privacy.  Consideration of the ‘neutral’ 
category of responses as positive changes that interpretation somewhat; suggesting 
that the second, third and fourth questions could be considered to have a 50-60% 
supportive response.  However, ‘the demo changed the way I think about privacy’ 
remains tilted towards the negative.   
The remaining observations are presented by question.  The results strongly suggested 
that the demo did not change the way participants thought about privacy (53% disagree 
or strongly disagree versus 15% strongly agree or agree) as presented in Figure 56. 
 





















Figure 57 demonstrates that participants also disagree, albeit less emphatically, that the 
demo gave them new information about privacy (46% disagree or strongly disagree 
versus 32% strongly agree or agree). 
 
Figure 57: Raw Count of Responses to 'The demo gave me new information about privacy' 
Participants are evenly split on whether viewing the demo increased their privacy 
awareness (41% disagree or strongly disagree versus 41% agree or strongly agree) as in 
Figure 58.   
 




































Finally, participants support the notion that idea that an app like this would help make 
decisions about privacy (44% agree or strongly agree versus 34% disagree or strongly 
disagree) in Figure 59. 
 
Figure 59: Raw Count of Responses to ‘An app like this would help me make decisions about privacy’ 
By design, we included an opportunity for survey participants to provide comments in a 
free text box.  41% of respondents elected to provide feedback.  For analysis purposes, 
we divided comments in to two categories: execution of the information in the demo 
and concept of providing a measurable scale for privacy.  Initially, we had thought 
responses would likely fall in to one category or the other.  However, upon detailed 
review, the majority of responses were similar to this one: 
Just showing a number doesn’t do much.  Why is buying goods in the 
store with they(sic) loyalty program less privacy sensitive than 
downloading the loyalty app?  You need to explain the implications of the 
actions, instead of just saying “This is 6 sensitive!” (#033) 
Participant #033’s comment can be read both about execution, citing the need for more 
information about consequences of personal information disclosure, but also about 
concept, critiquing the distinction made between electronic privacy and physical 





















the comment, the presented execution is not.  Further, the participant provided 
actionable feedback. 
As a result we identified a scale for feedback:  
 Negative: a comment that critiques but does not provide any corrective action. 
 Negative actionable: a comment that both critiques and provides corrective 
action. 
 Neutral: a comment that neither critiques nor supports. 
 Positive actionable: a comment that both supports and provides suggestions. 
 Positive: a comment that supports but does not provide any suggestions. 
We considered the entire comment set in turn, first as it relates to concept and 
constructiveness of feedback and then second, as it related to execution and 
constructiveness of feedback. 
6.5.1. Feedback on Concept 
The entire comment set was sorted evaluated based on how the feedback related to the 
concept demonstrated in the application.  The results of the sorting are presented in 
Figure 60. 
 



















When sorted by concept, 38% were ‘positive’ where the participant provided positive 
feedback or a supportive comment.  Participants complimented the classification 
identification (participant #016), insights on privacy (#004), providing information on 
consequences of choices prior (#013), and the concise summary of degrees of privacy 
(#041).  Others remarked, 
Before seeing the progression from private to identified on a 
number line, I had not thought of it as a progression.  I thought 
more like either I share it or I don’t, vet(sic) black or white in 
nature. (#071) 
Nice was to show people what this so called privacy is – online.  I 
think this Kind of Education should be tought(sic) in elementary 
school. (#079) 
Important topic, I’m sure I’m not as private as I like to think I am 
online! (#100) 
It’s weird because these are privacy concerns I am aware of but I 
would not consciously take into consideration when these things 
actually happen. (#104) 
I have an IT background, but it was still informative.  I can imagine 
that this example can make privacy clearer to people who do not 
think about privacy all along. (#106) 
Continuing under the concept umbrella, 24% of comments were ‘neutral’ where the 
participant either provided a comment that was neither positive nor negative.  For 
example, participant #090 noted the use of an alias name and email, stating “I never 
respond to that email address.”  Other ‘neutral’ comments reflected a simpler 
understanding of the information technology environment, for example, participant 




I don’t get the relevance.  I go into a store, they sell me stuff, they get to 
know who I am – so what?  A hundred years ago you could go in to any 
small town store anywhere in the world and the proprietor would know 
exactly the same thing if you were a regular customer.  I don’t see the 
need for concern. 
Third, 20% of comments were ‘positive actionable’, where participants compliment the 
idea but suggested additional information or data points be provided in the application.  
For example, participant #017 requested proof points, noting “The way you present 
information is clear and concise, but why should I believe it?  There were no links to 
back up your claims.”  Other participants provided design ideas, for example, participant 
#047 commented that the demo was a “good teaching aid” and suggested explaining 
why each scenario results in the indicated state of privacy. 
‘Negative actionable’ comments were 5%, and generally reflected a need for more 
information.  For example, participant #038 remarked, “Oversimplistic.  Did not 
communicate risks at all well.”  Although the demo was not designed to communicate 
risks of oversharing, this is an actionable recommendation for future work.   
‘Negative’ comments were also 5%, but on the other hand were more difficult to action.  
For example, participant #130 merely stated “confusing” (which could apply to either 
concept or execution).  Participant #011 was eloquent in critique, commenting “It’s like 
putting buttons on sugar that say ‘this sugar contains sugar.” 
6.5.2. Feedback on Execution 





Figure 61: Raw Count of Comments Sorted by Execution, then Tone and Constructiveness 
At 35%, ‘negative actionable’ is the highest category when sorted by execution.  This 
was especially true of participants who self-identified as ‘privacy geeks’ or ‘security 
experts’ in their own comments.  Participant #019 noted the numbers “seemed 
needlessly granular for the average user” yet commended the concept of defining levels 
of privacy.  Contextual data was also suggested by participant #125.  Participant #065 
endorsed the idea, but noted “I’m also not a normal person.”  Participant #109 
suggested reworking the demo into a game.  Conversely, very few positive actionable 
comments about execution were received (4%). 
‘Positive’ is the second highest category at 29% of comments when sorted by execution.  
Similar to the concept comments, participants remarked on the importance of the 
research generally (e.g. #092) and also remarked on their own backgrounds or privacy 
sensitivity in context (#106,111,070,023,041,095). 
Neutral comments constituted 22% of execution comments, also largely written by 
participants self-identifying as privacy sensitive, or privacy well-informed.  Several 
participants expressed concern over the methodology, particularly over a re-tweet of 

























aware of the issues.  However, distributing your survey through X’s Twitter followers 
would bias your sample.”  Similarly, Participant #091 commented, 
I am relatively well-informed about privayc(sic) and security topics and 
believe many of his other followers are, too.  So unless another question is 
coming about how well-informed I was about privacy topics before 
looking through the images, I believe the results will be skewed a lot. 
Participant #035 carried the theme forward, “I’m a privacy geek, and saw this study 
because another privacy geek linked to it.  I’m not very representative of the general 
pop.”   
The ‘negative’ comments on execution (11%) were somewhat predictable by this point.  
Participant #008 was especially eloquent, commenting, “Honestly, I was in a hurry, 
skimmed the directions, and possibly missed the point, because I didn’t see one.” 
Finally, the ‘positive actionable’ comments on execution were minimal (4%).  Participant 
#007 endorsed the overall notion, and requested more specific analysis,  
So go ahead and show them how resellers track their behaviour and offer 
things with customized prices because they know certain customers 
tent(sic) to spend more.  How travel agencies put higher prices online for 
e.g. mac users etc. 
6.6. Analysis 
To recap, one of our goals in creating the formal model was to provide visibility to the 
data subject and / or transparency by the organization of how the state of privacy 
changes while information is being managed in the system.  We were also looking for a 
distinction between feedback on concept and execution by participants who 
volunteered comments.  Primarily, the purpose of this study was to test the usability 
and feasibility of informing data subjects about their privacy state at the point of 
requested personal information disclosure.  At first glance, the overall survey results 




small number of responses to any of our questions in the ‘strongly agree’ category in 
Figure 62 (repeated from earlier in this Chapter). 
 
Figure 62: Raw Count of Completed Surveys Grouped by Response 
 A more detailed analysis tells a different story. 
First, as several participants pointed out, the survey distribution was biased towards 
networks that are fairly sophisticated in consideration of privacy issues.  18% of the total 
population of participants voluntarily self-assessed as privacy aware.  When considering 
the subpopulation of participants who provided comments, this represents 44%.  It is 
likely that the majority of commenting participants can be considered privacy aware, 
while the overall population is likely to be privacy sensitive.  For such populations, 
questions such as ‘The demo changed the way I think about privacy’ would likely result 
in a ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ response, or perhaps ‘neutral’ at best.  A similar 
rationale applies to the question ‘The demo gave me new info about privacy’.  These 
questions would have been better phrased to prompt the participants to consider 
whether the demo could give any person or a lay-person new information about privacy, 
or changed the way they think about privacy. 
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about privacy
An app like this would help me
make decisions about privacy
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That is what makes the ‘agree’ responses to the remaining questions more interesting.  
Assuming that the overall population is at minimum privacy sensitive, 41% agreed or 
strongly agreed that viewing the demo increased their own privacy awareness.  44% 
agreed or strongly agreed that an app like the one in the demo would help make 
decisions about privacy.  Within the commenting participant group, where we know 
almost half of the population to self-report as privacy experts, 38% agreed or strongly 
agreed that viewing the demo increased their own privacy awareness; 36% agreed or 
strongly agreed that an app like this would help make decisions about privacy.  In effect, 
the ‘experts’ in privacy endorse the approach.  With the additional of the ‘neutral’ 
category, the support jumps to 49% and 58% respectively.   
The survey, like any other, has design flaws which helped to generate interesting 
observations about the privacy community of participants.  The use of a Likert scale 
seemed obvious as we desired informational or opinion data; free text boxes were 
incorporated in a final version of the survey as an afterthought.  They turned out to be a 
critical part of our data analysis, and provided excellent feedback on both the design 
and execution of our formal model.  We designed the survey to be anonymous to 
reduce any impact of social pressure or social bias, eliminating the questions asking 
participants to self-assess privacy knowledge and awareness that were present in earlier 
versions of the survey.  Yet, our commentating participants seemed eager to identify 
themselves, at minimum, providing contextual information about their own expertise 
and work experience and in some cases, including identifiable data.  Future surveys of 
the privacy community should consider incorporating voluntary self-identification or 
self-assessment of awareness as a key data point. 
This Chapter and the previous two Chapters define and apply a formal model for 
privacy.  The examples provided in Chapter 5 in particular describe how the formalism 
could be an extremely useful tool for establishing shared expectations, obligations and 
practices on personal information disclosure.  For sociology and computing sciences, 
both concerned with connectivity albeit different mechanisms, the formal model can be 









This Chapter explores what the formal model says about privacy itself and discussed the 
claims made throughout about the behaviour of privacy.  Purpose being to ensure that 
the formal model for privacy aligns with actual privacy, or the way privacy works in the 
physical world.  Using this formal model as a simulation for privacy affirms some facts, 
present new notions and challenges others.  The observations in this Chapter describe 
general privacy, but are intended to be utilized eventually in the formal model using 
formal language.  Some observations may be easier to incorporate as rules than others.  
Some may also be (rightly) obvious as privacy is commonly intuitive to all of us 
(Fineman, 1990; Westin, 1967) which suggests we all have a subjective knowledge of the 
topic. 
7.1. Privacy is both an individual and collective experience 
Privacy is a balancing act (Reidenberg, 2012).  Legislative models typically rely on some 
combination of notice, consent and authority for personal information collection use 
and disclosure as in Figure 63.  Notice and consent models are typically utilized where 
data subjects are able to choose about an information disclosure or providers, as in 
credit card providers or banks.  Notice and authority models apply when there is limited 
or no choice but a recognition of the need for transparency, for example, in obtaining a 
driver’s licence from the government authorities in Ontario who are the only authorized 
providers of licensing services.  Third, an authority model, where an organization is 
permitted by law to collect, use and disclose personal information under specific 






Figure 63: The Relationship between Notice, Authority and Consent 
These three different models for collection demonstrate the need for privacy rights and 
obligations to be commonly applied yet customized where possible.  The formal model 
enables all three of these options through the use of the factor sets.  The legal rules 
incorporate requirements for authority, notice and consent obligations on behalf of the 
organizations.  Consent is further incorporated into the data subject’s privacy profile 
enabling a multitude of situational options to the data subject as permitted or required. 
7.2. Privacy may be positive, negative and non-existent 
Much privacy scholarship approaches privacy as a 2 state option: either available or not 
(see Chapter 4 for multiple examples).  Westin’s work establishing multiple states 
provides a framework for a range of privacy (Westin, 1967).  We utilize (Marsh, 1994) as 
a basis for establishing thresholds.  This work focuses on the positive threshold states 








Figure 64: Positive Threshold for Privacy 
The formal model thusly suggests the existence of negative threshold for privacy in 
Figure 65. 
 
Figure 65: Negative Threshold for Privacy 
The formal model similarly suggests the existence of a range within the negation of 
privacy.  The range of states in that negative threshold may be smaller or greater than 
ours [+1,+9].  Sensibly, a data subject is not either (a) in a state of privacy or (b) in a 
state of surveillance.  Such a thing would negate the existence of privacy laws entirely, 




Further along the continuum exists another threshold, that of total surveillance, as in 
Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66: Threshold for Surveillance 
The formal model suggests this space is separate from a negative value of privacy.  
Surveillance, whether passive or active monitoring, incorporates a purpose whether it 
be of influence or protection, direction or management (Lyon, 2007).  The use of online 
mechanisms in particular for surveillance incorporates a massive amount of internet 
traffic across any traditional notion of a sovereign territorial boundary. 
7.2.1. Privacy must consider intentionality 
There are at least two type of intentionality indicated by the formal model.  The first, 
surveillance, suggest a deliberate action by another party to take away privacy from a 
data subject (or multiple data subjects).   The second originates with the data subject.  A 
non-disclosure, failure to disclose or providing misinformation (e.g., lying) may result in 
false transitions.  In either case, the theory for privacy proposed illuminates that 
intentionality is a critical component of privacy. 
7.3. A person may exist in multiple states of privacy at once 
To that end, the model demonstrates that a data subject may exist in multiple states of 




model allows for the identification of different factors within a set that clarify the 
impact of each personal information disclosure action or decision.  Consider the follow 
two examples from Chapter 5 starting with Figure 67. 
 
Figure 67: Making a Phone call to Book an Appointment 
It is possible that a data subject may make a phone call (in this case to book an 
appointment) while also engaging in an online chat room from a social networking site, 
suggesting yet another applicable state of privacy. 
 
Figure 68: Consenting to a EULA 
In this case, our data subject may be in a privacy state of ‘confidentiality’ in respect of 
her phone call, but her online activities yield a different privacy state (‘identified).  Here, 
















accurate.  The net privacy outcome for the data subject thusly considers both states or 
takes the higher valuation in context, e.g., public, as the ‘real’ state of privacy. 
7.4. Privacy is transitive 
Traditionally, privacy was akin to a light switch.  Even in context, you either had it or you 
did not.  The formal model allows us to see that privacy is a continuous relationship 
between the data subject and their information.  The model supports this relationship, it 
is continuous, contextual and ongoing.  By providing a mechanism by which we can see 
continuous representation in context, we can observe how we relate to the rest of the 
world through our information.  There is a very strong privacy relationship with some 
entities and not others; we tell our banker different information than our doctor.  If they 
are both required to disclose my information to a third party, then my privacy has 
changed yet again.  We can see that privacy between one data subject and another 
entity may impact the relationship between that same data subject and the rest of the 
world.  The model demonstrates that Alice may have a state of privacy ‘n’ with Bob, but 
if Bob has a state of privacy ‘x’ with Eve in respect of that same information, then Alice 
also has – knowingly or unknowingly – a state of privacy ‘x’ with Eve.   
For example, I share some personal information with Google and my privacy state with 
Google changes.  Google subsequently shares part of that personal information with 
DoubleClick (a subsidiary of Google that develops Internet advertising services).  In a 
different transaction, Google then shares a different part of my personal information 
with a law enforcement agency.  Or perhaps all of it.  There’s a multiplier here, e.g., my 
privacy state multiplied by the impact of my transaction with Google, multiplied by the 
transaction with DoubleClick, and the transaction with the law enforcement agency 
together equal my ‘real’ state of privacy.  The problem is that people can only manage 
to follow for a few hops before it gets far too complicated.  However, machines can 
move along the continuum easily and compute the complexity.  An application or 
website add-on can remember the history of a data subject’s behaviour and provide a 




7.5. Privacy laws do not maintain privacy 
Returning to our notion of privacy as control, the formal model demonstrates that 
privacy legislation does not enable data subject control.  Each example assumes 
organizational legal compliance, and yet there is often little or no real control allowed 
for the data subject to exercise about personal information disclosures in order to 
procure services or participate in daily activities, such as making a phone call.  Save the 
case of an active ongoing law enforcement investigation, the data subject must disclose 
their data to move about the networked computing system that underpins our day-to-
day human interaction.  Notionally, the idea that legislation is intended to enable 
‘control’ for a data subject may be misleading as there are many other purposes for 
enacting laws.  For the purposes of observing privacy, however, it appears that 
compliance with legislation does not engender data subject privacy. 
7.5.1. Privacy compliance is improbable 
To illustrate this complexity taking Ontario as a case study, an organization could 
potentially be subject to 2 or more privacy laws that establish a variety of obligations in 
the management of personal information.  There is known inherent complexity for 
those who work in such environments, however the formal model suggests that for 
computing systems it may be far more complicated than recognized.  One factor set 
establishes the legislative rules as a component of the formal model.  In order to define 
the state transitions for calculation purposes each role, rule and personal information 
set should be established.  Although this is a finite list (as there are only so many roles, 
rules and data points referenced in each Act) it is a lengthy list.  Each organization, in 
order to demonstrate compliance, must establish contextual rules for each role for 
every possible action taken with information.  For example, in order to comply with the 
federal private sector privacy legislation, a regulated private company must create a 
roles and responsibilities matrix for the collection, access, use, disclosure and disposal 
rule required under the Act.  Confirming compliance with those rules is a key 
component of establishing the amount of privacy under that Act offered to a data 




Table 23 presented earlier sets out the number of decision tables required for 
compliance purposes with each Act in a given region (Ontario).  It deliberately did not 
consider additional legal rules that are not explicitly privacy laws, e.g., the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act, a federal statute in Canada that sets out disclosure, retention and 
destruction requirements for any records that make reference to a crime perpetuated 
by or on, or witnessed by a young offender.  
Table 23: Compliance Tables  




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 
FIPPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
MFIPPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
PIPEDA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 5 
PHIPA Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 5 
 
In the event that a given organization is covered by multiple laws, for example, a young 
offender receiving medical treatment in a public hospital could have privacy rights 
under 3 different statutes.  It is also possible that these rules may conflict.  It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that compliance with each of the rules set out in the multitude of 
statutes is the intentional or desired outcome. 
7.5.2. Less privacy poses a greater probability of harm 
Related to the observation about legislation is the notion of harm.  A key problem in 
privacy is how to control information sharing (Anderson, 2000).  As multiple examples in 
the formal model suggest, relatively small disclosures of personal information yield 
changes in privacy states rather quickly.  There is a small window in which a data subject 
                                                     
k In Canada, access generally refers to the right of the data subject to access their own personal 
information as held by the government, a healthcare organization, federally regulated undertaking or 
commercial entity.  This reflects a country specific notion that access to personal information and privacy 
rights related to that information are related.   





can share information but maintain a level of privacy, before the minimum bar is 
reached and there is no privacy.  Alongside of that decreasing privacy, research suggests 
there is an increasing probability of inappropriate, unauthorized or unlawful information 
disclosure (Calo, 2011; Choi, 2013; Information and Privacy Commissioner / Ontario, 
2011; D. Solove, 2011; Solove, 2007; Xiao & Varenhorst, 2009).   
7.6. Privacy changes with the format of data 
There are three ways to record information: paper, electronic and / or online.  These 
exist in loose relationship with each other, since paper data may be scanned 
electronically, and uploaded.  Not all electronic information is available online (although 
arguably this is less so now).  Consider Figure 69 as a representation.  The formal model 
establishes the sources for personal information, repeated here in Figure 70. 
 
Figure 69: Formats for Information 
 
Figure 70: Sources of Personal Information 











Figure 71: Categories of Personal Information 
As we use the model a special relationship between these two factor sets is illuminated, 
particularly in consideration of the space in which electronic meets online formats.  For 
example, a data subject may choose to make a personal information disclosure while 
making a phone call, but the phone itself may also disclose personal information about 
the data subject.  The recording of the happenstance of the phone call at a certain time 
and date is another personal information disclosure.  Over time, machines may also 
create personal information about the data subject using inference on those machine 
generated records. 
I may choose to leave the house every day for work at 8am, taking my mobile phone 
with me.  I have not explicitly created a record of my physical location, but my phone 
likely has and shared that with my telecommunications provider by way of a GPS signal 
and a cell phone tower.  Over time, it is possible to infer my activities via this log created 
by my daily use of the mobile phone.  These metadata points are personal information 
created by my device, not me, and can be used over time to infer not only my 
geographical and location personal information, but also temporal information, 



















technology becomes more sophisticated) accurately describe my beliefs, attitudes and 
emotions.  The impact of electronic data, particularly online electronic data, becomes 
thusly more significant for my privacy profile than personal information recorded and 
stored about me on paper. 
7.7. The amount of available privacy may be unknown to the data subject 
There are two considerations in making this observation.  The first relates to the overall 
increase in factors, some of which may be known or unknown to the data subject, which 
in turn impacts the state of privacy.  The second, that different factors have a different 
impact to a data subject’s privacy, which may be known or unknown to the data subject. 
7.7.1. Increased existence of privacy related elements decreases privacy 
We already know privacy is context specific (Nissenbaum, 2009, 2011).  The formal 
model also behaves differently in context.  Consider again the case of our data subject 
deciding to utilize a live chat feature embedded in a social networking site. 
 
Figure 72: Using a Live Chat Feature in a Social Networking Site 
The jump from a privacy state of masked to confidential here occurs largely because of 
the change in the information services factor set (all others being equal).  Our data 
subject moves from utilizing network and hosting services to revealing more personal 
information types through the use of messaging, backup and archiving features typically 
associated with social media chat rooms.  Taking the example further, consider that our 




















which lawful surveillance has been authorized such as Figure 73. 
 
Figure 73: The Subject of Lawful Surveillance 
The recipient of personal information in this case is a police officer collecting personal 
information during presumed lawful surveillance.  As the recipient collects information 
about our data subject, more computing services are required to manage that data, the 
model identifies a corresponding change in the state of privacy for our data subject.  
Similarly as the possible sources for personal information increase (including inference) 
there is another change. 
In this case, our data subject may appear to be in a privacy state of confidentiality, 
however, her personal information disclosure profile is actually public.  The net privacy 
outcome for the data subject thusly considers both states or takes the higher valuation 
in context, e.g., public, as the ‘real’ state of privacy. 
7.7.2. Different factors have a different privacy impact 
When used together, each factor set may have a different impact on the state of privacy 
of the data subject.  For example, revisiting the act of making a phone call, the factors 
controlled by the data subject yield a much lower state of privacy then what is possible 
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Figure 74: The Impact of Individual Factor Sets 
While the interim state of privacy is much lower, it does not reflect the availability of 
personal information about the data subject represented in the additional factor sets.  
The impact of each factor set is described in Table 24. 
Table 24: Information Disclosure Control 
Source Factor Set Factor Description Impact 
Computer PI Type Geography & 
Location 
Stored in data subject’s phone records Increase  
















Software Administration software to run network Increase  
Computer PI Source Network Data Tracked by data subject phone records Increase  
Computer PI Source Inferred Data Inferred by machine learning about data 
subject’s behaviour 
Increase  
Data subject PI Type Individual  Choosing to make a phone call, and 
communicate during the call 
Increase  
Data subject PI Type Identification, 
Temporal 
Choosing to make a phone call, and 
communicate during the call 
Increase  
Data subject PI Type Beliefs / 
Attitudes & 
Emotions 
Choosing to make a phone call, and 
communicate during the call 
Increase  
Data subject Consent Pragmatist 
(assumption) 
Set by privacy preferences Increase  







7.8. Privacy cannot be facilitated through consent 
As the previous Section describes, electronic and online personal information is created 
by devices and machine inference without a data subject’s request, accessibility or even 
knowledge in some cases.  These notions are captured in the concept of consent.  
Consent is a historical philosophical discussion, dating back to legal and moral 
obligations raised by Plato, Locke and Hume (Miller & Wertheimer, 2009).  Practical 
consent models, for our purposes here, can be considered in Table 25. 
Table 25: Matrix of Consent Options 
 Express (Type 1) Implied (Type 2) 
Verbal (Method 1) Option 1 Option 2 
Written (Method 2) Option 3 N/A 
 
Regardless of options, all consent is desired to be informed by the possible 
consequences.  Express consent means that the consent provider has informed the data 
subject of the possible implications of their choice, that discussion and that decision 
have been recorded in writing or verbally.  For example, when a form detailing the 
practices and harms for participating in a given situation are provided and the data 
subject is asked to check a box or sign their name.  Implied consent is not granted by the 
data subject, but rather assumed from the actions or situations.  For example, a person 
who is hurt or unconscious is presumed to desire assistance unless and until they are 
able to refuse.  Regardless of method, consent models are generally problematic and 
much research has been done in other science disciplines to explore these problems 
(Macklin, 1999; Meisel & Roth, 1981; Siegal, Bonnie, & Appelbaum, 2012).  One possible 




information only be used for ‘reasonable’ purpose should hold a more central role 
(Austin, 2006).m   
Where privacy and consent meet is in the realm of autonomy, or an interest in making 
certain decisions without undue influence and in the presence of choice (Faden, 
Beauchamp, & King, 1986).  This is not an absolute notion, and continues to evolve as 
laws and practices do.  In the pursuit of formalizing privacy, however, it becomes clear 
that competing factor sets restrict the impact and force of consent, particularly implied 
consent. 
7.8.1. Privacy is self-reinforcing 
Data subjects tend to favour reinforcing behaviours that confirm prior held beliefs than 
disprove them (Marsh, 1994).  We also know that data subjects are not informed about 
the privacy implications of online activities, do not read privacy policies or end-user 
license agreements prior to using computing services (Cranor, 2003; Hoofnagle, King, Li, 
& Turow, 2010; McDonald & Cranor, 2008).  The formal model proposes a simple view 
of consent options (where available) in consideration of this research, assuming that 
where a data subject has identified the need or desire for a particular online service, 
e.g., to play a game or download a mobile application, that person will be pre-disposed 
to the same consent preference they have established with that service provider.  In 
considering past decisions on permissibility of information disclosure in context (by 
utilizing established privacy preferences (Westin, 1967)) the formal model mimics the 
physical way data subjects make decisions.  There is a threshold stopping point for this 
reinforcement.   
                                                     
m The ‘reasonable’ principle references a concept in law considering the composite of a specific 
community and how they might respond.  Consideration of this concept is out of scope of our work, but 






Figure 75: Thresholds for Privacy 
While our model describes the variety of acceptable ranges of positive privacy from 
private through public, the threshold diagram presented earlier and repeated in Figure 
75 demonstrates that a similar variance of ranges similarly exist in the negative 





8. Future Work 
The possibilities for exploration and application in other areas are diverse and explored 
in some detail in this Chapter.  The model requires refinement.  In terms of Popper’s 
notion of falsifiability as the demarcation point for scientific inquiry, we highlight many 
opportunities in this Chapter to test the formal model and the class of basic statements 
about privacy.  Additional factor sets, including details of how and why humans make 
decision on data disclosures, may be worth considering for inclusion.  It is likely that 
some factors or decisions weigh more heavily in to the availability of privacy for a data 
subject, so weighting of the representational values assigned in the formalization should 
also be tested.  The applied expansion of the privacy preferences factor set cannot be 
overestimated, particularly in the ‘cloud’ computing environment.  Overall, the model 
does not explicitly consider historical state assignment, a notion that builds on privacy 
impact of machine inferred behavioural PI listed as a factor in sources of personal 
information. 
The intersection of physical and digital selves becomes clear in the application of this 
model, particularly in the realm of physical privacy.  In terms of social media or other 
digital communities, there are likely additional nuances in personal information 
disclosures that could be fleshed out.  During the research process, it became evident 
that the fallacy of the privacy impact assessment process as a tool for assuring privacy 
rights and obligations bears further exploring.  Related, the notion of societal interests 
and the rule of law become important ethical considerations in the development of any 
compliance model. 
8.1. Refining the Methodology 
This Section examines ways in which the formal model may be reconsidered both as an 
ethical exercise and an attempt elucidate value ranges. 
8.1.1. Ethical Considerations 
Popper’s notion of falsifiability as a basis for scientific theory is not without controversy.  




advancement of scientific research (Kuhn, 2012).  The theory within a theory model 
advances the ability of scientists to consistently revisit scientific claims, and to theorize 
about a given computational ability (for example) without the means to test it.  Some 
claim logical fallacies exist within the model, and others question the ability to ‘test’ a 
theory at the level Popper demanded (Jeffrey, 1975; Johansson, 1975; Maxwell, 1972).  
Popper’s response to these critiques was two-fold.  He stated that falsifiability may lead 
a scientific theory to be disproven, but that does not equate with disregarding the 
theory.  So we too acknowledge that the formal model for privacy may indeed fail in 
some or all tests, but that does not negate the overall goal of moving towards a unified 
theory.  Popper further explicates that the end goal of falsifiability is to sort scientific 
theory from those which are ad hoc.  We consider that the failure of the formal model 
for privacy to be designated a ‘scientific theory’ does not remove the other 
contributions this exercise makes to the discipline or the field of computing; we may 
have conclusively identified upon further testing a method that does not work(!) 
Setting aside epistemology, further questions in ethics are tied to the scientific method 
itself, in this case the delineation of a finite state machine and survey research.  Survey 
research in particular often presents ethical dilemmas, particularly when pertaining to 
sensitive topics and collecting personal information.  In this context, Kelman posits, “We 
therefore have a moral obligation to avoid actions and policies that reduce others’ well-
being (broadly defined) or that inhibit their freedom to express and develop 
themselves” (Kelman, 1982).  We designed both the finite state machine and survey 
specifically to minimize the potential for harm, recognizing the particular concern with 
privacy research that is itself privacy invasive.  Having done so successfully, we hope to 
see the formal model utilized in research to simplify and illuminate that which 
computing systems have obfuscated, thus meeting the bar presented by Kelman. 
Then comes the question of how.  A brief discussion of measurement was presented in 
Chapter 2 but we seek to expand on that here.  There are two related questions in social 
science measurement that apply to our development of a formal model for privacy.  




second, how to make the specification of that assignment special enough to be unique 
(Suppes & Zinnes, 1962).  The first part of this problem is one of representation.  The 
second part of this problem is more challenging, because it incorporates a problem of 
assigning meaning to the numbers.  For our formal model, we determine a transition to 
be, 
Next_Privacy_State =  T (Current_Privacy_State, Source of Personal information, 
Action,  
Type of Personal Information, Recipient, Privacy Preferences, Information 
Management Services, Laws) 
 Where 
 Next_Privacy_State ∈ { Private, Unidentified, Anonymity, Masked, De-
identified, Pseudonymous, Confidential, Identified, Public} 
 Current_Privacy_State ∈ { Private, Unidentified, Anonymity, Masked, De-
identified, Pseudonymous, Confidential, Identified, Public} 
 Action ∈ {Release, Redact} 
 
What remains unclear is the empirical meaning of the state itself.  To that end, we have 
identified a scale with values [+1,+9] to measure the positive threshold for privacy, 
establishing a ratio scale for the formal model (Suppes & Zinnes, 1962). 
Finally, the nature of privacy work could be considered activism (Raab, 2008).  As a 
subject matter for government and legislatures, privacy research cannot be done 
without consideration of the domains of political science, public policy and politics more 
generally.  Thus, Raab concludes, privacy researchers are advocacy-driven and without a 
history of the discipline on which to build.  We disagree.  The literature review in 
Chapter 4 describes a robust new body of research that is inter-disciplinary at its core.  It 
envelops some concepts from the natural and social sciences, as well as other 
disciplines.  In other matters, such as neglect in answering the question of: (1) the non-




evaluation of systems that protect privacy, we would suggest our formal model is 
readily able to test against such questions.  In terms of the first question, for example, 
we would suggest a human factor set explicitly derived from sociology research on 
decision-making (Schwartz, 1968).  For the second, we suggest a robust test of multiple 
actors against the model that would be situation and context specific; in some cases our 
data subjects are entitled to no legal privacy protection as in cases of active, ongoing 
and lawful surveillance.  For the final question we suggest the notion of either third 
party attestations and / or metadata tagging of all personal information.  Moving away 
from the notion of advocacy driven scholarship, we suggest representative 
measurement of values to further advance the formal model. 
8.1.2. Value Ranges 
The formal model is thus far focused on the positive threshold, using a value scale 
[+1,+9] and corresponding descriptive labels to create the model for privacy.  The next 
step in the methodology is to identify the similar scale for negative privacy and / or 
surveillance and explore the relationship between the two other thresholds.  As a 
beginning, we identify in Table 26 a less language constrained labelling system for the 
value range for the surveillance thresholds based on (Marsh, 1994). 
Table 26: Stratifications of Negative Privacy Values 
Value Range (Representational) Label 
-1 to -2 Low surveillance 
-2 to -3 Low medium surveillance 
-3 to -4 High medium surveillance 
-4 to -5 High surveillance 
-5 to -6 Very high surveillance 
-6 to -7 Total surveillance 
 
It is also possible that further testing of the positive privacy states will indicate a concern 
with the use of varying nomenclature to describe each value set.  In particular, this may 




Consistent with Popper’s notion of falsifiability we welcome these results and consider a 
similar model to Table 26 possible to adapt to the positive threshold across all 9 
(positive) privacy states. 
8.2. Refining the Model 
The model itself bears further scrutiny and testing.  In particular, how aggregation 
changes the privacy state poses some deeper questions.  Additional factor sets should 
be also considered.  Some tweaking of the calculation algorithm is required as the 
model evolves.  Other computational models could bring to bear some features to the 
formal model.   
8.2.1. The Special Case of Aggregation 
The state of privacy might change without a user releasing sensitive information. The 
aggregation of non-sensitive information may result in information that may impact the 
subject’s state of privacy. “How data is evaluated?” is a question that is hard to answer 
since data value changes over time and specifically when aggregated together. This 
issue can be addressed by taking into consideration the history of factors when 
calculating the next privacy state and not just relying on a single factor by itself.  
If other information is released on top of the transition state then it moves forward to a 
lower state of privacy. For example, knowing the geographic location of a subject may 
impact the user’s privacy, but not as much as knowing the geographic location as well as 
the time they spent at that location and what stores, hospitals, companies are located at 
that location. The aggregation of data about a subject even when released separately 
may impact privacy resulting in knowledge of identity and other personal information. 
Omoronyia, et al. proposes adaptive privacy using Privacy Awareness Requirements 
(PAR), which addresses the issue of past information to predict new information about a 
subject, which impacts on the privacy of a user (e.g., knowing running start time plus 
end time as well as the distance results in inferring the average speed of a user, and 




This may take into consideration the history of factors as well as the ability to infer 
information that impacts the privacy of a user (Omoronyia et al., 2013). 
8.2.2. Additional Factor Sets 
Other factors for the calculation of privacy may be regional, based on local laws or 
customs.  Cultural notions of privacy also bear consideration, specifically beyond the 
traditional juxtaposition of ‘East’ and ‘West’ (Capurro, 2005).  Further to that notion and 
in order to address broader privacy notions, e.g., beyond personal information 
protection or privacy legislation, an ethical rule set could also be considered.  Two 
particular sets that were considered in earlier versions of this work related to patterns 
of decision making and regulatory guidance or orders.   
8.2.2.1. Human Factors 
Years of research in sociology tells us that people need non-verbal cues for social 
interaction.  There are a number of questions that individuals will consider when making 
decisions on voluntary information disclosure, or reducing their own state of privacy as 
presented.  Not all of these will apply to each decision a data subject makes about their 
privacy.  In some cases, they will overlap or be irrelevant.  It is possible, if not likely, that 
the majority of these choices are made sub-consciously.  Some may be represented by 
crisp logic, but others may require fuzzy logic techniques for calculations. 
This work was based largely on Schwartz’s concepts of privacy in social psychology 
(Schwartz, 1968).  An introductory notion of these factors could look something like 
Table 27. 
Table 27: Human Factors for Calculating Privacy 
Factor Type Consideration Response 
Object What is the subject matter of the PI requested? Free Text 
Appearance Of the self, of others by the data subject Free Text 






Factor Type Consideration Response 
Information 
Control 
Does the data subject have control over what information is 
disclosed? 
Binary 
Audience Control Who and how many other people (audiences) are present at the 
time of disclosure? 
Ordinaln 
Access Control Who and how many other people (audiences) may have access 
to the information after disclosure? 
Ordinal 
Discretion Is it possible for the data subject to exercise any discretion? Binary 
Established Roles Does each party present have a clear and understood role? Binary 
Social Status What is the social status of the person requesting information 
disclosure? 
Ordinal 
Common Bonds Do the data subject and requestor have an existing 
relationship? 
Binary 
Social Structure Is the relationship between the data subject and requestor 
subject to an existing social structure? 
Binary 
Social Condition What is the social situation surrounding the request for 
information?   
Binary 
Ritual Type What are the rules for the social situation? Ordinal 
Authority Are the requestors and / or observers authority figures to the 
data subject? 
Binary 
Visibility Does the information disclosure happen in a defined physical 
space? 
Binary 
Expectations Does the data subject have an absence of the expectation of 
privacy in some form?   
Binary 
 
Several of these factor types have already undergone research or analysis by other 
researchers in some form.  For example, the notion of social status, social structure and 
condition as well as ritual types are effectively the foundation of the theory of privacy in 
context ( Nissenbaum, 2009, 2011). 
The notion of visibility and expectations are particularly of interest in considering online 
data disclosures.  Using a computer alone in a room may well change the way a data 
subject makes decisions about disclosing information, as opposed to using a computer 
                                                     
n This may or may not be possible to calculate, for example, in a digital networked environment the 




in a lab or other communitarian type setting.  This suggests that computational research 
on information privacy, or online privacy is remiss not only in considering the data 
subject, but also other privacy profiles for physical and territorial privacy as a factor for 
decision making in the informational privacy realm. 
8.2.2.2. Enforcement Factors 
Privacy enforcement is typically assigned in accordance with geographic boundaries; 
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) can have a right to audit and / or investigate 
independently, or may be offered those abilities after a compliant has been filed.  
Decisions made about complaints, audits or investigations may be called ‘orders’ or 
‘findings’.  These are different from case law.  Depending on jurisdiction and authority, 
the DPA may or may not be bound to comply with past guidance provided on the same 
sections of the legislation. 
Earlier versions of this work examined the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada’s enforcement of PIPEDA as presented in Findings.  The findings factor set 
contained several categories found in findings as published, outlined in Table 28. 
Table 28: Enforcement Factors Calculating Privacy 
Factor Type Consideration Response Options 
Industry  Industry classification and applicability of finding Checkbox from Industry Canada 
industry classification list 
Service  What kind of service was provided to the data 
subject? 
Checkbox from Industry Canada 
services classification list 
Medium  Was the format of the PI electronic or paper? Binary 
Collection  Was the collection of the PI direct or indirect? Binary 
Sharing  Was the PI shared and / or disclosed beyond the 
initial collecting organization? 
Binary 
Consent  Was consent of the data subject obtained? Binary 
Principle  What sections of the Act were considered in 
issuing the finding? 
Ordinal (1-10, plus subsections) 
Action  What actions were taken by the organization that 
are at issue by the complainant? 






This factor set, similar to the legislation factors listed in 5, would necessarily change 
depending on the geography of the data subject.   
8.2.2.3. Exceptions in Existing Legislation 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we account for legal rules in respect of collection, use and 
disclosure.  However, most privacy legislation also contains broad exceptions to the 
rules that further complicate the decision tables required to support the model.  The 
formal model may ultimately be limited in its capacity to deal with these exceptions, for 
example, where a national security requirement for disclosure remains secret.  An area 
for future work is to document such exceptions, and perhaps eventually determine the 
probability of such a disclosure in respect of a particular personal information disclosure 
with a given organization based on published transparency reports. 
8.2.2.4. ‘Real’ Compliance Factors 
We account for the legal rules as a factor set, and we suggest a mechanism for 
considering enforcement factors once an order or investigation is completed by a data 
protection authority.  How could a data subject be assured that the organization has 
met its compliance obligations?  It is possible that a third party certification may be used 
in some jurisdictions to ‘pass’ organizations and certify their compliance with legal rules 
prior to any enforcement order.  This may also include attestations or audits.  It could 
eventually incorporate a code review for appropriate metadata tagging on all personal 
information (Jiang & Landay, 2002).  Any or all such policy compliance documents could 
be translated in to factor sets for compliance on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis using 
existing deontic logic models or taxonomies (Antón, Earp, & Reese, 2002). 
8.2.3. Calculations 
Acknowledging that the calculation of privacy has some indeterminacy, weighting of the 
factors is still a valuable exercise.  Once completely identified, it is likely the factors do 
not modify the state of privacy in equal ways for each data subject.  Using probability 




approximate the privacy states.   Assuming the system states are fully observable a 
Markov property may be useful.  Where the state depends only on current (or starting 
state) the Markov chain might prove useful to represent movement from one state to 
another based on factor set changes independent of previous calculations.  In addition, 
where the calculation of privacy yields a result on the cusp of one state, a probability 
technique could also be used to select the ‘right’ state.   
8.2.4. Other Computational Models 
A finite state machine model is deterministic, which is to say it requires a 
comprehensive data set to be finitely defined for computing purposes.  This type of 
model can also incorporate other aspects of computing models that may be useful to 
support calculations and interfaces, including a decision support system (DSS) and / or 
an artificial neural network (ANN).  A brief discussion of these possibilities is included 
here. 
Ultimately, a system based on the FSM model can incorporate some of the DSS 
mechanisms by recommending what the data subject can do to change from an 
unacceptable state (decided by the system, for example, non-compliance, or decided by 
the data subject) to an acceptable state.  It can also incorporate aspects of AI techniques 
that utilize probability mechanisms to consider choices the user will make in a given 
system (within the confines of their legal ability to do so using the consent 
mechanisms). 
A mixed model also easily allows for code for an agent that can behave on behalf of a 
data subject, adding a key dimension to the privacy state.  An FSM based agent listens, 
analyzes the current state of the user and makes recommendations for corrective 
action.  In some services, for example, networks, the agent could be location aware and 
adjust as the data subject changes service providers.  A more sophisticated agent could 
also make recommendations based on environmental scanning and provide individual 
notifications.  Such an agent can be coded to provide a high level description of the 




8.2.4.1. Decision Support Systems 
A DSS model is the simplest way to represent privacy, serving only to support decision-
making on privacy.  It necessarily includes a software-based system intended to compile 
useful information from raw data.  The intended users of the system can be individuals 
or organizations.  The DSS model is based on the compliance based notion of privacy, 
outlined in Figure 76. 
 
Figure 76: Theoretical Application of a DSS to Computing Privacy 
In this model, the core data set changes frequently and forces decisions on privacy as a 
user travels through multiple jurisdictions.  While this representation of privacy cannot 
consider data subject choices (e.g., consent preferences), it is a relatively 
straightforward mechanism to program and could be useful in representing 
organizational compliance as a factor set as represented in privacy impact assessments 
(PIAs).  This presumes that an organization has completed a PIA or similar assessment, 
and that it is an accurate reflection of the state of compliance, which may in itself 












8.2.4.2. Artificial Neural Networks 
The term artificial neural network (ANN) refers to a model that attempts to simulate 
human neural functions; its primary function would be for the data subject in this case.   
ANNs function as interconnected groups of programming constructs that use a 
connectionist approach (a model of biological behavioural phenomena of neurons) to 
computation.  There at least two kinds of network structures within the ANN: feed-
forward networks (acyclic) and recurrent networks (cyclic).  Recurrent networks 
function more like the human brain, because they feed their own outputs back as 
inputs; in essence, they can ‘learn’ by short-term memory.  Feed-forward networks are 
less complex, and function only on the current input.   
Artificial neurons (as biological ones) require an input and output.  Inputs for privacy are 
pre-defined and finite, although they may change depending on the legislative 
framework.  The output is simply to identify whether the data subject is protected by 
legislation or not based on mimicking human deduction.  A feedback loop (not shown) 
allows for the data subject to adjust their decisions (previously unknown) and the 
system to accurately reflect the consequences of the choice.  Independent probabilities 
are used to teach the computer in this model to accurately represent privacy.  ANN 
models use strong artificial intelligence techniques intended to create or mimic human 
intelligence in machines.  This kind of privacy representation would include the hidden 
probabilistic element of the data subjects’ own choices.  The importance of this variable 
depends on the legislative regime.  Figure 77 demonstrates how an ANN model (by 





Figure 77: Theoretical Application of an ANN to Computing Privacy 
Most Western countries rely heavily on consent mechanisms to enable private sector 
privacy in information systems; comparably most of the legislation includes mandatory 
non-consensual disclosures that override any stated preference.  A second difficulty 
with using an ANN to represent privacy is the impossibility of knowing how it will work. 
Ultimately, no model can explain why a person made a choice.  The net cannot explain 
how it came to a recommendation, but that is different.  ANNs are statistical methods; a 
detailed examination of the nodes may make it possible to gain more insight, in 
particular by using probabilistic uncertainty to anticipate the data subject’s choices / 
behaviour. 
8.3. Revisiting a Mobile Application 
Our ‘mobile application’ was a web demo intended to examine the feasibility of 
usefulness of an applied formal model for privacy.  An actual mobile application could 
















subject’s information can be tricky.  While privacy rules and obligations apply to service 
providers, a more complex question is how to apply the data subject’s rights and 
preferences at the data level across multiple services in a networked computing 
environment.  In theory, each data subject’s data would be wrapped in a container that 
included their own privacy expectations and norms.  A mobile application can be 
expanded to incorporate the definition of policies related to the management of each 
user’s PI.  In the cloud environment, it would be possible for the app to represent these 
preferences in policy format to each subsequent application at the transaction level. 
In current technology, wrapping user-generated content with additional metadata on 
preferences for management would have to be done at the application layer.  In future, 
it may be possible for these types of preferences to be managed across a networked 
environment (such as the cloud) so that the rules of each geography apply to the data 
subject’s PI.  For example, the application could negotiate (based on user privacy 
preferences set in the application) with service providers individual privacy settings for 
each transaction.  As personal information travelled around the network, the data 
subject’s rights and preferences – regardless of server location – could be respected as it 
applies to the personal information itself. 
Such work has already begun.  Essentially building on the notion of trust agent 
articulated by Marsh, one of the projects proposes storage and disclosure of personal 
information in accordance with data subject’s instructions by an intelligent web-based 
agent (Tomko, Borrett, Kwan, & Steffan, 2009).  Notably, there are challenges to this 
approach including the computational burden of a large number of different requests 
for personal information (Tomko, 2013).  Other challenges, such as teaching agents to 
learn to behave in unstructured situations are already addressed by Marsh (1994).  A 
mobile app such as we propose could be integrated in to such proposals in two ways.  
First, the privacy theory that we developed allows for standardized protocols for 
referring to privacy across organizations ensuring that given the same factors and 
contexts the level of privacy remains the same for different individuals.  Second, our 




of their personal information to embed meaning in to the instructions presented to 
web-based agents. 
8.3.1. Managing Consent Preferences  
Consent preferences expressed by data subjects as allowed by privacy legislation 
represent the rules for collection, use and disclosure of personal information.  
Depending on the legislation, the consent may be more or less detailed, written or oral, 
or subject to a variety of other applicability requirements.  Rather than attempting to 
reference all possible combinations of consent in an application of the formal model, we 
utilize privacy profiles to create user preferences.  For example, a pragmatist profile may 
receive more prompts to consent to a permitted disclosure than an unconcerned 
privacy profile who may set a wider ranging consent for any permitted disclosures as 
demonstrated in Table 29. 
Table 29: Managing Consent Preferences in a Mobile Application 
Options Fundamentalist Pragmatist Unconcerned 
“Yes” Disclose Disclose Disclose 
“Consent” Prompt (1) Disclose for collection 
Prompt (1) for use 
Prompt (1) for disclosure 
Disclose 
“No” No disclosure No disclosure No disclosure 
“Authority” Prompt (2) Disclose Disclose 
 
Prompt (1) is an opportunity to invite the data subject to provide a consent for the 
collection, use or disclosure of their personal information, while prompt (2) would invite 
the data subject to challenge the authority of the request.  In other cases, the personal 
information would be disclosed or not disclosed as permitted / required by law but 
mapping against the data subject’s privacy preferences.  As Table 29 demonstrates, the 
data subject’s profile could determine how many prompts they might receive as their 




8.3.2. Summary and Exceptions Tracking 
A summary screen at the end of the day can be presented to the user to inform as to 
how much personal information they have disclosed and to whom throughout the day.  
Track exceptions to consent; ‘you’re consistently overriding recommendations; do you 
want to change your preferences?’  A prompt can be developed to help the user 
understand when a disclosure of personal information may be ‘lawful’ but risky. 
8.3.3. Harm and Risk 
Privacy is often approached from the perspective of harm (Calo, 2011; Kotz, 2011; 
Ludington, 2006; Solove, 2005).  Harms may be financial, as in the case of identity theft.  
They may be emotional, as in the case of previously private affair becoming publicly 
known.  They may be physical, in the case of medical identity theft resulting in 
erroneous treatment.  Some of the forms of redress to these harms invoke legal 
solutions, others technical.  Use of the formal model suggests a blend of both, which 
could also be used to anticipate harm over time.   
Recall one of the practitioner tools described in Section 4.2, the privacy risk assessment.  
In its current form, the risk assessment is intended for use by organizations to judge the 
potential risk to the organization in compliance practices associated with collection, use 
and / or disclosure of data subject personal information (American Institute of 
Chartered Professional Accountants (ACIPA/CIPA), n.d.-b).  The privacy impact 
assessment, on the other hand, is intended for use by organizations to judge the 
potential impact on the privacy of data subjects’ in respect of a given product or service 
(Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2010).  Following on the notion of third party 
certifications, it could be possible for a blend of these assessments to provide context 
for the use of the formal model in a mobile application.   
Recall the demo utilized in our applicability survey.  Participants are made aware of the 
results of the formal model for privacy, and our first goal is transparency of that process 
to reintroduce the non-verbal cues missing from electronic and online personal 




what?’  We will need to demonstrate the impact of that change.  We will further need to 
suggest a recommendation, an alternative or a non-disclosure perhaps, as a result of 
both the harm and possibly in consideration of the user’s privacy preferences.   
 
Figure 78: Screenshot of 'Results' 
Building on a taxonomy of harm similar to (Calo, 2011; Solove, 2005) we could place 
these results in context for the user.  Perhaps in this case, moving from private to 
unidentified yields no harm.  Perhaps in another case, such a move might yield a 
significant harm as a result of a factor change in legal rules or types of information 
management services in use in a computing system.  In the latter, the same seemingly 
innocuous personal information resulting in the ‘unidentified’ privacy state could have a 
more substantial impact or pose a specific harm that is not under consideration or 
identified. 
8.4. Other Uses 
The formal model could potentially be embedded in to other applications.  Plugins for 
browsers such as Lightbeam use visualizations to display first and third party sites that a 
user has interacted with as they browse the Internet.  Social media sites, intended for 





The formal model could be visualized using a browser plugin, add-on or extension.  It 
could also function akin to a password strength indicator.  Privacy Bird is another tool 
that is readily available to build on.  Unlike these tools, the formal model allows for 
continuous ongoing representation of the personal information disclosure.  It could be 
presented to the user in a privacy engine, toolbar or image that tracks everything a data 
subject has disclosed on a given website, and adapt in real time to display a cumulative 
privacy state.  Noting the design concerns of security alerts (Devdatta, 2013), the model 
could rather be a dynamic display built in to an existing browser platform. 
8.4.2. Social Media 
Social network sites (SNS) may have a unique contribution in calculating privacy that 
requires more attention.  The concept of social media nodes describe to whom personal 
information is sent, and how likely it is to be shared and with whom by considering node 
connectivity, shared information type and the traffic each node produces.  Building on 
transitivity (Section 7.4) the formal model provides a basis for integration of a tool to a 
social media platform where I share with you, and you share with another friend.  
Calculating the state by following my original personal information disclosure through 
any subsequent disclosures could be done using the prescribed factors in Section 5.5.  
Making transparent the ability of information to travel across networks may also help 
the user learn about connectivity.  For example, using Rogers’ 5 stages of innovation 
diffusion can help to design the model outputs to most efficiently move the data subject 
towards a specific privacy enhancing outcome (Rogers, 2010). 
8.5. Changing Practitioner Models 
We identify and evaluate four practitioner tools in Chapter 4, including privacy risk 
assessments, audits, maturity models and impact assessments.  As with any tool, each 
has its own benefits and drawbacks.  The formal model for privacy presents an 
opportunity to refocus privacy enforcement on the data subject.  To elaborate, the 
mobile application we test in Chapter 6 and further refined in Section 8.3 is intended to 




have a 1:1 conversation with each data subject via a consent mechanism to enable 
compliance.  Rather, the formal model enables a 1:many approach.  The organization 
may attest to compliance via a third party, public statement or shared code depending 
on their level of sophistication.  The factor set in the model is enabled to embrace the 
rule set, assume compliance and assign a privacy state based on the combination of 
those and other factors.  Once a single organization for each rule set has done this work, 
it can provide a model for all others to adopt and a template for the application to 
consume. 
8.6. Related Domains 
The model can also work to help identify and provide clarity where related concepts 
meet, challenges some existing assumptions about privacy in other domains identified 
by the formal model, and identifies some new opportunities presented by the formal 
model for engagement. 
8.6.1. Privacy and Security 
The model highlights the distinction between allowing physical access to point in time 
documents when travelling through customs and allowing customs agent full access to 
the entirety of the data subjects’ traveling record and identity information.   
Note the data subject does not begin in a state of private, as it is presumed they are 


























Figure 79: Applying the Formal Model to Security 
In regard to the legislative rule set in particular in Table 30, there is no specific 
legislation listed here as it would depend on which border crossing the data subject was 
traversing.   
Table 30: Step-by-Step Application 






Action PI Type Recipient Info Mgmt. 
Service 
End State 
Anonymity * Data 
Subject 








Masked * Data 
Subject 














Confidential * Data 
Subject 



























The formal model for privacy demonstrates how privacy and security can result in a zero 
sum game.  Moreover, by discretely identifying the personal information disclosure 
process and describing factor sets individually, the model allows for a transparent 
discussion on the balance between privacy and security.  It further allows for 
contextually consideration, suggesting that the balance may be more discrete in the 
context of electronic and online personal information disclosures.  Any additional 
accessibility to personal information by the recipient in this example would effectively 
move the data subject from a privacy state of 8 to 9, effectively rendering them both 
physically and digitally naked. 
8.6.2. Physical Privacy 
The formal model can similarly illustrate privacy in physical spaces, as demonstrated in 
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Figure 80: Physical Privacy 
The figure is explained in Table 31. 
Table 31: Step-by-Step Application 






Action PI Type Recipient Info Mgmt. 
Service 
End State 
Identified None Data 
Subject 







This applicability is a promising indicator that the formal model may have achieved the 
goal of unifying consideration of physical, territorial and informational aspects of privacy 
(described in Chapter 1) subject to further testing. 
8.6.3. Surveillance Art 
In consideration of critical social practice offered by surveillance artists, among others, 
the formal model may be able to assist artists and their sponsors in setting expectations 
with data subjects who participate in artistic projects by walking through the steps of 
personal information disclosures.  This comes at a time when a critical eye is turning 
towards artistic endeavors that invade traditional privacy norms.  Most recently, there 
was a short film produced by two directors using a drone to film actors having sex on a 
rooftop in Brooklyn.  Although it was staged, it brought to bear a social conversation 
about the potential use of drones and how they may capture our data.  Unlike 
traditional surveillance cameras that usually identify an owner (e.g., the camera I am 
holding while I record a video, or the name on the building on which the surveillance 
camera is mounted) drones do not clearly identify who the owners are by virtue of 
being.  Another example is Heather Dewey-Hagborg’s portraiture of DNA samples from 
discarded hair, cigarettes and gum that she collected.  Other artists deliberately use 
surveillance tactics themselves, Conversnitch is a project that tweets overhead 
conversations collected from an eavesdropping device placed in public spaces.  These 
examples, and many others, raise the question of whether this type of art is ‘fair game’ 
(Maass, 2014).   
The formal model for privacy could help level the playing field.  If, for example, artists 
utilized the model to identify the various types of personal information and sources for 
their projects to understand the impact on the data subject’s privacy, they may make 
different decisions.  In any case, the model makes visible the impact of such work 
through the use of the factor sets.  Such artwork is a valuable social commentary and 
the model may address some of the growing privacy concerns over its contribution to 





This work is not complete.  Neither the formal model for privacy, the privacy theory, nor 
the ways in which the use of privacy might be applicable to other fields.  It is in 
development, and should continue to be (Popper, 1967).  Privacy, like trust, should be 
extant in any computing system that includes personal information.   






Privacy may be a key indicator of the health of our democracy.   Global warming, climate 
change, wars, famine are all complex systems that cross international boundaries.  
Normal notions of sovereignty cannot be used to bind these problems, just as they 
cannot be relied on to address a human right to privacy.  Computing, like climate, is 
simply not easily bounded by geography.  Computing changes not only our ‘human to 
human’ communication mechanisms, but also the historical balance of power between 
organizations and people.  Power rests with those who have computing power, better 
algorithms and the fastest network access.  Personal information is a commodity, and 
individuals simply cannot collect, use or even disclose it about themselves on the same 
scale as an organization. 
9.1. A Brief Review of the Early Chapters 
The thesis began in Chapter 1 with a framework for referring to privacy intended to 
incorporate each of the physical, territorial and informational aspects, to set up a brief 
interdisciplinary overview of privacy markers across scholarly and non-scholarly work.  It 
presented a list of privacy themed movies and novels each of which delight in exploring 
the boundary of technology versus privacy.  Against this colourful backdrop, we peeked 
at the notion of an interdisciplinary formal model for privacy and jumped immediately 
to conclude that a failure to do so would still be a success; as it would disprove many of 
the current attempts to incorporate privacy in computing systems to date. 
Aside from the formal model itself and corresponding observations (Chapter 7), we 
summarized an additional 5 core contributions this thesis has made.  First, we have 
created the first framework from information management principles to classify 
computing services.  This framework allows for privacy scholars from any discipline to 
view advances in technology not from the lens of the technologist, but the same core 
privacy impacting activities.  For example, as drones use multiplies, we need not 
examine the drones themselves but merely see them as another tool for personal 




computing device that collects personal information.  In order to assess the privacy 
impact of a new technology then, we might only ask does it include archiving, backup, 
hosting, messaging, registration, software or website / portal services?  These core 
functions tell us much about the privacy impact of the technology itself.   
Second, we evaluated several computational models in respect of representing 
historically social science concepts.  Finite state machines, artificial neural networks and 
decision support systems were examined in the process of developing the formal model 
to see if they could adopt characteristics of privacy.  Similarly, a comprehensive 
literature review of privacy across disciplines is particularly helpful in understanding 
how privacy is represented and implemented by computer scientists across domains, 
correctly and incorrectly, and what we might learn from each.  Beyond a traditional 
literature review, the thesis also incorporated a review and evaluation of privacy 
practitioner tools.  Our research study of Ontario hospitals provides proof that it is not 
common organizational practice for healthcare organizations to conduct any privacy 
impacting assessment of technology (see Appendix B, Chapter 12).   
Finally, we established thresholds for privacy both negative and positive that allow for 
dynamicity in a system.  The overview of these contributions paves the way for Chapter 
2 and a discussion of our methodology.  We set up our model and theory for privacy 
based on scientific principles and representational measurement, and acknowledge 
flaws in both.  The notion of assigning values is highly subjective and privacy 
practitioners themselves struggle with definitional concerns about privacy and 
identifiability.  Far from presenting problems, these present opportunities for the formal 
model to be tested robustly.  Chapter 3 outlines the problem statement further, positing 
that privacy is an important concept in which we have a vested interest.  The myriad of 
laws that exist create complexity in managing that interest, and organizations generally 
do not understand how to apply these requirements in a meaningful way.  Individuals 
are no different, as privacy requires some educative component for decision-making.  
Regulators (using Ontario as a case study) are growing active in enforcement patterns 




own to collect and store personal information grows.  Workable models can exist, we 
argue, by examining the successes and failures of those who have gone before us and 
the practitioner toolset. 
Chapter 4 is a robust literature review and stands alone as a contribution.  We examined 
policy and ontological representation of privacy.  We examined privacy architectures in 
specific products and systems, applied techniques for online privacy and location based 
privacy specifications.  We examined privacy domain specific research on privacy 
interests, data subject activity and identifiability.  Finally, we examined artificial 
intelligence techniques in health information management, user adaptive expert 
systems and decision support systems that could be applied to privacy.  In the 
practitioner space, we examined privacy impact assessments, privacy audits, privacy 
maturity models and privacy risk assessments.  From this extensive review, we gathered 
requirements and proposed our formal model. 
9.2. The Formal Model 
The purpose of the formal model for privacy to inform debate on the subject.  It is 
implementable, and provides a framework for others to use as a basis for 
implementation in their own disciplines and models.  The theory of privacy extends 
across traditional norms and boundaries to take into account further work in the area.  
To date, privacy research and debate suffers because of the lack of common definitions, 
language or methods.  The formal model presents a means for establishing precision 
building on the formal model for trust (Marsh, 1994).  Similarly, it may be impossible to 
finitely define the process by which people make personal information disclosure 
decisions, however we can identify a close approximation.  Chapter 5 presents the 
methodology that allows this work to be carried out by using a finite state machine 
model.  We further expand on Westin’s original four states of privacy.  We define 
transitions, and how to compute these from state to state.  Finally, we identify five 
factor sets to utilize as a model for calculating these states intended to provide a close 




is incomplete, and propose additional factor sets in the future work Chapter to further 
elucidate the work. 
The observations described in Chapter 7 further support the applicability of the formal 
model to scholarship and debate on privacy.  The language of the model and its 
behaviour confirmed some of what we already know about privacy, for example, that it 
is contextual.  The use of the model also provided several new privacy behaviour 
characteristics, for example, demonstrating the transitivity of privacy. 
9.3. Implementation 
The formalisation itself is implementable and that is the major contribution of this 
thesis.  It provides a tool for researchers and practitioners to discuss privacy in a 
comparable way, to set aside the nuances of discipline specific definitions and make 
progress.  Based on representative measurement using simple mathematics, it can also 
be used by computing systems to easily calculate any number of factor sets or options 
that may be possible under any legislative rule set in any conceivable context.  Chapter 6 
describes how we tested the implementation, and the feedback we received from 
research participants demonstrating the usefulness and need for such a model in 
practical decision-making. 
9.4. Future Work 
The formal model for privacy is itself impactful on the discipline of computing science, 
particularly in consideration of the ability to unify cross-domain research within the 
discipline.  We examine several ways in which the methodology, model and a mobile 
application may be refined and revisited to enhance this contribution further.  However, 
it is also of importance in consideration in other areas.  Chapter 8 explores these in 
greater detail, incorporating both ways the formal model may be applied to other 
disciplines and how observations about privacy gained from the use of the model may 




9.5. General Conclusions 
The utility of the formal model for privacy is that it is simple, which lends itself to 
implementation.  There are general limitations from the model that we acknowledge, 
not the least of which is that the consideration of the human factors in decision making 
on privacy may be opaque to us until such time as we are readily able to see and 
understand inside the human brain as it decides.  Until such time, we have created a 
model that will provide the emotional brain with a rational data point for making 
decisions on privacy.  Simple implementations were presented in great detail in Chapter 
5 and experimentation conducted in Chapter 6. 
The formalism and theory of privacy are beneficial to computer science because they 
clarify the concepts, definitions and the discussion of privacy.  It develops a new way to 
use computing models to describe some of the interdisciplinary markers of privacy.  It 
meets Popper’s recommendations for scientific theories in that it is falsifiable and 
circumscribes its domain.   
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11. Appendix A: Legal Definitions of Privacy in Ontario 
Privacy legislation sets out definitions for personal information, personal health 
information and applicable roles for each actor.  Personal health information can, in 
some sense, be considered a subset of personal information although legislation treats 
them as separate data types.   
The Privacy Act, the oldest privacy legislation in Canada applicable in Ontario had a 
detailed definition of PI, notably applicable to records in ‘any form’, including the 
following content types (Department of Justice Canada, 1985): 
(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, age or marital status of the individual, (b) information relating to 
the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the 
individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the 
individual has been involved, (c) any identifying number, symbol or other 
particular assigned to the individual, (d) the address, fingerprints or blood 
type of the individual, (e) the personal opinions or views of the individual 
except where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a 
grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual by a 
government institution or a part of a government institution specified in 
the regulations, (f) correspondence sent to a government institution by 
the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential 
nature, and replies to such correspondence that would reveal the 
contents of the original correspondence, (g) the views or opinions of 
another individual about the individual, (h) the views or opinions of 
another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be 
made to the individual by an institution or a part of an institution referred 
to in paragraph (e), but excluding the name of the other individual where 
it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual, and (i) the 




relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would 
reveal information about the individual. 
FIPPA and MFIPPA both bounded the definition similarly, using the terminology 
‘recorded’ and ‘identifiable’, but also expanded it to include sexual orientation (Ministry 
of Government Services, 1990a, 1990b).    
(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the 
individual, (b) information relating to the education or the medical, 
psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the 
individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the 
individual has been involved, (c) any identifying number, symbol or other 
particular assigned to the individual, (d) the address, telephone number, 
fingerprints or blood type of the individual, (e) the personal opinions or 
views of the individual except where they relate to another individual, (f) 
correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or 
explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that 
correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original 
correspondence, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the 
individual, and (h) the individual’s name where it appears with other 
personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of 
the name would reveal other personal information about the individual. 
PIPEDA’s definition of personal information is significantly less detailed and open to 
interpretation, including the similar terms of ‘identifiable’ but disregarding the use of 
‘recorded’.   
PHIPA specified the definition of personal health information to the healthcare context 
and certain organizations (health information custodians), and further clarified recorded 




(a) relates to the physical or mental health of the individual, including 
information that consists of the health history of the individual’s family, 
(b) relates to the providing of health care to the individual, including the 
identification of a person as a provider of health care to the individual, (c) 
is a plan of service within the meaning of the Home Care and Community 
Services Act, 1994 for the individual, (d) relates to payments or eligibility 
for health care, or eligibility for coverage for health care, in respect of the 
individual, (e) relates to the donation by the individual of any body part or 
bodily substance of the individual or is derived from the testing or 
examination of any such body part or bodily substance, (f) is the 






12. Appendix B: Use of Existing Tools 
We designed a study to explore the assertion that organizations are not meeting their 
privacy obligations.o  This research project was intended to test multiple organizational 
ability to identify software in their environment that may have a privacy impact.  
Further, it also tested whether organizations were meeting their legal obligations by 
conducting privacy impact assessments (PIA), and related, whether those PIAs were 
done with any consistency across organizations.  The former was intended to determine 
whether obligations were met, the latter whether organizations were meeting those 
obligations with any kind of rigor.  
As a result of the legislative environment, there were limitations on population that 
could be selected for sampling.  The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act (FIPPA) empowers individuals to obtain access to government information using the 
Freedom of Information (FOI) provisions.  In addition, the Personal Health Information 
Protection Act (PHIPA) is the only statute that specifically requires organizations subject 
to the Act to undertake specific privacy assessments to evaluate the impact to data 
subjects (in this case, patient populations receiving services).  To examine current 
practices it was necessary to identify a population of organizations that were subject to 
FIPPA’s FOI disclosure provisions as well as PHIPA’s assessment requirements.   
12.1. Participants 
The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (MOHLTC) is the provincial Government 
Ministry tasked with managing the public health care system in the province.  In 
addition to its stewardship role, the Ministry is responsible for (Ministry of Health and 
Long Term Care, 2013a): 
• Establishing overall strategic direction and provincial priorities for the health 
system; 
                                                     




• Developing legislation, regulations, standards, policies, and directives to support 
those strategic directions; 
• Monitoring and reporting on the performance of the health system and the 
health of Ontarians;  
• Planning for and establishing funding models and levels of funding for the health 
care system;  
• Ensuring that ministry and system strategic directions and expectations are 
fulfilled.  
The Ministry also classifies hospitals: public, private and specialty psychiatric facilities.  
They are governed by different legislation.  For example, public hospitals are governed 
by the Public Hospitals Act (and supporting regulations).  Private hospitals are covered 
by the Private Hospitals Act and the Mental Health Act addresses psychiatric facilities 
(among other requirements for mental health services (Ministry of Health and Long 
Term Care, 2013b)). 
Conveniently on January 1, 2012 Ontario General Hospitals became subject to FIPPA.  
This extension of FIPPA to hospitals is a result of the Broader Public Sector 
Accountability Act, 2010, which received Royal Assent on December 10, 2010. In line 
with the other aspects of that Act, the provincial government anticipates that FIPPA will 
help to increase the transparency and accountability of the hospital system.  FIPPA came 
into effect in 1988, and initially applied to the provincial government and approximately 
200 public institutions. Since that time, freedom of information and protection of 
privacy obligations have been extended to numerous other publicly-funded institutions.  
By extending FIPPA to hospitals, Ontario is aligning itself with many other Canadian 
provinces (including British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec), 
where public hospitals (or the regional health authorities that operate them) are already 




Freedom of information (FOI) is a right of citizens to access Government held 
information.  In Ontario, this right extends to any institution listed in the regulations 
under FIPPA and MFIPPA.  The FOI process is well established in law and precedent, and 
adjudicated by the Information and Privacy Commissioner / Ontario.   
Participants were selected thusly based on three criteria: (a) listed as a publicly funded 
hospital on the MOHLTC website under the Public Hospitals Act and (b) subject to FIPPA.  
This resulted in a total of 153 hospitals and two provincial agencies (Cancer Care Ontario 
and eHealth Ontario).   
12.2. Methodology 
The Ministry of Government Services, which administers FIPPA in Ontario, outlines the 






Figure 81: Screenshot from the Ministry of Government Services Website 
Two sets of records were identified as relevant for the research.  PHIPA requires Health 
Information Custodians (HICs), or more generally hospitals and other healthcare 
providing organizations, to properly maintain patient records.  Specifically, 
13.  (1)  A health information custodian shall ensure that the records of 
personal health information that it has in its custody or under its control 
are retained, transferred and disposed of in a secure manner and in 
accordance with the prescribed requirements, if any. 2004, c. 3, Sched. A, 




This section implies that in order to meet the privacy obligations set out in the Act, the 
healthcare organization should be able to identify and locate patient records.  The 
request therefore asked for records related to an inventory of software applications that 
collect, use and / or disclose data subject personal health information (PHI).  This same 
section also requires that organizations retain, transfer and dispose of patient health 
records in a secure manner. The Act further obligates hospitals to take reasonable steps 
to ensure protection against “theft, loss and unauthorized use or disclosure and to 
ensure that the records containing the information are protected against unauthorized 
copying, modification or disposal” (s.12(1) (Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 
2004)).   
In the regulations to the Act, there is a more detail.  Health Information Network 
Providers (HINPs) who provide electronic services to two or more hospitals, are required 
by section 6(3)5 to undertake specific assessments to address privacy and security 
concerns (Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2004). 
The provider shall perform, and provide to each applicable health 
information custodian a written copy of the results of, an assessment of 
the services provided to the health information custodians, with respect 
to, 
i. threats, vulnerabilities and risks to the security and integrity of the 
personal health information, and 
ii. how the services may affect the privacy of the individuals who are the 
subject of the information. 
The process for conducting an assessment to determine how the privacy of individuals 
may be affected is a privacy impact assessment (PIA) (Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, 2011).  The request therefore asked for any completed privacy 





FOI requests were sent by mail along with the required cheque for five dollars to each 
institution as required under FIPPA procedures.  A special note was included in each 
request to ask for communication by email for efficiency and record keeping purposes.  
The original FOI request is captured in Figure 82.p 
                                                     
p The ‘invalid signature’ is a protection mechanism that disallows adjustments to the e-signature provided 





Figure 82: Screenshot of the Original Request Letter 
12.4. Procedures 
The initial package (request letter and cheque) were mailed through Canada Post 
regular mail over the period of September and October 2012 to each of the 153 public 
hospitals listed on the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care as of August 2012.  Also 




Cancer Care Ontario, Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion and eHealth 
Ontario.   
Most organizations that responded sent paper mail replies over the November through 
December 2012 time period (142 letters received).  FIPPA requires a 30 day initial 
acknowledgement response to FOI requests, which may explain the number of letters 
received.  1 organization sent a letter in February 2013, while the remaining 
organizations either disregarded the request (8 organizations) or communicated entirely 
by email as requested (4 organizations).  
Email correspondence was done directly with the Researcher / Principle Investigator 
through the UOIT domain.q  Paper correspondence was generally mailed to the Faculty 
of Business and IT at UOIT’s north campus and subsequently forwarded to the 
Researcher’s home address for processing.  Correspondence did not contain any 
personal information, as the Researcher engaged with organizational staff through their 
work resources.  Documentation obtained through the FOI process did not contain any 
personal information; lists of software application and privacy impact assessments are 
limited to system, process and data types.  Responsive documents were received over 
2013 with the data collection period closing by December 2013. 
12.5. Observations 
Of the 156 FOI requests sent, 136 requests were completed.  5 were dropped because 
the fees requested were beyond our ability to pay, for example, eHealth Ontario sent 
back a fee estimate of 5000-8000k for the requested records.  7 were still in progress as 
of November 2013, 8 hospitals disregarded the request entirely.r  Figure 83 displays the 
results as percentage of total. 
                                                     
q All correspondence was retained and will be made available in the supporting research repository. 





Figure 83: Status of All Requests 
Of the 136 completed requests, 132 hospitals provided an inventory.  3 hospitals were 
unable to provide responsive records, and 1 was still in progress in developing the 
record as of November 2013.  Interestingly, these inventories generally focused on 
patient software, but also included administrative, security and other tools (for 
example, Skype).  Figure 84 summarizes the totals as percentages. 
 



















47 hospitals responded with a document called a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) of the 
136 completed requests.  69 reported completed no privacy assessments of any kind 
related to software recorded across the organization.  12 hospitals transferred requests 
to other institutions, 6 are still working to respond to the request as of November 2013.  
Notably, 1 institution denied the request entirely under the security exemption in FIPPA.  
These results are summarized in Figure 85. 
 
Figure 85: FOI Request Results on Part 2 
12.6. Analysis 
While 97% of hospitals were able to provide some sort of software inventory, there are 
no assurances that these are complete.  Some of the software listed, for example, 
Skype, could present a risk to the security of the network on which patient data is 
managed.  The majority of inventories included software clearly intended to managing 
patient data, yet only 35% of respondents were able to provide privacy impact 
assessments while several other hospitals transferred the requests to other 
organizations acting as service providers.  This suggests that (conservatively) at least 
51% of Ontario hospitals are using software to manage (in some respect) patient data 
and have not conducted any type of privacy impact assessment on the ability of the 














The privacy impact assessments that were provided by 35% of respondent varied wildly 
in terms of scope, application, findings and remediation plans.  There was no 
demonstrable evidence that the assessments are revisited consistently to update action 
plans as software changes or is upgraded.   
Finally, the privacy impact assessments were only available using the FOI mechanism.  
There is no visibility to data subjects of how their information in managed in a 
healthcare setting beyond the initial consent form, and certainly no demonstrable 
evidence of enforcement in conducting assessments.  For example, setting aside the 8 
hospitals that ignored the request entirely, there is no evidence from the Information 
and Privacy Commissioner / Ontario’s office of proactive enforcement of PHIPA (despite 
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